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Despite a number of documented fatalities, African institutions concerned with transcontinental migration issues remain silent on the treatment of Sub-Saharan migrants in Tunisia.

At least 5 sub-Saharan African nations are due to hold presidential or general elections in 2018. Check out our expert briefings and reading material on our interactive elections resource map.
The post 2018: Elections in Africa first appeared on Africa Research Institute.
The post 2018: Elections in Africa appeared first on Africa Research Institute.

Among the many diplomatic risks for the United States amid the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza, further alienating the Global South — including Africa — is high on the list.It is difficult to generalize about African public opinion, especially given the absence of continent-wide polling data regarding the present violence. Yet after African governments' initially divided reactions to the round of conflict that began with Hamas's October 7 attack on Israel, there are now numerous indications that most African governments, key African political factions, and substantial portions of African publics are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and appalled at the current Israeli military campaign in Gaza.Many African governments have historically supported an independent Palestine. In recent decades, however, Israel has increased its diplomatic presence on the continent, although not always in a linear fashion. Mauritania, for example, recognized Israel in 1999 before suspending ties in 2009. Amid the current crisis, however, African governments have virtually all been opposed to Israel's bombardment and invasion of Gaza.For example, on October 23, a Jordanian resolution calling for an "immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities" passed in the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 120 for, 14 against, and 44 abstentions. Thirty-five African states (counting North African states) voted for the resolution, including Morocco and Sudan, which are signatories to the Abraham Accords that normalized their relations with Israel in late 2020. No African state voted against the resolution, although some did not vote, while a handful of others, such as Cameroon and Ethiopia, abstained. Support for such resolutions went directly against American wishes.At the diplomatic level, the African Union continues to support a two-state solution and, on October 15, joined the Arab League in a statement calling for peace and decrying "collective punishment" — a reference to the high civilian toll resulting from Israel's heavy bombing campaign.Meanwhile, at least two African countries have recalled their diplomats from Israel: South Africa and Chad. South Africa's ruling African National Congress (ANC), even before coming to power in 1994, was a longtime supporter of the Palestinian cause and, in particular, the Palestine Liberation Organization of Yasser Arafat, whom the ANC's Nelson Mandela called an "outstanding freedom fighter." On November 6, Pretoria summoned its ambassador back from Israel, citing civilian deaths in Gaza and what Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor called "collective punishment" of Gazans by Israel and what her government has also framed as "genocide."Two days earlier, Chad had recalled its chargé d'affaires from Tel Aviv, calling for a "ceasefire leading to a durable solution of the Palestinian question." Chad's move was particularly significant because it only recently upgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel and opened an embassy just this past February.Some African countries that initially appeared highly supportive of Israel immediately after Hamas's October 7 attack have since taken more nuanced stances as the death toll from Israel's response mounted: Kenya, for example, initially made a strong statement of "solidarity" with Israel, but has since backed calls for de-escalation. Despite their UNGA votes, African governments have been somewhat more cautious when it comes to allowing mass pro-Palestinian mobilizations on their own soil. The caution reflects at least two factors: such demonstrations could be used by their domestic political opposition, and some governments hope to quietly maintain their ties with Israel.In North Africa, pro-Palestinian protests have been stronger than in sub-Saharan Africa, with even Morocco — a signatory to the Abraham Accords and a partner of increasing importance for Israel — permitting huge protests. In sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, even the governments of some Muslim-majority countries have been reluctant to allow protests to proceed: on October 28, for example, Senegal denied permission for the National Alliance for the Palestinian Cause in Senegal to hold a rally, although a protest did eventually go forward in Dakar. South Africa, meanwhile, has unsurprisingly seen some of the largest protests south of the Sahara, given the historical solidarities mentioned above, as well as the presence of the Economic Freedom Fighters, an outspoken party to the left of the ANC. Another significant protest theater is Nigeria, both among Sunni and Shi'a Muslims.Expressions of condemnation of Israeli policy in different parts of the African continent come against the backdrop of a largely failed push by the United States to cajole African governments into taking sides on the Ukraine war. Before and after the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington in December 2022, Biden administration officials have found even longstanding allies, such as Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, unwilling to break completely with Russia.Given the massive financial, diplomatic, and military support that Washington is currently giving to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government and the Israel Defense Forces, lining up African governments against Russia — or on other globally relevant conflicts — may become an even tougher sell.In the Global South, the idea of a "rules-based international order" rings increasingly hollow for many governments and their publics as Western governments (with few exceptions, such as Ireland) offer virtually unqualified support to the Israel's military offensive. Those actions are in clear violation of international laws against collective punishment, the targeting of civilians, the targeting of journalists, and the cutting off of food, water, and electricity, according to major Western-based international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and major media freedom groups such as Reporters Without Borders.In The Continent, an influential South African magazine, one prominent commentator accuses the U.S. (and Germany, among others) of deep hypocrisy when it comes to Palestine — for example, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier's public apology in Tanzania earlier this month over genocidal-level colonial repression landed awkwardly for some Africans. One Kenyan writer laments that the United Nations is toothless, the U.S. government seems "blasé" about Palestinian deaths, and "Western media…appears to have become a mouthpiece for US and Israeli propaganda."Meanwhile, amid both the Ukraine war and the crisis in Gaza, some Africans feel that the continent's own conflicts and tragedies (in Sudan, Ethiopia, and beyond) have been ignored, a dynamic that veteran observers have warned about as well. Washington may thus find it increasingly difficult to convince Africans that the United States represents a particular set of universal values.In Africa, the situation of Palestine evokes numerous solidarities: ethnic, religious, political, and more. Those solidarities are growing amid the present conflict, undoing some of Israel's diplomatic gains and posing long-term challenges to Washington's own diplomatic clout.

