Subsidiarity is a principle about the ordering of relations between groups. It has a foothold in legal doctrine, most notably in the law of the European Union, but increasingly also in international human rights law. But subsidiarity is at its heart a moral principle about how state and society (and perhaps states and societies plural) should be structured. While its precise content and implications in a range of contexts are certainly contested, at its core the principle requires higher (larger) groups to aid lower (smaller) groups, rather than to obliterate or subsume them. The principle thus recognises the value of a plurality of social groups, of multiple associations in which a measure of self-government is possible.
First made available online in 2018 ; First made available online in 2018 ; History is unpredictable. 1992 was to crown eight years of hard labour of the Community institutions, with the completion of the internal market and the launching of the European Union. Instead, the Community has been caught in one of the most severe crises it has ever had to face. The rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish people and the narrow victory of the "yes" vote in the French referendum have shown that European integration was meeting with stronger resistence than expected at national level, while the monetary crisis of mid-September has cast a shadow on the prospects for monetary union. In this difficult situation, the subsidiarity concept appears as a cure for all the problems now faced by the Community. Today's political discourse is replete with references to the spirit an letter of subsidiarity. Encouraged by its recognition in the Maastricht Treaty, the Community institutions have engaged into a discussion on how such a principle could be given effect. The expectation seems to be that this will help the Community to steer a new course in the years to come. Yet there is still no clear understanding of the actual scope of the subsidiarity principle, nor of the ways in which it could be used by the Community institutions. The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on these two issues. Before examining the merits of the discussion, it is however useful to analyse the reasons that have led to the insertion of subsidiarity in the Treaty on European Union.
Subsidiarity requires taking decisions at the level of government best placed to do so, but does not say what that level is. Rather, it gives a broad framework within which to have the debate. Implementing subsidiarity means (1) allocating roles appropriately between levels of government, (2) co-ordinating implementation of decisions, and (3) managing accountability and participation. Subsidiarity does not, however, tell us how to achieve these goals. It is therefore more about how a decision is made than about what the specific decision is. Europe, the United States and Australia have adopted varying solutions to these issues. New Zealand's ability to influence the trans-Tasman outcome is likely to be limited. The main implications for New Zealand are in designing trans-Tasman institutions and allocating responsibilities between central and local government.
The post-Maastricht world of the European Union is only about two years old. Within that new world, however, few concepts are as important, and yet as elusive or unsettled, as the doctrine of subsidiarity. On the other hand, the European Community has for many years evidenced concern over human rights. The purpose of this essay is to consider the implications of the concept of subsidiarity for human rights law and enforcement within the European Community and the European Union.
The answer to the demand for acquis communautaire, which arises from migration and mobility, should be found in a European subsidiarity approach at all levels. This involves: at the local level looking for solutions to the problems of integration and interculturalism; at the national level, the planning of legal flows; and at the supranational level, the political governance of migration movements including relations with the sending countries. The migration issue demands a multiple answer at both European and national level, but local governments also need to be involved, as they are the first to be exposed to the presence of migrants. Daily issues dealing with such problems as housing, school, jobs, health services, and mobility need the institutional presence of local governance, in symbiosis with the planning of national resources and the stability of accepted international relations between sending and receiving countries in the EU context.
The notion of subsidiarity in European federalism labors from all manner of burdens. It seems elusive by nature, commentators claiming that they do not know what subsidiarity means or, if they do, that they do not see in it anything new. At the same time subsidiarity has been presented at least in some quarters as a panacea for the Community's current malaise. It clearly is not that. Even if subsidiarity has not been oversold, it is almost certainly overexposed, a condition that the present Article is unlikely to cure. My purpose in this Article is simply to help make some sense of subsidiarity and even to make a case for it as a Community standard. Thus, after offering a basic definition and rationale for subsidiarity (Part I), I attempt to justify subsidiarity first by reference to the legal and political circumstances that gave rise to it (Part II), and then by reference to the specific functions it may usefully perform in the workings of the Community institutions (Part III). On the other hand, precisely because it does risk being oversold, subsidiarity's chief difficulties need to be explored and understood (Part IV). This is not because these difficulties are necessarily easily overcome, but because their acknowledgment should help lower the expectations that continue to be brought to the subject.
The principle of subsidiarity is a bastion of Catholic social teaching. It is also a principle in the philosophy of the American Founding Fathers. In the USA, subsidiarity is ignored without a sense of the proper harmony between authority and responsibility. Human dignity and wise stewardship are compromised. Conscience protection becomes a concerning issue as highlighted by the conflicts arising after passing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. A reconnection of the patient to be steward of his health care is critical in addressing these issues. Third parties, including the government, business, and insurance companies, are firmly entrenched in health care oftentimes with the result being increased cost and detachment of the patient from the stewardship of his or her care. Vitally needed is a return to the principle of subsidiarity in health care. Hopeful solutions include the Zarephath Health Center, the Surgery Center of Oklahoma, and the clinic of Dr. Juliette Madrigal-Dersch.
The post-Maastricht world of the European Union is only about two years old. Within that new world, however, few concepts are as important, and yet as elusive or unsettled, as the doctrine of subsidiarity. On the other hand, the European Community has for many years evidenced concern over human rights. The purpose of this essay is to consider the implications of the concept of subsidiarity for human rights law and enforcement within the European Community and the European Union.
Regulatory overlap can inflict real costs on businesses through repetitive inspections and data collection efforts. It is particularly burdensome when agencies issue conflicting rules with inconsistent standards. In recent decades there has been a gradual increase in the number and activity of non-governmental bodies in regulation in a number of contexts. Although good intentions have underpinned widespread government agendas to deregulate and impose less restrictions from a central government perspective, this may have led to overlap in this different sense, particularly when one considers that this 'retreat of the state' has been accompanied by a 'rise of regulatory pluralism'. Causes aside, the purpose of this paper is to provide background to the discussion on principles to reduce regulatory overlap.
