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Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Meaning of ``Chaos'' in Legislative Politics -- 1.2 Is Legislative Chaos Relevant? -- 1.3 Legislative Chaos Exists in Paraguay -- 1.4 The Conditions for Chaos May Exist Elsewhere if We Dare to Look -- 1.5 Does Assuming Chaos Destroy Political Science? -- 1.6 Who This Book Is For -- Part I Legislative Chaos Exists in Paraguay -- 2 The Potential Causes of Legislative Stability -- 2.1 Sacrifices are Necessary to Solve Chaos -- 2.2 Solving Chaos I: Preference-Induced Equilibriums -- 2.3 Solving Chaos II: Structure-Induced Equilibriums -- 2.4 Solving Chaos III: Dictatorship -- 2.5 The Alternative to Solving Chaos: Describing Chaos -- 3 Preference-Induced Equilibriums I: Weak Ideologies Promote Chaos -- 3.1 Conceptualizing Preferences -- 3.2 Measuring Preferences -- 3.3 Hypotheses: Preference Structures and Legislative Stability -- 3.4 Analysis of True, Ideological Preferences in Paraguay -- 3.4.1 Unidimensional Analysis of True Ideological Preferences -- 3.4.2 Discussion of Unidimensional Analysis -- 3.4.3 Multidimensional Analysis of True Ideological Preferences -- 3.4.4 Discussion About True Ideological Preferences -- 3.4.5 Conclusions About True Preferences -- 3.5 Analysis of Expressed Preferences -- 3.5.1 Results of Analysis of Expressed Preferences -- 3.5.2 Discussion of Structure of Expressed Preferences -- 3.5.3 Qualitative Analysis of Estimated Ideal Points -- 3.6 Correspondence Between True and Expressed Preferences -- 3.7 Discussion -- 3.8 Conclusions and Implications -- 4 Preference-Induced Equilibriums II: Electoral Incentives Promote Chaos -- 4.1 Replacement: Realignment Through Static Preferences -- 4.2 Modification: Realignment Through Preference Change -- 4.3 Institutional Expectations for Preference Change in Paraguay.

I: Qualitative Analysis -- 1. Qualitative Structural Analysis: Game or Science? -- 2. Two Approaches in Reading Model Interdependencies -- 3. Reading Macroeconomic Models and Building Causal Structures -- 4. Structural Analysis, Hierarchical Functions, and Poor Structures -- 5. Rationing and Aggregation in a Multi-level Model of Household Behaviour: the SABINE model -- II: Quantitative Analysis -- 6. Semi-reduced Forms of Econometric Models -- 7. The Dynamics of a Discrete Version of a Growth Cycle Model -- 8. The Structure of Rational Expectations Behaviour in Economics: an empirical view -- 9. The Disequilibrium Theory in Macroeconomic Models: a small scale model -- 10. The Monetary Sector of the Netherlands in 50 Equations -- 11. Specification of the Import Function and the Determination of Short and Long Term Equilibria in Macroeconomic Models -- 12. An Alternative to Debreu's Dated and Located Commodities.

The search for symmetry is part of the fundamental scientific paradigm in mathematics and physics. Can this be valid also for economics? This book represents an attempt to explore this possibility. The behavior of price-taking producers, monopolists, monopsonists, sectoral market equilibria, behavior under risk and uncertainty, and two-person zero- and non-zero-sum games are analyzed and discussed under the unifying structure called the linear complementarity problem. Furthermore, the equilibrium problem allows for the relaxation of often-stated but unnecessary assumptions. This unifying approach offers the advantage of a better understanding of the structure of economic models. It also introduces the simplest and most elegant algorithm for solving a wide class of problems

Capital tax competition is analyzed in a model with a single private and a locally supplied public consumption good. As a benchmark case necessary conditions for efficient interregional tax structures are derived and contrasted with the outcome of beggar thy neighbor strategies. If households are immobile an intervention of a central government can be justified to raise efficiency of the NASH equilibrium. In contrast, NASH equilibria are efficient if households are imperfectly mobile because regions have incentives to ensure an efficient interregional resource allocation via granting interregional transfer payments.