The Guardian tells us that austerity has meant that we're seeing the stunting of British children again: Children raised under UK austerity shorter than European peers, study findsAverage height of boys and girls aged five has slipped due to poor diet and NHS cuts, experts sayThe average height of British children has risen slightly. British children who grew up during the years of austerity are shorter than their peers in Bulgaria, Montenegro and Lithuania, a study has found.In 1985, British boys and girls ranked 69 out of 200 countries for average height aged five. At the time they were on average 111.4cm and 111cm tall respectively.Now, British boys are 102nd and girls 96th, with the average five-year-old boy measuring 112.5cm and the average girl, 111.7cm. In Bulgaria, the average height for a five-year-old boy is 121cm and a girl, 118cm.See? That's a rise in height. Not a fall, a rise, in the height of British children.And now the poltroonery.Experts have said a poor national diet and cuts to the NHS are to blame.What, cuts to the NHS make kids grow taller? Really? said Henry Dimbleby, the former government food adviserWell, at least we have been given the usual sign that the rest of this is nonsense.The actual paper is here. And so to the truly interesting part:But they have also pointed out that height is a strong indicator of general living conditions, including illness and infection, stress, poverty and sleep quality."They have fallen by 30 places, which is pretty startling," said Prof Tim Cole, an expert in child growth rates at the Great Ormond Street Institute of Child Health, University College London. "The question is, why?"OK, so British children aren't shorter, they're taller. But if we rank kiddies by country then British children have fallen 30 places in such a ranking. A ranking of 200 countries by the way.So, what has happened? The most glorious thing, the greatest reduction in absolute poverty in the history of our entire species. This past 40 and 50 years has indeed been exactly that, as idiot socialism died off and free market capitalism roamed the globe. Meaning that children in formerly poor countries are now in places not so poor. Those children are also now, as ours have for a century, getting three squares and some milk a day and are now growing up big and tall. As the actual paper in Nature points out. And laments isn't happening in those areas like sub-Saharan Africa where this joy is not, as yet, happening.Globalisation means kids formerly so poor they were stunned from hunger grow up tall now. And this gets turned into a whine about the NHS? Poltroons, there's no other explanation for it.Except Dimbleby, of course. No one's going to accuse him of understanding this enough to twist it.

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Raufu Alaka, chief in the fishing village of Orimedu (Lagos State). © Photo: Arne Hoel, World Bank






















Digital technologies offer new avenues for economic growth in Africa by accelerating job creation, supporting access to public services and increasing productivity and innovation. However, major challenges remain. The lack of connectivity in remote and rural regions and the low use of digital technologies in connected areas is further disadvantaging the poor, women, and small businesses. Increased cyber risks and lack of data protection have brought new risks and vulnerabilities to businesses, governments, and people.

Government policies and regulations are key to enable greater use of digital services while mitigating risks. But how to intervene in a timely manner in a changing technological environment? Agile enabling regulations are needed to quickly respond to market developments, facilitating entry of new competitors for the benefit of consumers. In Kenya, collaboration between the competition authority, the central bank and the telecom regulator allowed digital financial service providers to access telecom services to offer mobile money services along mobile network operators. Consumers benefitted with greater availability of options for mobile payments. Later, the collaboration also facilitated interoperability between mobile money providers and banks, allowing consumers to seamlessly transfer funds between providers, top up saving accounts or use digital credit.

Such new approach is required to support the development of agile and collaborative regulations. A shift from planning and controlling to piloting and implementing policies in a multi-stakeholder setting for rapid feedback and iteration is necessary. Feedback loops allow policies to be evaluated against the backdrop of the broader ecosystem to determine if they are still meeting citizens' values and needs and considering the impact on the industry and private participation. To implement this approach, a change of mindset is first needed. This approach is particularly appropriate for dealing with digital transformation, which by its nature is changing and evolving, and would otherwise be hampered by rigid policies and regulations.

Some African countries are already implementing agile regulation principles to address various issues. Ghana and South Africa responded swiftly to COVID pandemic demand for higher bandwidth by quickly adjusting current regulations and made it easy for companies to offer higher bandwidth to citizens. Kenya and Zimbabwe were quick to remove roadblocks and supported the roll-out of applications that allowed citizens to quickly access mobile money transfers and other financial apps. The African Union has consulted perspectives from businesses, civil society and academia to develop policy frameworks on data and on digital identities. This inclusive multi-stakeholder approach resulted in workable frameworks that encourage innovation through data sharing and cross-border data flows for African eCommerce while protecting rights of individuals. These African Union frameworks on data and on digital identities are important cornerstones to build an African Digital Single Market – the vision of the Smart Africa Alliance that is endorsed by all members of the African Union.

The African Union's Agenda 2063 envisions a people-driven development for Africa, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth. That's why digital skills are prioritized in the African Union Digital Transformation Strategy 2020-2030, where the goal is to "build inclusive digital skills and human capacity across the digital sciences […] and technology policy & regulation". African leaders recognize the pivotal role of policies and regulations in shaping societal and business practices and - if done correctly – how policies can support and encourage digital transformation.

German Development Cooperation and the Digital Development Partnership of the World Bank, in partnership with Smart Africa, have started piloting this agile approach under the Agile Regulation for Digital Transformation program (AReg4DT), a program linked to the Smart Africa Digital Academy, the digital skills vehicle for Smart Africa, and atingi - an online learning platform developed by GIZ, the implementing organization of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation. The pilot is equipping policymakers and regulators in Africa with the knowledge and tools to regulate digital markets in Africa to support digital transformation. The results so far have been promising with a combination of online and face-to-face training events to allow for learning and knowledge exchange within and for Africa. This partnership is testing the development of capacity building activities in an agile and iterative way and tailoring the content to the local context, as well as gaining a practical understanding about implementation challenges and the training ecosystem in Africa. Prof. Dr. Yeboah-Boateng from Ghana's National Communications Authority also appreciated the chance for peer-to-peer exchange during the event in Abidjan. In particular, he noted the "value of better harmonization of policies and regulations across Africa that would benefit the continent as a whole."








