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One of today major problems of public administration – defense system of the state and planning of herstrategy. Sucha situation is, because too small attention was paid for it in literature of public administration, like aspecific problem that belong to sector of public administration. This problem often is solved only in military aspect,and is hold as a part of military defense system. There are not enough competitive specialist and experts who wouldunderstand sucha problem and would take part solving it as well.It is very important to understand, that defense system is systematic objekt and all problematic should betaken as a whole system that integrate and accumulate different, even opposite elements. Spectrum of methods isvery wide, and amount is very large, and for realization well-organized and effective management should be involved.Effectiveness of defense system depends on ability to use all possible resources that are in the state. That is whydefense system and control of he implementation should belong to public administration.

One of today major problems of public administration – defense system of the state and planning of her strategy. Sucha situation is, because too small attention was paid for it in literature of public administration, like a specific problem that belong to sector of public administration. This problem often is solved only in military aspect, and is hold as a part of military defense system. There are not enough competitive specialist and experts who would understand sucha problem and would take part solving it as well. It is very important to understand, that defense system is systematic objekt and all problematic should be taken as a whole system that integrate and accumulate different, even opposite elements. Spectrum of methods is very wide, and amount is very large, and for realization well-organized and effective management should be involved. Effectiveness of defense system depends on ability to use all possible resources that are in the state. That is why defense system and control of he implementation should belong to public administration.

One of today major problems of public administration – defense system of the state and planning of her strategy. Sucha situation is, because too small attention was paid for it in literature of public administration, like a specific problem that belong to sector of public administration. This problem often is solved only in military aspect, and is hold as a part of military defense system. There are not enough competitive specialist and experts who would understand sucha problem and would take part solving it as well. It is very important to understand, that defense system is systematic objekt and all problematic should be taken as a whole system that integrate and accumulate different, even opposite elements. Spectrum of methods is very wide, and amount is very large, and for realization well-organized and effective management should be involved. Effectiveness of defense system depends on ability to use all possible resources that are in the state. That is why defense system and control of he implementation should belong to public administration.

The purposes of this study is arrage alternative strategies for national defense systems that can be applied today to deal with information warfare in the digital era. This research was conducted at the Office of the Commission 1 of the Republic of Indonesia, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia (Kemhan RI) specifically the General Director of Defense Strategy (Directorate General of Strahan), Directorate General of Defense Potential, data and information centers as well as cyber defense centers and at the Central Information and Communication Republic of Indonesia Ministry of Defense. In addition, the location of the study was also determined at the TNI information center (Puspen TNI) and the Military Cyber Unit Office (Satsiber), the TNI Staff Commander\'s Office and the Indonesian Army Territorial Center which had been tasked with preparing the region or region as the basis of the universal defense. This research is conducted in November 2018 until March 2019.This study uses a qualitative descriptive method with observation and deepening of the material for quite a long time. The result of this study are the formation of augmentation strategy.

Major changes in defense policies since 1981. SDI and nuclear deterrence; uses of military force and conventional deterrence; reducing and controlling arms; competitive strategies.

IN 1940, JAPAN'S WEALTH, ESTIMATED IN TERMS OF NATIONAL INCOME, WAS ROUGHLY ONE-TENTH OF THAT OF THE UNITED STATES; YET JAPANESE MILITARY POWER, IN TERMS OF THE AIRCRAFT AND WARSHIPS IN THE PACIFIC, SURPASSED THAT OF AMERICA. JAPAN HAD A WELL-DEFINED, ALBEIT DISASTROUS, STRATEGY FOR CONQUERING ASIA IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT EMPIRE. TODAY, JAPAN HAS CAUGHT UP WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ECONOMIC INDICATORS, BUT IT SPENDS FAR LESS ON DEFENSE AND IT CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE DEVELOPED MORE THAN A RUDIMENTARY NOTION OF DEFENSE STRATEGY. THIS PAPER CONTRASTS THESE TWO PERIODS IN RECENT JAPANESE HISTORY AND DISCUSSES POSSIBLE FACTORS FOR THIS DRAMATIC REVERSAL. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT DEFENSE STRATEGIES MUST BE SEEN AS CONSCIOUS CHOICES BY A COUNTRY'S LEADERS; THUS, WHO THEY ARE AND HOW THEY PERCEIVE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ARE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE.

Der US-Verteidigungsminister skizziert wesentliche Veränderungen der US-Sicherheitspolitik seit Amtsantritt Präsident Reagans, v.a. die Strategische Verteidigungsinitiative (SDI), aber auch Überlegungen zum Einsatz von Kampftruppen außerhalb der USA. Er betont den nachhaltigen Eindruck, den die entschlossene Politik Reagans auf die sowjetische Führung ausgeübt hat. So zeichnen sich ernsthafte Verhandlungen über Rüstungskontrolle ab (Verringerung des Potentials an Nuklearwaffen). Die UdSSR bleibt davon zu überzeugen, daß die US-Verteidigungsanstrengungen von Dauer sind und folglich der Versuch, ein militärisches Übergewicht zu erringen, keinen Erfolg haben und kein Beitrag zu einem dauerhaften Frieden sein kann. (SWP-Btg)

In 1940, Japan's wealth, estimated in terms of national income, may be said to have been roughly one-tenth of that of the United States, and yet Japanese military power—the number of aircraft and warships in the Pacific—surpassed that of America. Japan had a well-defined strategy, albeit a disastrous one, for conquering Asia in order to establish a more self-sufficient empire. Today, fifty years later, Japan has caught up with the United States in economic indicators, but it spends far less than the latter on defense, and it cannot be said to have developed more than a rudimentary notion of defense strategy. This article contrasts these two periods in recent Japanese history and discusses possible factors for this dramatic reversal. It argues that defense strategies must be seen as conscious choices by a country's leaders; who they are and how they perceive international affairs are of crucial importance.