Cover -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Freedom and Unfreedom in Palestine -- 1.2 Scantily-Documented Pass Systems -- 1.3 Overivew of the Book -- 2. Registration and Denationalisation -- 2.1 The Census -- 2.2 The Population Registry -- 2.3 Feigning Authority -- 2.4 Denationalisation -- 3. Blacklists -- 3.1 Paper Blacklists and Executions -- 3.2 Blacklists as Hierarchies of Discrimination -- 4. Coercion and Collaboration -- 4.1 Withholding Rights as Coercion -- 4.2 Trading Rights for Needs -- 4.3 Informants and Collaborators -- 5. Movement Restriction and Induced Transfer -- 5.1 Entrenching Movement Restrictions -- 5.2 Induced Transfer -- 5.3 Enhanced Movement for Colonists, Restricted Movement for Indigenous Palestinians -- 6. The Health System -- 6.1 Collapsing Public Health Structures -- 6.2 Health System Shutdown -- 7. Education -- 7.1 Collapsing Education Structures -- 7.2 Education System Shutdown -- 8. Conclusion -- 8.1 Review of the Book -- 8.2 Looking Forward -- Notes -- Index.

We incorporate a wage bargaining structure in a dynamic general equilibrium model and show how this feature changes short and long-run properties of equilibria compared with a perfectly competitive setting. We discuss how employment, capital, and income shares respond to wage setting shocks and show that adjustment dynamics depend decisively on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. Values of the elasticity below unity add persistence, tend to preserve stability, and lead to empirically plausible adjustment patterns. By contrast, values above unity introduce additional volatility, thereby making steady states potentially unstable.

Effectiveness in Processes of Science-Policy Interaction -- The Science-Policy Nexus -- Designing Institutions for Science-Policy Interaction -- The Development of an International Regime on a Human-Induced Climate Change -- Structure: The Institutional Design of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change -- Agent: Leadership Performance in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change -- Causal Relationship: Real or Spurious? -- Structure and Agent in the Scientific Diplomacy of Climate Change.

We develop a model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and face aggregate liquidity shocks. Banks with liquidity shortage sell loans on the interbank market. Two equilibria emerge. In the no default equilibrium, all banks hold enough reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed equilibrium, some banks default with positive probability. The former exists when credit market competition is intense. The latter emerges when banks exercise market power. Thus, competition is beneficial to financial stability. The structure of liquidity shocks affects the severity and the occurrence of crises, as well as the amount of credit available in the economy.

1 Introduction -- 2 Borch's Theorem: A historical survey of applications -- I: Economics of Uncertainty -- 3 The role of securities and labor contracts in the optimal allocation of risk-bearing -- 4 Proportional risk aversion and saving decisions under uncertainty -- II: Economics of Information -- 5 The welfare economics of moral hazard -- 6 Problems of equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information -- 7 Moral hazard and insurance market structure -- 8 The effects of organizational form on capital structure: The case of stock and mutual property-liability insurance firms -- III: Economics of Insurance -- 9 Strategic growth and profit policy of insurance companies -- 10 (De)regulation of insurance markets -- 11 Price regulation and segmented insurance markets -- 12 The microstructure of the London insurance market -- 13 Do shares in other insurance companies reduce the solvency margin of an insurer? -- Author Index -- Subjetc Index.