Regulators across the world are developing and testing new policies and regulatory tools, while also adapting existing ones for new purposes, particularly in face of the COVID pandemic. In many cases, the same technologies that challenge traditional regulation also offer many opportunities to reinvent rule making, oversight, inspections, and enforcement.

The AReg4DT program supports the implementation of the Digital Economy for Africa (DE4A) initiative and aims at facilitating regional integration through a common understanding of challenges, opportunities and solutions that can be implemented at the national and regional level, thereby ushering Africa, into the dawn of the single digital market.









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Boutheina Guermazi
Director for Regional Integration for Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank
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Birgit Pickel
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Based in Casablanca, Hélène Cazes Benatar not only assisted a great number of refugees fleeing from Europe to North Africa, but also helped with the liberation of internees in Saharan forced labor and internment camps run by the Vichy regime. Her social, political and even clandestine activities were significant and extend far beyond the Jewish community until well after the Second World War.

Out of several countries in the coup-stricken African Sahel slated to hold elections this year, Senegal looked like the only one that might escape the threat of voter suppression, rigging, or other corrupt practices.But this is no more the case as a sudden turn of events last week plunged the West African nation into an unprecedented constitutional crisis, which pundits argue could lead anywhere at this point, from an uneasy elite pact to a total state collapse. On February 3, the eve of the official presidential campaign, Senegal's President Macky Sall announced a postponement of the election, citing dispute over the candidate list. His decision to postpone came weeks after a controversy erupted over the exclusion of opposition candidates from the ballot. The opposition Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), whose candidate Karim Wade was among those excluded by the Constitutional Council from running in the election for possessing a dual French-Senegalese citizenship, had earlier filed a formal request to postpone the vote. Also excluded is the opposition PASTEF's popular leader Ousmane Sonko, who opposed Sall in 2019 and has been behind bars since last year for immoral behavior and plotting an insurrection. His candidacy in the 2024 election was rejected last month by the Constitutional Council in a move critics say was targeted at eliminating the most potent obstacle to Sall's preferred candidate, Prime Minister Amadou Ba, running and winning the forthcoming elections. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Sonko's substitute candidate, is also in jail on charges of contempt of court, defamation, and acts likely to compromise public peace.OutrageNever before has Senegal postponed a presidential election. Ordinary Senegalese are shocked by the strange turn of events in part due to the sense of security created by Sall's decision in July last year not to run for a third term."I feel sad for Senegal, a beautiful and peaceful country always considered as an example of democracy and for the Senegalese people who fought in 2011 in the name of democracy so that the current President Macky Sall could be elected," Awa Diouf, a Senegalese activist, told RS. Sall has repeated his stance not to run for a third term, but the opposition doesn't believe him, accusing Sall of premeditated plans to cling to power or to force his preferred candidate on the people. After the decision, protests resurfaced in the country's capital Dakar reminiscent of scenes of deadly clashes with police that were once a fixture of life from 2021 to 2023. One leading opposition politician was arrested in the renewed disturbance on Feb. 4, as police fired tear gas to disperse angry protesters amidst a growing crackdown which has seen a private television station, Walf TV, suspended for 'inciting violence' and internet cut. The crisis continued into last week at the country's parliament where a bill seeking to fix a new date for the elections and extend Sall's tenure led to a row with some opposition MPs forcibly removed by police clad in riot gear. At the end of proceedings, the parliament, which is dominated by the ruling coalition, Benno Bokk Yakaar (which includes President Sall's Alliance for the Republic party) voted for a 10-month extension of the election until December 15. Sall's term was originally meant to lapse in early April. In response, activists are once again mobilizing for new protests and many fear for more violent crackdowns.A diplomatic solutionThese developments, which occurred on the heels of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's tour of the region last month, have attracted widespread condemnation. The West African bloc, ECOWAS, whose credibility has taken a beating over its handling of a string of coups in the region, failed to condemn the postponement.In sharp contrast, a statement by the U.S. State Department was more decisive in describing the poll's postponement as a move that runs "contrary to Senegal's strong democratic tradition," while also calling the National Assembly's vote illegitimate, "given the conditions under which it took place." The U.S. also condemned the attacks on press freedom and the severing of internet communications in the country. "The U.S. is a strong all round partner with Senegal and is the leading provider of development assistance valued at $238 million per year," Dr. Joseph Siegle of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies noted to RS. Besides the significant economic ties and trade, it is in the area of regional security that Senegal is most important for the United States. As one of the most stable democracies in Africa and a model for religious and ethnic tolerance, Senegal has been a longtime partner of the U.S. in promoting peace and security in Africa. "[Senegal's] importance has become even more outsized in the wake of recent coups and military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Guinea," Afolabi Adekaiyaoja, a research analyst with the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD-West Africa) explained. Although an outlier in the region's anti-democratic trends, this does not mean Senegal's democracy has been free of turmoil. For instance, out of four Presidents that have governed Senegal since it gained independence from France in 1960, only two have taken office in peaceful transfers of power — the first of which occurred in 2000. In 2012, Sall was only elected following a period of widespread protests against his predecessor Abdoulaye Wade's attempt to undemocratically cling to power. After 12 years at the helm of the country, critics now accuse Sall of the same crimes as Wade's, which include eroding the country's democratic credentials through a pattern of jailing political opponents under spurious charges and bending Senegal's justice system to his will. What is most significant, however, is that even in the midst of chaos "the struggle of the Senegalese people always takes place within the framework of institutions as much as peaceful and unarmed resistance," activist Louise M. Faye told RS. The hope is that today's disagreements won't be litigated in a coup like Senegal's Sahelian neighbors.By and large, experts believe what is likely is an uneasy pact within the elite, which has been brought about as a result of rising opposition to conventional politics. "The US [needs to start] talking directly to all of the relevant Senegalese actors as well as ECOWAS to navigate a stable, constitutionally-based, democratic outcome," Siegle explained. The Biden administration's playbook for the continent, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, mandates Washington to "stem the recent tide of authoritarianism and military takeovers by working with allies and partners in the region to respond to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses."While doing this, however, Washington needs to be mindful that recent anti-French sentiment has played into Russia's plans to expand its influence in the region. "While that does not necessarily mean direct anti-American perceptions, it will also need to ensure it can retain backchannels to the different factions if it wants to diplomatically intervene. Washington's important role will be to maintain pressure on Dakar to ensure a fair and transparent review process, or national dialogue as President Sall has put it, ahead of the elections," Adekaiyaoja added.