International audience ; Russia does not renounce to a power policy. After having undergone a strong erosion of its strategic positions, Vladimir Putin remains the strong man of Moscow and, as a good strategist, he has been able to maintain a significant nuclear power, equivalent to that of the United States, especially since the SORT Agreement, while renouncing the principle of "no first use" and committing himself to the option of pre-emptive strikes and the doctrine of a graduated response. It has engaged in conventional wars against Chechnya and Georgia, which it has won. However, the modernization of the army is hampered by financial constraints, and the modernization of conventional forces is part of a dissuasive approach, given the hypothetical nature of the threats from the major powers. Russia still remains a military superpower, probably the most determined to use it if necessary, given the gag order that has been placed on expressions of public opinion. ; La Russie, ne renonce pas à une politique de puissance. Après avoir subi une forte érosion de ses positions stratégiques, Vladimir Poutine reste l'homme fort de Moscou et, bon stratège, il a su maintenir une puissance nucléaire importante, équivalente à celle des Etats-Unis surtout depuis l'Accord SORT, tout en renonçant au principe du « no first use » et en s'engageant à la fois dans l'option des frappes préemptives et dans dans la doctrine de la réponse graduée. Il a engagé des guerres conventionnelles contre la Tchétchénie et la Georgie, qu'il a remporté. La modernisation de l'armée se heurte cependant aux contraintes financières et la modernisation des forces conventionnelles s'inscrit dans une démarche plutôt dissuasive, compte tenu du caractère hypothétique des menaces des grandes puissances. La Russie reste toujours une superpuissance militaire, sans doute la plus déterminée à l'utiliser si besoin était, compte tenu du baillon qui a été posée sur les expressions de l'opinion publique.

International audience ; Russia does not renounce to a power policy. After having undergone a strong erosion of its strategic positions, Vladimir Putin remains the strong man of Moscow and, as a good strategist, he has been able to maintain a significant nuclear power, equivalent to that of the United States, especially since the SORT Agreement, while renouncing the principle of "no first use" and committing himself to the option of pre-emptive strikes and the doctrine of a graduated response. It has engaged in conventional wars against Chechnya and Georgia, which it has won. However, the modernization of the army is hampered by financial constraints, and the modernization of conventional forces is part of a dissuasive approach, given the hypothetical nature of the threats from the major powers. Russia still remains a military superpower, probably the most determined to use it if necessary, given the gag order that has been placed on expressions of public opinion. ; La Russie, ne renonce pas à une politique de puissance. Après avoir subi une forte érosion de ses positions stratégiques, Vladimir Poutine reste l'homme fort de Moscou et, bon stratège, il a su maintenir une puissance nucléaire importante, équivalente à celle des Etats-Unis surtout depuis l'Accord SORT, tout en renonçant au principe du « no first use » et en s'engageant à la fois dans l'option des frappes préemptives et dans dans la doctrine de la réponse graduée. Il a engagé des guerres conventionnelles contre la Tchétchénie et la Georgie, qu'il a remporté. La modernisation de l'armée se heurte cependant aux contraintes financières et la modernisation des forces conventionnelles s'inscrit dans une démarche plutôt dissuasive, compte tenu du caractère hypothétique des menaces des grandes puissances. La Russie reste toujours une superpuissance militaire, sans doute la plus déterminée à l'utiliser si besoin était, compte tenu du baillon qui a été posée sur les expressions de l'opinion publique.

International audience ; Russia does not renounce to a power policy. After having undergone a strong erosion of its strategic positions, Vladimir Putin remains the strong man of Moscow and, as a good strategist, he has been able to maintain a significant nuclear power, equivalent to that of the United States, especially since the SORT Agreement, while renouncing the principle of "no first use" and committing himself to the option of pre-emptive strikes and the doctrine of a graduated response. It has engaged in conventional wars against Chechnya and Georgia, which it has won. However, the modernization of the army is hampered by financial constraints, and the modernization of conventional forces is part of a dissuasive approach, given the hypothetical nature of the threats from the major powers. Russia still remains a military superpower, probably the most determined to use it if necessary, given the gag order that has been placed on expressions of public opinion. ; La Russie, ne renonce pas à une politique de puissance. Après avoir subi une forte érosion de ses positions stratégiques, Vladimir Poutine reste l'homme fort de Moscou et, bon stratège, il a su maintenir une puissance nucléaire importante, équivalente à celle des Etats-Unis surtout depuis l'Accord SORT, tout en renonçant au principe du « no first use » et en s'engageant à la fois dans l'option des frappes préemptives et dans dans la doctrine de la réponse graduée. Il a engagé des guerres conventionnelles contre la Tchétchénie et la Georgie, qu'il a remporté. La modernisation de l'armée se heurte cependant aux contraintes financières et la modernisation des forces conventionnelles s'inscrit dans une démarche plutôt dissuasive, compte tenu du caractère hypothétique des menaces des grandes puissances. La Russie reste toujours une superpuissance militaire, sans doute la plus déterminée à l'utiliser si besoin était, compte tenu du baillon qui a été posée sur les expressions de l'opinion publique.