Preface -- Contents -- 1 Why Age Structure? An Introduction -- 1.1 Human Demography: A Classic -- 1.1.1 Demographic Age Structure -- 1.1.2 The Death Process -- 1.1.3 Fertility -- 1.1.4 Migration -- 1.1.5 Modeling Trends and Habitat Changes -- 1.1.6 The Basic Elements of a Description -- 1.2 Ecology -- 1.2.1 Life Tables -- 1.2.2 Juvenile-Adult Interaction -- 1.2.3 Modeling Nonlinear Vital Rates -- 1.3 Epidemics -- 1.3.1 Essential Unstructured Modeling -- 1.3.2 The Single Epidemic Outbreak -- 1.3.3 Disease Endemicity -- 1.3.4 The Age of the Disease: The Internal Clock -- 1.3.5 Chronological Age: Demography and Epidemics -- References -- 2 The Basic Linear Theory -- 2.1 The Lotka-McKendrick Equation -- 2.2 The Renewal Equation -- 2.3 Existence of a Solution -- 2.4 Regularity -- 2.5 The Asymptotic Behavior -- 2.6 The Age Profile -- 2.7 The Open Population -- 2.8 Infinite Maximum Age -- 2.9 The Leslie Matrix -- 2.10 Eigenvalues, Eigenvectors and the Characteristic Equation -- 2.11 Comments and References -- References -- 3 Numerical Methods for the Linear Model -- 3.1 The Methodology of Characteristics -- 3.2 Euler-Riemann Methods -- 3.3 Convergence of ER Methods -- 3.4 Higher-Order Methods -- 3.5 Unbounded Mortality Rates -- 3.6 Approximation of R and α* -- 3.7 Numerical Simulations -- 3.8 Comments and References -- References -- 4 The Time-Dependent Case -- 4.1 Extension of the Lotka-McKendrick Model -- 4.2 The Case of Converging Rates -- 4.3 Periodic Rates -- 4.4 Strong and Weak Ergodicity -- 4.5 Real-Life Data and Numerical Simulations -- 4.6 Comments and References -- References -- 5 Nonlinear Models -- 5.1 A General Nonlinear Model -- 5.2 The Solution to the Problem -- 5.3 The Equilibria of the Model -- 5.4 Modeling Logistic Growth -- 5.5 Juvenile-Adult Dynamics -- 5.6 Multiple Equilibria in Juvenile-Adult Dynamics -- 5.7 The Allee Effect

1. Introduction. 1.1. Mathematics is language. 1.2. Notes on some mathematical tools in this book. 1.3. Basic mathematical concepts and definitions -- 2. Fixed-point theorems. 2.1. Classical results and basic extensions. 2.2. Convexity and duality for general spaces. 2.3. Extension of classical results to general spaces -- 3. Nash equilibrium and abstract economy. 3.1. Multi-agent product settings for games. 3.2. Nash equilibrium. 3.3. Abstract economy -- 4. Gale-Nikaido-Debreu's theorem. 4.1. Gale-Nikaido-Debreu's theorem. 4.2. Market equilibria in general vector spaces. 4.3. Demand-supply coincidence in general spaces -- 5. General economic equilibrium. 5.1. General preferences and basic existence theorems. 5.2. Pareto optimal allocations. 5.3. Existence of general equilibrium -- 6. The C̮ech type homology theory and fixed points. 6.1. Basic concepts in algebraic topology. 6.2. Vietoris-Begle mapping and local connectedness. 6.3. Nikaido's analogue of Sperner's lemma. 6.4. Eilenberg-Montgomery's theorem -- 7. Convex structure and fixed-point index. 7.1. Lefschetz's fixed-point theorem and its extensions. 7.2. Cohomology theory for general spaces. 7.3. Dual-system structure and differentiability. 7.4. Linear Approximation for Isolated Fixed Points. 7.5. Indices for compact set of fixed points -- 8. Applications to related topics. 8.1. KKM, KKMS, and core existence. 8.2. Eaves' theorem. 8.3. Fan-Browder's coincidence theorem. 8.4. L-majorized mappings. 8.5. Variational inequality problem. 8.6. Equilibrium with cooperative concepts. 8.7. System of inequalities and affine transformations -- 9. Mathematics and social science. 9.1. Basic concepts in axiomatic set theory. 9.2. Individuals and rationality. 9.3. Society and values -- 10. Concluding discussions. 10.1. Fixed points and economic equilibria. 10.2. Rationality and fixed-point views of the world.

When corruption is exposed, unknown aspects are revealed which allow us to better understand its structures and informal norms. This book investigates the hidden order of corruption, looking at the invisible codes and mechanisms that govern and stabilize the links between corrupters and corruptees. Concentrating mainly on democratic regimes, this book uses a wide range of documentation, including media and judicial sources from Italy and other countries, to locate the internal equilibria and dynamics of corruption in a broad and comparative perspective. It also analyses the Transparency International Annual Reports and the daily survey of international news to present evidence on specific cases of corruption within an institutional theory framework.

The paper analyses the effects of international migration on national welfare and on the structure of private production in a two-country trade model with public goods. Implications for migration policy and the role and design of entrance fees are discussed. It is further demonstrated that a migration-induced adjustment in public good supply affects a country's trade structure: in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework an immigration (emigration) of labourers can be connected to a decrease (increase) in the production of the labour intensive private good.