NDI's Chris Fomunyoh is once again joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson as they discuss the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy. They continue their conversation with their thoughts on the key challenges and opportunities facing Africa this year.
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Johnnie Carson: When female voices are not heard, the conversation is crippled, the policy is crippled, the institutions are crippled and the results are crippled.
Chris Fomunyoh: I'm Chris Fomunyoh, senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, NDI. Welcome to this edition of DemWorks.

Again we're joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a proud member of the board of directors of The National Democratic Institute, NDI with a 37 year career in the U.S. Foreign Service focus on Africa. In our previous episode, you spoke about the risk of back sliding. So for this episode, we will focus on the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy in Africa.

I'd like us to pivot a little bit to the Sahel because in Tanzania we see the back sliding that's coming from political actors themselves, but there's something happening in the Sahel, which is a region in which we see a lot of political commitment to democratic governance, whether it's from the leaders and activists in Niger Republic, in Burkina Faso and in Mali, but at the same time these countries are coming under tremendous pressure from violent extremists who are coming across the desert and destabilizing what would be an emerging democracy and what concerns do you have and how do you think organizations like NDI, like USIP and others that have the self-power expertise, so to speak can contribute to the efforts to counter violent extremism like Sahel and also the whole of Africa?

JC: Chris you're absolutely right and we should all be concerned about outside forces that can come in and destabilize a country, its politics, its economy and its society and across the Sahel we in fact see this happening. The challenges to stability, to democracy to holding free and transparent and creditable elections and having democratic systems that work, are not only challenged by sometimes authoritarian leaders seeking to maintain power and control, we also can see this emerging as a result of exogenous forces coming in from outside, and here we see non-state actors undermining stability across the Sahel, which is creating tension for democracies and tensions for states.

I think one of the things that is absolutely critical in addressing the problems with the Sahel is for government to reconnect with their citizens, to put in place the kinds of services that citizens are looking for and are demanding and expecting. They need to be responsive to the needs that they, citizens believe are not there and they have to have these connections in order to build up resilience, to build up strength against the ideologies and to the negative forces that are brought in by extremist groups.

It is extremists groups across the Sahel are taking advantage of the absence of good services and good connectivity between government and citizens and one of the things that must accompany the security response is in fact a development and government response. Security alone cannot end the problems in the Sahel. It's an important ingredient but the most important ingredient is government going in and establishing responsible connections, providing services, education, healthcare, sanitation, water cattle feeding stations and services that citizens require and are being deprived of.

So one of the things that must be hand in hand and be out front is not the military response and the security response but the governance response, the social service response and if that is absent, the security response will be deficient and will not work.

CF: In fact, I'm so thankful you say that, because I know that you and other members of our board, Secretary Albright, in particular the chair of our board, you've been emphasizing reinforcing this message about democracy and development component as part of the toolkit in conquering violent extremism and in fact, that's the approach that NDI is taking to its work in the Sahel because we currently have ongoing programs in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and our focus, the main focus of that piece of work is on people, processes and the politics and trying to create platforms where governments can reconnect with citizens at a grassroots level.

So in a number of cases we've set up platforms where civil society with legislatures and members of the executive branch, including representatives of the security services get together regularly to figure out what the challenges are in various communities and how to foster inter-communal dialogue and better relationships between the security services and the populations that they seek to serve, because you may remember there was a UN study that said that in many of the cases where violent extremism persist, that 70% of the people who join extremist organizations, are reacting to poor performance by security services and you have paid a lot of attention to Nigerian and the whole Boko Haram phenomenon.

I don't know how this would fit into our conversation with regards to the Sahel as well.


JC: I think it also very pertinent for Nigeria, and I too have seen studies of some very distinguished organizations, Mercy Corps and others that talk about why people are recruited and indeed, the authoritarian sometimes brutal nature of security forces towards communities that they should be protecting drives individuals away from the government and into the hands of Boko Haram.

Even the origin of the current violence in Northern Nigeria has its origins in the brutal extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram's first leader in 2009. His apprehension, his questioning, his interrogation, torture and mistreatment were all recorded on someone's cellphone and became widely seen throughout the country and throughout the north. Two years later, after that event in 2009 we saw and upsurge in 2011 and the activities of Boko Haram and indeed people continued to say that the brutal nature in which the security forces sought to root out Boko Haram, in fact generated more recruits for Boko Haram than it did for support for the government's efforts.

