Suchergebnisse

"In den letzten 10-15 Jahren haben sich in vielen Ländern Subsahara-Afrikas bemerkenswerte und umfassende Veränderungen in der politischen, sozialen und ökonomischen Gesamtsituation ergeben. Das tiefe Tal der 80er (und eines Großteils der 90er) Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts liegt nicht nur zeitlich hinter uns, denn in vielen afrikanischen Staaten ist ein Prozess erkennbar, der zu breitflächigen und bemerkenswerten Verbesserungen in allen Bereichen von Politik und Wirtschaft geführt hat. Afrika wandelt sich langsam von Sorgen- zum Chancenkontinent." (Autorenreferat).;;;"Numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa have undergone profound political, social, and economic change in the last ten to fifteen years. The lost years of the 1980s (and most of the 1990s) have not only been overcome. In many countries they have been replaced by widespread and remarkable improvements in politics and the economy. Africa, once a cause for great concern, is now slowly making the transition, to become a continent of opportunity." (author's abstract).

"Development Aid has been facing harsh criticism throughout the past decades. Even after half a century of assistance to underdeveloped countries, aims and objectives have not been met and progress has come to a hault, outspoken critics like Axelle Kabou and Dambisa Moyo proclaimed. Their concern was not only addressed at previous development approaches, but rather questioned the general idea of aid as an instrument to improve life quality in regions such as Sub-Saharan-Africa. Below the author reviews this criticism and points out some of its misconceptions concerning the asserted demands of Development Aid. He goes on to reflect on current and future scenarios on what may constitute reasonable assistance to countries in need. By not dwelling on either the valid criticism or the irrefutable achievements of Development Aid, but instead outlining resent paradigm changes, the author helps to give an overview to a broad and often emotionally charged discourse." (author's abstract)

The CFA-zone is basically composed of two sub-zones, characterised by significant structural economic and political differences within and between its member countries: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA/CEMAC). The growing structural divergences between UEMOA and CEMAC have been intensified by the recent development of world oil markets, booming production in Equatorial Guinea and the arrival of Chad in the club of oil producers. Nevertheless the CFA-zone in general, and the UEMOA in particular, have been considered as model case for economic and monetary integration in Africa. Yet, neither of these sub-zones meets the classical criteria of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA). In contrast, they show a low degree of diversification of production and exports, low factor mobility (except of labour in some countries) and price and wage flexibility, different levels of infrastructure and of inflation, low intra-regional trade and a strong exposure to asymmetrical external shocks (e.g. violent political conflicts, different terms of trade development for oil- and agricultural exports). The rules of the informal sector, are more important in structuring the CFA-zone than the institutions and policies of the formal economic sector, including its monetary institutions. For decades, prices of French imports were overpriced, due to protection by tied aid and other political and cultural non-tariff barriers. The cost of this rent-seeking was carried not only by the French Treasury, who guarantees the peg, but by the French and EU-taxpayers, who financed budgetary bail-outs and development aid, and finally by the poorer member countries and social strata (cf. the free-rider thesis). This article analyses the aims and structures of the WAEMU and its future development prospects.