Copper in Drinking Water -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Executive Summary -- THE CHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE -- THE COMMITTEE'S APPROACH TO ITS CHARGE -- THE COMMITTEE'S EVALUATION -- Health Effects of Excess Copper -- Recommendations -- Physiological Role of Copper -- Recommendations -- Sensitive Populations -- Recommendations -- Risk Characterization -- Recommendations -- 1 Introduction -- CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES -- SOURCES OF COPPER IN DRINKING WATER -- COMMITTEE'S APPROACH TO ITS CHARGE -- STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT -- REFERENCES -- 2 Physiological Role of Copper -- ESSENTIALITY -- BIOCHEMISTRY AND PHYSIOLOGY -- FACTORS AFFECTING BIOAVAILABILITY -- Effect of Age -- Dietary and Other Interactions -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS -- REFERENCES -- 3 Health Effects of Copper Deficiencies -- TERATOGENESIS OF COPPER DEFICIENCY -- Causes of Copper Deficiency -- Copper in Prenatal Development -- Drug-Induced Copper Deficiency -- Disease-Induced Copper Deficiency -- Copper-Diet Interactions -- Gene-Induced Copper Deficiency -- Human Copper Deficiency and Teratogenesis -- Primary Dietary Copper Deficiency -- HEALTH EFFECTS OF COPPER DEFICIENCIES IN ADULTS -- CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES -- 4 Disorders of Copper Homeostasis -- MENKES DISEASE -- OCCIPITAL HORN SYNDROME -- WILSON DISEASE -- GENETIC CHARACTERISTICS OF WILSON AND MENKES DISEASES -- HETEROZYGOTES FOR WILSON DISEASE -- ACERULOPLASMINEMIA -- TYROLEAN INFANTILE CIRRHOSIS -- INDIAN CHILDHOOD CIRRHOSIS -- IDIOPATHIC COPPER TOXICOSIS -- OTHER GENETIC DISORDERS -- DISEASE-INDUCED CHANGES IN COPPER HOMEOSTASIS -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS -- REFERENCES -- 5 Health Effects of Excess Copper -- ACUTE TOXICITY -- Case Reports and Population-Based Studies -- CHRONIC TOXICITY -- Reproductive and Developmental Toxicity -- Genotoxicity, Mutagenicity, and Carcinogenicity of Copper.

i. General Modelling Considerations -- "Traffic Equilibrium Methods: The Structure of Model Research" -- "Equilibrium Models in Use: Practical Problems and Proposals for Transport Planning" -- ii. Theoretical Studies -- "Highway- Traffic Equilibria Analysed Via Geometric Programming" -- "Integrated Equilibrium Flow Models for Transportation Planning" -- "Equilibrium Versus Optimum in Public Transportation Systems" -- "Statistical Equilibrium" -- "Transportation Model with Elastic Constraints" -- iii. Computational Methods -- "A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Methods for Traffic Assignment" -- "Network Equilibrium Capabilities for the UMTA Transportation Planning System" -- "Application of Error Measures to Traffic Assignment Results" -- "Some Models for Combining the Trip Distribution and Traffic Assignment Stages in the Transport Planning Process" -- "Multiple Route Assignment: A Comparison of Two Methods" -- iv. Dynamic Traffic Assignment Methods -- "Emulation of Dynamic Equilibrium in Traffic Networks -- "A Model and an Algorithm for the Dynamic Traffic Assignment Problem" -- v. Traffic Equilibrium and Traffic Control -- "Area Traffic Control and Network Equilibrium" -- "Evaluation of Freeway Corridor Assignment Equilibria" -- vi. Model Components -- "Supply Functions for Public Transport: Initial Concepts and Models" -- "A Note on the Economic Interpretation of Delay Functions in Assignment Problems" -- vii. Applications Of Traffic Equilibrium Methods -- "Recent Experience with Equilibrium Methods for the Study of a Congested Urban Area" -- "The Choice of Assignment Techniques for Large Networks" -- "An Analysis and Comparison of Behavioral Assumptions in Traffic Assignment" -- "An Investigation of Some Problems in the Calibration of Traffic Assignments" -- "The Use of Traffic Equilibrium Based Problem-Oriented Language for a Governmental Feasibility Study".