It is absolutely critical, it's absolutely critical that security forces recognize that they have a responsibility to protect the civil liberties and the human rights of the citizens of the state that they are protecting and that the way they treat the individuals in areas that they go into, may have an impact on their ability to ultimately win the conflict, but one thinks of Nigeria and particularly of the North East and there again weak institutions of corruption of lack of social services are all playing a major part in why the conflict in that region continues.

In the north east of Nigeria particularly and the three most affected states, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Those three states have the lowest social indicators of any of Nigeria's 36 states, less access to education, to healthcare, to water resources and to jobs and access and this all plays out as well. Governments needs to be responsive to their citizens and while a security response is important, governance and providing social services and the needs to citizens to build resilience is critical as well.

CF: This seems like a good place to take a short break. For well over 35 years NDI has been honored to work side by side with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help contribute to develop the institutions practices and skills necessary for democracy's success.

I realize it's many countries to cover but in the few minutes that are left, I just see if you have any parting words for four countries that we haven't really focused that much on and those are Ethiopia, Kenya, The Democratic Republic of Congo and we'll exit with Cameroon. What are your thoughts?

JC: My thoughts on Ethiopia. It is absolutely essential that those of us who support a democracy and democratic progress lend all of our efforts to those of the Ethiopian government to ensure that the democratic experiment that is underway is successful. Prime Minister Abiy won the Nobel Prize for bringing about peace with Eritrea but the more important thing is that we, outside step up our effort to help him ensure that his legislative elections, this year, are successful and that we do what we can to strengthen his country's democratic progress.

He has appointed and outstanding leader, Birtukan, former opposition leader, spent many years in jail as his country's election commissioner. We need on the outside to provide the kind of technical and financial and advocacy support that she might need to put in place the architecture for running the country's elections. It will in fact be the first real serious elections in that country since the collapse of the Derg in the early 1990s. So it's important that we help do this.

Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country behind Nigeria and it's important that we help democracy there. It's also a key and strategic state in the region bordering a number of other countries that will look to the success of what happens here. So we need to support.

Kenya, will have elections next year. It is important that there be a continuation in the improvement of the country's electoral agencies. The shadow of the flawed and failed and controversial and violent elections of 2007 and 2008 continue to be a shadow. The controversies associated with the last elections and court decisions there continue to hang over. It is important to continue to support civil society, support the electoral commission and work with the Kenyan government to ensure an outcome.

It appears very clearly that President Kenyatta wants to leave a positive legacy of progress, economically, politically and electorally. This will be a challenge but we should support the process moving forward. The features are still there.

CF: In fact, I should say before end up with the last two countries that for listeners, Ethiopia has got a parliamentary system of government. That's why the parliamentary elections are extremely important, the national elections for Ethiopia and also with regards to Kenya, as you say, President Uhuru Kenyatta would like to leave a good legacy. He's coming to the end of his second term and NDI working with partners on the continent has been very strong on the issue constitutionalism, respect for rule of law. In fact, we had a continent wide conference in Niamey, Niger Republic last October on the whole question of presidential term limits and we'll be having a second conference in Botswana in June to discuss term limits with former African heads of states and various other partners on the continent.

Just to say that, as leaders relinquish power when their terms come to an end, they help consolidate and strengthen democratic practices and institutions. So, with the two remaining countries-

JC: I applaud President Kenyatta for saying very early on that he would adhere to the constitution, he would serve two terms and step down. This is an important message for the most important country in East Africa, especially looking at the neighboring states, particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda where leaders there have found ways to extend themselves in office. He recognizes the importance of transition at the top and allowing the citizens of the country to select new leadership on a constitutional basis rather than trying to alter the constitution to eliminate term limits, age limits and perpetuate themselves in power.

So I hope others in the region are in fact looking at Kenya's model. One jumps across to West Africa and looks at President Paul Biya who's been in power for three decades, plus shows no desire whatsoever to leave office. Here is a man who has lost touch with his citizens and the communities of his country and because he has lost touch with his citizens, because there have been structural deficiencies and weaknesses and the institutions that he is responsible for, we now see a country that is suffering from three or four major political crisis, crisis with the English speaking portion of this country in the south west, the emergence of Boko Haram and radicalism across the border from Nigeria in the north west and problems of herders and farmers driven by drought and climate conditions.

President Biya has lost touch with the needs of his citizens and his government has not been responsive to anyone but himself and a small political elite. I think it is important for the international community to point out the failures and the flaws of his governance, the corruption that underpins it and to support those internally who are pushing for a constitution and political policies that fundamentally change the nature and structure of society, political architecture in society.

CF: You're so right, because that's one country that it's got tremendous potential but that it's not pulling its weight at all and because of its strategic location, invariably weakens other countries in the central Africa sub region, as well as in West Africa too and it's now taking full advantage of what could be real opportunities to improve the wellbeing of its citizens.

We'll be right back after this quick message.

And let's end with the country right in the heart of the continent, The Democratic Republic of Congo. I was in Kinshasa in October and met with political leaders and opinion leaders across the board, civil society, religious leaders who are very powerful in the Congo, very influential and I came away, I should say, a little more optimistic than I was going in. I was quite apprehensive given what has transpired in the 2018 presidential elections but after talking to the Congolese, I got a sense that a genuine attachment to reform.

Everybody wants some reforms of the political process or the electoral process and the key question is whether they are going to be able to set aside their personal agendas and actually get together to help this country, which has got tremendous resources and tremendous potential get back on its feet. I was very impressed by the fact that most of the leaders in Congo are pretty young. I know that you and I have talked about Congo for many, many times and when you were still in the administration you had to deal with some of their crisis.