The principle of subsidiarity lies at the heart of the European Union's strife to bring the EU closer to the citizen. Yet, it appears to be failing to do so in its present form. Therefore, the new Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [hereafter: European Constitution] has the intention to bring it to the best possible position in this respect.
This article examines how subsidiarity can limit the exercise of EU procedural criminal law competence. It argues for a narrow understanding of subsidiarity, suggesting that EU procedural criminal law legislation can only be directed at problems which are of a cross-border nature. By analysing a specific piece of EU legislation, the new Victims Directive, it is shown how the subsidiarity principle can be enforced. The article sustains that the Victims Directive can be criticised on subsidiarity grounds as the directive fails to adequately account for the link between victim rights and the application of the principle of mutual recognition, since the directive fails to explain properly the need to regulate local victim rights. The article also draws some broader reflections on the justifications for EU harmonization. It is argued that EU initiatives in procedural criminal law have not primarily been driven by the need to facilitate mutual recognition and free movement but rather motivated by a general concern to deliver a common European sense of justice. Whilst this approach from the EU legislator can be justified from a moral perspective, it flies in the face of the idea that decisions should be taken as closely as possible in respect of citizens. ; Subsidiarity and EU criminal law
Europeanization can be regarded as a process that finds expression in the gradual redefinition of state sovereignty and the development of supranational common institutions (e.g. Agreement of Schengen, Court of Justice, Euro currency). In parallel, territorial subsidiarity seeks to provide for a greater sub-state say in areas of social policy making, often linked to cultural or identity considerations. This article deals with welfare development in the European social model in contemporary times. While a paradigm shift in macro-economic policies has allowed for monetary centralization and a growing matching of EU internal 'open' markets, the quest for the decentralization of welfare programmes has also aimed at meeting demands for policy innovation and a more effective management. Allegedly, welfare provision by sub-state diversity may affect collective solidarity and redistribution. The emergence of new social risks and the role played by the mesogovernments in welfare reform in Europe are also subject to analysis and discussion in this article. ; Peer reviewed
Peer reviewed ; This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Regional & Federal Studies on 2007, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=frfs20 Europeanization can be regarded as a process that finds expression in the gradual redefinition of state sovereignty and the development of supranational common institutions (e.g. Agreement of Schengen, Court of Justice, Euro currency). In parallel, territorial subsidiarity seeks to provide for a greater sub-state say in areas of social policy making, often linked to cultural or identity considerations. This article deals with welfare development in the European social model in contemporary times. While a paradigm shift in macro-economic policies has allowed for monetary centralization and a growing matching of EU internal 'open' markets, the quest for the decentralization of welfare programmes has also aimed at meeting demands for policy innovation and a more effective management. Allegedly, welfare provision by sub-state diversity may affect collective solidarity and redistribution. The emergence of new social risks and the role played by the mesogovernments in welfare reform in Europe are also subject to analysis and discussion in this article. The author is also grateful to the WRAMSOC project ('Welfare Reform and the Management of the Societal Change', European FP5) and the NURSOPOB project ('New Social Risks and Welfare Policy Trajectories', Spanish National R&D Plan, SEJ2005-06599), for making use of some of the findings produced during the period 2002-2007.
The subsidiarity principle of water resources management suggests that water management and service delivery should take place at the lowest appropriate governance level. The principle is attractive for several reasons, primarily because: 1) the governance level can be reduced to reflect environmental characteristics, such as the hydrological borders of a watershed that would otherwise cross administrative boundaries; 2) decentralization promotes community and stakeholder engagement when decision-making is localized; 3) inefficiencies are reduced by eliminating reliance on central government bureaucracies and budgetary constraints; and 4) laws and institutions can be adapted to reflect localized conditions at a scale where integrated natural resources management and climate change adaptation is more focused. Accordingly, the principle of subsidiarity has been welcomed by many states committed to decentralized governance, integrated water resources management, and/or civic participation. However, applications of decentralization have not been uniform, and in some cases have produced frustrating outcomes for states and water resources. Successful decentralization strategies are heavily dependent on dedicated financial resources and human resource capacity. This article explores the nexus between the principle of subsidiarity and the enabling environment, in the hope of articulating factors likely to contribute to, or detract from, the success of decentralized water resources management. Case studies from Haiti, Rwanda, and the United States' Florida Water Management Districts provide examples of the varied stages of decentralization.
The subsidiarity principle of water resources management suggests that water management and service delivery should take place at the lowest appropriate governance level. The principle is attractive for several reasons, primarily because: 1) the governance level can be reduced to reflect environmental characteristics, such as the hydrological borders of a watershed that would otherwise cross administrative boundaries; 2) decentralization promotes community and stakeholder engagement when decision-making is localized; 3) inefficiencies are reduced by eliminating reliance on central government bureaucracies and budgetary constraints; and 4) laws and institutions can be adapted to reflect localized conditions at a scale where integrated natural resources management and climate change adaptation is more focused. Accordingly, the principle of subsidiarity has been welcomed by many states committed to decentralized governance, integrated water resources management, and/or civic participation. However, applications of decentralization have not been uniform, and in some cases have produced frustrating outcomes for states and water resources. Successful decentralization strategies are heavily dependent on dedicated financial resources and human resource capacity. This article explores the nexus between the principle of subsidiarity and the enabling environment, in the hope of articulating factors likely to contribute to, or detract from, the success of decentralized water resources management. Case studies from Haiti, Rwanda, and the United States' Florida Water Management Districts provide examples of the varied stages of decentralization.
