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The idea that capital possesses structural power over the state is of growing importance. Yet the theoretical literature on power has argued that this concept is either a contradiction in terms or is conceptually redundant. Seeks to show that a coherent distinction can be made between structural power, nonstructural power, and structural constraints. These distinctions are based upon a concept of human agency which draws attention to the peculiar pasts of those individuals occupying the same type of structural position. (Abstract amended)

The idea that capital possesses structural power over the state is of growing importance. Yet the theoretical literature on power has argued that this concept is either a contradiction in terms or is conceptually redundant. This paper seeks to show that a coherent distinction can be made between structural power, non-structural power, and structural constraints. These distinctions are based upon a concept of human agency which draws attention to the peculiar pasts of those individuals occupying the same type of structural position. It is argued that these distinctions are both widely applicable and 'empirically' relevant.

AbstractThis article examines the interrelationship between and the relative importance of individual leadership and structural power in promoting (or impeding) regime implementation. The theoretical debates on structural power and individual leadership are related to a particular case of regime implementation: the efforts of the Preparatory Commission on the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to make the international seabed regime operational. The article concludes that hegemonic stability theory highlights a variable—structural power—which in this case is the key determinant of the ability to exert influence. On the other hand, hegemonic stability theory fails to establish causal links and it ignores other important variables, such as the constraints imposed by changes in the domestic environments of leading states as well as in the international environment. In the pulling and hauling of international negotiations aimed at regime implementation, individuals can and do play significant roles as structural, intellectual and, most particularly, entrepreneurial leaders.

This article argues for the utility in conceiving of two distinctive approaches to the structural power of finance—New Structural Power (NSP) and Traditional Structural Power (TSP). While both are crucial to political economy scholarship, this article highlights the intellectual trade-off that is inherent to the adoption of one perspective over the other, and it stresses the explanatory advantages of the TSP perspective specifically. First, it shows how the TSP framework can facilitate an understanding of when policymaker ideas do and do not matter in the exercise of structural power, retaining the concept of "automaticity" in structural power operations. Second, it demonstrates how each framework is custom-built to explain substantively different aspects of the policy process, with TSP research aimed at system-oriented limitation mechanisms and NSP research aimed at agent-oriented selection mechanisms. Third, it contends that TSP formulations must be embedded within a model of (contradictory) functional explanation, which is the best way to gain empirical traction on the most important macrostructural developments in contemporary finance-led capitalism. Methodologically, this implies an agenda of "explanation through commonalities" rather than the NSP-favored "explanation through variation."

An attempt is made to show that a coherent distinction can be made between the structural power, nonstructural power, & structural constraints of capital. These distinctions are based on a concept of human agency that draws attention to the peculiar pasts of those individuals occupying the same type of structural position. It is argued that these distinctions are both widely applicable & empirically relevant. Modified HA

Realism explains the ruling of the international system through the underlying distribution of power among states. Increasingly, analysts have found this power analysis inadequate, and they have developed new concepts, most prominently structural power. The usage of structural power actually entails three different meanings, namely indirect institutional power, nonintentional power, and impersonal power. Only the first, however, is compatible with the current neorealist choice-theoretical mode of explanation. This is the basic paradox of recent power approaches: by wanting to retain the central role of power, some international relations and international political economy theory is compelled to expand that concept and to move away from the very theory that claims to be based on power. Neorealism does not take power seriously enough. At the same time, these extensions of the concept are themselves partly fallacious. To account simultaneously for the different meanings of structural power and to avoid a conceptual overload, this article proposes that any power analysis should necessarily include a pair or dyad of concepts of power, linking agent power and impersonal governance. Finally, it sketches some consequences of those concepts for international theory.

Realism explains the ruling of the international system through the underlying distribution of power among states. Increasingly, analysts have found this power analysis inadequate, and they have developed new concepts, most prominently structural power. The usage of structural power actually entails three different meanings, namely indirect institutional power, nonintentional power, and impersonal power. Only the first, however, is compatible with the current neorealist choice-theoretical mode of explanation. This is the basic paradox of recent power approaches: by wanting to retain the central role of power, some international relations and international political economy theory is compelled to expand that concept and to move away from the very theory that claims to be based on power. Neorealism does not take power seriously enough. At the same time, these extensions of the concept are themselves partly fallacious. To account simultaneously for the different meanings of structural power and to avoid a conceptual overload, this article proposes that any power analysis should necessarily include a pair or dyad of concepts of power, linking agent power and impersonal governance. Finally, it sketches some consequences of those concepts for international theory.

(The article is an earlier version of Chapters 5 and 6 of the author's EUI PhD Thesis, 1994.) http://hdl.handle.net/1814/5139 ; Realism explains the ruling of the international system through the underlying distribution of power among states. Increasingly, analysts have found this power analysis inadequate, and they have developed new concepts, most prominently structural power. The usage of structural power actually entails three different meanings, namely indirect institutional power, nonintentional power, and impersonal power. Only the first, however, is compatible with the current neorealist choice-theoretical mode of explanation. This is the basic paradox of recent power approaches: by wanting to retain the central role of power, some international relations and international political economy theory is compelled to expand that concept and to move away from the very theory that claims to be based on power. Neorealism does not take power seriously enough. At the same time, these extensions of the concept are themselves partly fallacious. To account simultaneously for the different meanings of structural power and to avoid a conceptual overload, this article proposes that any power analysis should necessarily include a pair or dyad of concepts of power, linking agent power and impersonal governance. Finally, it sketches some consequences of those concepts for international theory.