I don't know what you take is on the present leadership and the present challenges but also the opportunities that present themselves in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

JC: Let me say that The Democratic Republic of the Congo has more unrealized potential than any other large state in Africa and that potential has continued to be in held in check and not realized because of the poor nature of the politics that have occurred there since the 1960s.

The 2018 elections were deeply flawed and irregular and not representative, I think, of the vote of the people. The one thing that one can say about the process that it did lead to President Kabila stepping down and a new younger president, Tshisekedi coming into power. There was immediately after the election a strong feeling that Tshisekedi was going to be instrument of Kabila going forward in that his leadership and his authority and his ability to do things would be substantially constrained. Tshisekedi has shown some degree of independence.

It is again important to recognize that there is little we can do to rerun that election or to reverse it but there is something that all of us can do going forward, and that to put pressure on President Tshisekedi to ensure that the electoral commission is strengthened, it has more independence, more technical capacity and more of an ability to deliver a more responsible, fair and transparent election going forward.

It is also important that he continue the fight against corruption, that he begin to put in place the kind of economic reforms that are going to unleash the potential of the Congo and to provide the people, The Democratic Republic of the Congo an opportunity to realize so many of the opportunities that they have been denied in the past. He has shown more independence than I thought but it is important that he not stop, that he continue to move forward, that he open up political space and continue to open it up for civil society, for the opposition, for the media, that he not constrain but unleash the country's potential and that he continue to show both in reality and fact his independence away from Kabila and those who were around him in the past.

He will be judged on the next four years very keenly, but it's important that the institutions of democracy to the extent that we can help civil society strengthen them, that they be nurtured and pushed forward. Elections and democracy...Democracy doesn't depend essentially, solely on elections. It is institutions that must be strengthened and we can help the DRC and civil society move those forward.

Again, working effectively with religions groups, Catholic Church, a very powerful instrument, working with women's groups, with working youth groups across the DRC and working with an emerging entrepreneurial class of young Congolese as well. We have to nurture and strengthen and push them forward. These next elections will be able to tell us whether there's been progress. President Tshisekedi needs to continue to move forward.

CF: Thank you very much Ambassador Johnnie Carson. It's really been an honor to have you do this tutor for us on the entire continent. Of course there still would always be ground to cover. As you were speaking, I thought about what late President John F Kennedy said about democracy as a never ending endeavor, and so NDI and similar organizations will continue to work side by side with our African partners to make sure that we can support them, give them the support and share experiences that they need so that we can all collectively, continue to work to strengthen and support democracy in countries like the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan and across the entire continent.

Thank you also for being a member of our board of directors. We are extremely proud of that and extremely proud of the partnership that NDI has with USIP and hope that our two organizations would continue to work together to support the growth of democracy across Africa and to our listeners, can I just say thank you for sharing in this edition of DemWorks, to follow our next podcast. Please check us out on our website www.NDI.org.

Thank you for listening.


Ambassador Johnnie Carson





Peace, Security and Democratic Resilience,

This year, there seemed to be reason for optimism among advocates of war powers reform. When the Senate voted in March to repeal the 2002 authorization for war with Iraq, many assumed the House would quickly pass the measure, which had garnered broad bipartisan support in previous years.
But that optimism may be misplaced, as a hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Committee demonstrated Thursday. Far from showing a desire to wrestle back their war-making authorities, most lawmakers appear determined to maintain the status quo that has seen U.S. troops carry out operations in more than 20 countries around the world.
The hearing revolved around the holy grail of war powers: the 2001 authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and any groups that harbored them. Despite concerns that the law has been stretched well past its original intent, Congress has struggled to build consensus on a replacement.
Yet Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), the HFAC chair, has made clear that he will only consider repealing the 2002 AUMF alongside a repeal-and-replace of the 2001 version. This may have been a clever attempt to prevent a straight repeal of the 2002 law, but, after a month of negotiations, McCaul now says he hopes to mark up a compromise bill by the end of October.
McCaul opened discussion on Thursday by arguing that America still faces "terrorists committed to our destruction" around the world. (It should be noted that the Department of Defense says the threat to the homeland from Al Qaida, ISIS, and Al Shabaab is "low" and possibly non-existent.)
McCaul said he would not consider putting geographic restrictions on a replacement, going against a key proposal among war powers reformers, who warn that unrestricted AUMFs are ripe for exploitation by the executive branch. Most of his colleagues — including a number of Democrats — agreed with McCaul's approach.
In fact, the only substantive point of disagreement between lawmakers was over which groups should be included in a replacement AUMF. Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), the ranking member on the committee, has proposed that a new law should only cover Al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates. McCaul and his Republican colleagues argue that the new AUMF should also include the Taliban and Iran-backed militias in Iraq.
There are, of course, some developments that will be welcomed by war powers reformers. Lawmakers widely agree that any new authorization should have a "sunset" provision that would require Congress to reaffirm its support for U.S. operations abroad after a few years. (Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland said the administration opposes this measure, which in her telling would allow terrorists to simply wait Washington out.) A new AUMF would also likely exclude the Taliban, providing a legal bookend to 22 years of American involvement in Afghanistan.
But this shift falls far short of ending America's so-called "forever wars." When Meeks asked witnesses what the war on terror may look like in 2045, no one could offer a concrete response. Perhaps more importantly, no official seemed ready to countenance the idea that hostilities would finally be over.
Indeed, witnesses and lawmakers gave little indication that the war on terror could ever truly end. They focused instead on a range of emerging "threats" to the United States, including the rise of terror groups in the Sahel, a sub-region of Africa stretching from Mauritania in the west to Sudan in the east.
One may hope that lawmakers would discuss whether U.S. military operations helped create the conditions for these new threats to emerge, as a range of experts and journalists have argued. But such a discussion was absent from the conversation, leaving little chance that these views will be taken into account when lawmakers hammer out the text of any new AUMF.
In a telling moment, Meeks recalled that memorable day in September 2001 when Congress passed the AUMF. The long-time lawmaker joined all but one of his colleagues in voting in favor of the resolution, hurriedly kicking off a new paradigm in which "war" and "peace" became relative terms.
"Though I carry the burden of that vote, not for one second do I regret it," Meeks said. "We needed to send a message. We needed to take action and prevent future terrorist attacks by those who orchestrated 9/11, and we did."
The world has undergone a number of major changes in the past two decades. But in Congress, it's still 2001.

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Armed conflict and violence seldom erupt overnight, even when their visible effects seem to take many off-guard. More likely, they stem from deep-rooted, entrenched fault lines that may not always be obvious or visible because they go back decades—if not longer. Effectively mitigating the eruption or recurrence of conflict requires identifying, analyzing, and tackling the root causes of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV)—not just what happens but why it happens.

Structural factors of FCV are systemic characteristics that underpin a country's economic, political, institutional, security, and societal evolution. They range from historical legacies and narratives to norms and values and include geography, subnational disparities, demographic trends, and many more. They may be simmering beneath the surface, deemed latent, as if no longer relevant or even self-evident, to the extent that one may not assess their full ramifications in the current context.

In the Lake Chad region, where armed conflict has been fueled by deep-rooted fragility and grievances, some groups, such as the "montagnards" from the Mandara Mountains and the Buduma, have been historically disenfranchised and still face regular barriers to representation in decision-making processes and development dividends. Geography is another important structural factor. As shown in the Lake Chad regional RRA with the exception of the capital N'Djamena, the Lake Chad region is remotely located which has fostered a sentiment of political isolation coupled with economic marginalization.

Past instances of armed conflict generate historical legacies, even when a generation or more has elapsed since violent events. Trauma, often inter-generational and collective, heals through acknowledging wrongdoings and reparative justice. In addition to direct survivors and families of victims, their descendants and the community at large can connect with the memory of violent events and how remnants of discrimination and stigmatization may still be perceived, long after these historical occurrences. Historical legacies shape a memory and group identity. It further contributes to a narrative where an individual's access to opportunities may be interpreted through the lens of whether they belong to the group of former perpetrators or survivors.

While underlying, persistent patterns of exclusion and a sense of injustice feed into strong local feelings, collective narratives, and psyche about significant elements of a society, structural factors of FCV do not necessarily determine the trajectory of a region, country, or locality. They are instead constitutive to the history and fabric of a context and, as such, shape a core part of its specificity. Think of rhizome more than direct causality.

There are many examples of this. For instance, territorial imbalances greatly contribute to inequalities and grievances. Analysts point out a crisis of pastoralism at the heart of nomadic herders' grievances in the Sahel, as well as zero-sum tendencies that prevent wider inclusion. Regional inequalities, between coastal and landlocked Saharan and Sahelian provinces, have various ramifications, such as on economic diversification, identity formation, and center-periphery relations.

Another example is the way in which governance systems inherited from colonial times have contributed to perpetuating contested and/or exclusionary patterns in settings affected by FCV. Guiding questions that may be helpful to unpack these connections include: To what extent did a colonial administration influence central or federal trajectories and power-sharing? Did independence occur as a result of a peaceful negotiation or from violent guerrilla warfare which institutionalized top-down, one-party "winner take all" mindsets? Did major milestones include and benefit all or only a few?

The recently completed Guinea Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) outlined the country's experimentation with different forms of governance, such as socialism. The country's exposure to various models has deeply influenced Guineans' yearning for equality and their low acceptance of economic stratification, which can still be perceived today.

How can we adjust our lens not just to the last unconstitutional change of government but to review core features that have defined a country's entire post-independence period? We cannot address the root causes of FCV unless we understand why events happen. This not only helps to mitigate their impact more effectively but also to prevent their recurrence in the future. Capturing structural factors of FCV entails augmenting a standard stakeholder mapping or conflict analysis with a recognition of these complex, intertwined connections, and the role of people's perceptions in fueling deep-rooted grievances. In line with the World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, it requires attention to the following:

Mobilizing various disciplines to understand a society, its constitutive forces, and pressure points. Armed conflict and violence rarely arise simply because of economic failures and asymmetries. Rather, they stem out of power dynamics as well as actual and perceived exclusion factors. To measure them, one should understand that the structure of the economy, the country's history, geography, culture, and social divisions, set entrenched patterns and require thinking outside the realm of traditional disciplines.
Valuing people's perceptions as much as objective measures of wellbeing and development. As the 2018 Pathways for Peace report demonstrated, inequalities and perceptions of exclusions between groups matter just as much, and often more, than inequalities between rich and poor. Perception and subjectivity play a critical role in shaping people's sentiments and appraisal of inequalities and exclusion. As such, it is often not only about what happened, but how it was perceived, interpreted, digested, and narrated by the people who experienced it. Therefore, one key challenge for practitioners is often one of data. Simply put, do we have the right data to dig deeper and wider
Accepting the compounding and dynamic aspects of conflict and risks. Structural factors of FCV are mostly static but they are not relegated to the past. The extent to which these simmering attributes interact with the present makes them "living" and ever-present in the backdrop of fragile and conflict-affected situations.
This web of connections between past and present, structural, and more acute experiences of state formation and contestations, illustrates that societies are not frozen in time—they live, breathe, and evolve. They also remember. In addition to spatial, social, cultural, and economic features, structural factors of FCV influence path dependency—a historically-influenced course from which sets a rigid route—and behavioral patterns that unfold and repeat through time. They resist change and sometimes build up over time, like the sediment of a riverbed. If we don't integrate them into a risk-informed approach and engagement, we, as development practitioners, miss critical depth and breadth, two essential parameters to effectively diagnose and tackle the root causes of FCV.









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Farah Abdessamad
Consultant, Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group
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Catherine Defontaine
Senior Operations Officer - Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group
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Dave


October 04, 2023

Very insightful article.






Catherine


October 27, 2023

Thank you!

Israel's war in Gaza – and Washington's support for it -- is inflicting serious damage on U.S. standing across the Arab world, according to a representative poll of 16 Arab countries released Thursday by the Arab Center Washington DC.An aggregate average of 82% of respondents across the region described the U.S. response to the war as "very bad," while another 12% described it as "bad." And an aggregate of 72% of respondents said that U.S. policy toward the war in Gaza will harm Washington's "image" in the region either "somewhat" (22%) or "very much" (50%). Similar percentages said it will harm U.S. "interests" in the region as well. An aggregate of 76% said their views on U.S. policy in the Arab world had "become more negative" since the war began.An aggregate average of more than half of respondents (51%) also said they regard the United States as constituting "the biggest threat to the peace and stability of the region" – up from the 39% who named the U.S. as the greatest threat in an Arab Center poll in 2022. One in four respondents (26%) described Israel as the region's greatest threat.The poll, which queried 8,000 respondents across the 16 countries that together account for 95% of the Arab region's total population, was conducted by telephone between December 12 and January 5; that is, during the third month of Israel's campaign in Gaza. The countries included Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Yemen, and Qatar in the Persian Gulf sub-region; Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and the Palestinian West Bank across the Levant and Mesopotamia; and Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan in North Africa. Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Syria were not included.The aggregate regional opinions were calculated as an average of the results of the 16 surveyed countries, with each country given the same weight in order to ensure that the opinions of respondents in the most populous countries did not dominate the survey's findings.The results of the poll, which was carried out in cooperation with the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar, should cause some alarm in Washington, according to Shibley Telhami, a professor at the University of Maryland. "This is a historic moment in some very important ways," Telhami said at an event presenting the survey findings at the National Press Club on Thursday. "The scale of what we have seen and the role the U.S. has played in this deeply painful crisis has been so large and been perceived to be so large that it's going to leave an imprint on the consciousness of a generation in the region that is going to outlast this administration and outlast this crisis."Respondents believed Washington to be the key component enabling Israel to carry out its war on Gaza, in which more than 27,000 people, mostly women and children, have reportedly been killed to date. Exactly half of the Arab public named "U.S. military and political support" as the most important factor, with an additional 15% saying it was the second most important. The "lack of decisive action" from Arab governments toward Israel, which was the second popular choice, was named by 14% of respondents as the most important factor and by 23% as the second most important. The poll also showed a notable increase of opposition in the Arab world for recognizing Israel in certain countries. An aggregate of 89% of respondents said they oppose recognition of Israel, while only four percent favored it, the lowest percentage since the question was first posed in 2011. Of particular note in that respect were responses from respondents in Saudi Arabia. Normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel has been a key goal of the Biden administration, which has been engaged in intensive negotiations with Riyadh over the terms for normalization, including Saudi demands for a ceasefire in Gaza. The poll found that the percentage of Saudi respondents who oppose the recognition of Israel has jumped from 38% the last time the question was asked (in 2022) to 68%, an increase apparently largely attributable to the Gaza war. (Twenty-nine percent of respondents in the kingdom declined to answer the question.) Opposition to normalization also rose by about ten percentage points over the year in Morocco and Sudan — both of which normalized relations with Israel in 2020 in what is known as the "Abraham Accords" — to 78% and 81%, respectively. In another blow to Biden's policy, which has repeatedly stressed its commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel since the Gaza War began, large majorities of respondents in each country said they did not consider Washington to be serious about following through. An aggregate average of 68% of respondents said Washington was "not at all serious" about the commitment, while another 13% said Washington was "somewhat unserious." Skepticism was particularly high in Jordan, Lebanon, and the West Bank which together house the greatest number of Palestinian refugees in the Arab world, but 77% of Saudi respondents said Washington was either "not at all serious" (62%) or "somewhat unserious" (11%). The poll also found that the Palestinian issue has resumed its place as a top priority for Arab publics as a whole. Asked whether they considered the Palestinian cause as "one for all Arabs and not the Palestinian people alone," an aggregate average of 92% of respondents chose the first option, 16 percentage points higher than when the same question was asked in 2022. In Saudi Arabia, the percentage agreeing with that view jumped from 69% to 95%. Similar large increases were found in Iraq, Egypt, and Morocco.As for views about the positions of key Arab countries toward the Gaza war, respondents were most critical of the UAE, with an aggregate average of 67% rating Abu Dhabi's position as either "very bad" (49%) or "bad" (18%). Saudi Arabia did not fare much better with an aggregate of 64% of respondents describing its position as "very bad" (44%) or "bad" (20%). Majorities also disapproved of the positions of Egypt and the Palestinian Authority.The war has also reduced the hope that there can be peace between Israel and Palestine. An aggregate of nearly 60% of respondents said that during the war they had "become certain that there will be no possibility for peace with Israel," while only 13% still believed in the possibility of peace. Ultimately, the test of whether the public's reaction to the war will be how governments in the Arab world respond, Telhami said at Thursday's event. The first evidence, he said, will be whether or not Saudi Arabia insists on the creation of a Palestinian state as part of any normalization agreement with Israel and doesn't settle for the promise of statehood at some point in the future,"That will be the real test for has this horrible crisis led to a public, so activated in the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, that governments are just not going to do things that are gonna go against their feelings," he said.