Suchergebnisse

This paper considers how the act of conferencing was central to imagining, negotiating and contesting post-war pacifism as an internationalist project. The paper contends that internationalism and the international conference are inexorably entwined. Through studying the conference geographers can explore the situated historical and political geographies of internationalism which belies its otherwise transcendent or universalist claims. A reading of the 1949 World Pacifist Meeting in India is used to make two key arguments. Firstly, it shows how conferences operate as stage-managed events through which to script and perform an alternative vision of internationalism. Half conference, half pilgrimage, the global composition of delegates was arranged to suggest a space 'singularly free from any sense of geographical limitation'. Yet total immersion in the rich cultural and historical context of India marked an uneven internationalist arena, where the 'Land of Gandhi' was held with unparalleled revere. Secondly, whilst geographers and others have turned to conferencing in recent years, this has largely been contained to 'summitry' and high-end diplomacy. This paper calls for geographers to consider a wider range of conferencing spaces and practices, and argues that studying 'other conferences' by necessity opens up consideration of other forms of internationalism. The paper concludes that the World Pacifist Meeting's delegates imagined an alternative form of internationalism, exemplified by an alternative form of international conference, which sought to challenge state-centric readings of global power relations.

This article investigates the role that diplomacy-especially at the highest levels-can play in transforming adversarial relationships. Building on Martin Wight's exploration of these issues, in particular the question of how two adversaries can convince each other that they are serious negotiating partners, the article contends that achieving a significant de-escalation of a conflict depends upon the growth of trust. In contrast to Wight's limited conception of what diplomacy could achieve in terms of ending conflicts, the argument made here is that particular types of communicative encounters between diplomats, and especially leaders, can build a level of trust at the interpersonal level which can lead policy-makers to make conciliatory frame-breaking moves. To make good on this claim, the article employs a case-study of the summitry between US President Ronald Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev. The key contention here is that the face-to-face encounters between Reagan and Gorbachev promoted a level of trust between them that made possible the fundamental de-escalation of the Cold War that took place in the second half of the 1980s. Rival explanations focusing on nuclear weapons and Soviet economic decline are analysed, but while these were enabling conditions in the transformation of relations, the article argues that it is necessary to recognize the critical role that interpersonal trust between US and Soviet leaders played in achieving this diplomatic transformation. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction: The Genealogies, Elements and Implications of a 'BRICS Order' -- Introduction -- A Brief Portrait of the Global Economy Since 2000: Locating the BRICS Rise -- The Great Recession and Its Aftermath, 2008-2018 -- New and Re-Emerging Actors in the Global Economy, 2000-2008 -- Brazil -- Russia -- India -- China -- South Africa -- The History of the BRICS -- The Global South, from Bandung to NIEO -- From IBSA to BRICS -- BRICS Summitry (so Far), 2009-2018 -- 1st Summit (2009) -- 2nd Summit (2010) -- 3rd Summit (2011) -- 4th Summit (2012) -- 5th Summit (2013) -- 6th Summit (2014) -- 7th Summit (2015) -- 8th Summit (2016) -- 9th Summit (2017) -- 10th Summit (2018) -- Literature Review -- Theoretical Underpinnings -- Accounting for the Rise -- Implications -- Impetus for, and Outline of, the Book -- Bibliography -- 2 Autochthonous Routes to Democracy: Assessing the Brics Polities -- Introduction -- Democracy: A Brief Conceptual Definition -- BRICS Countries' Autochthonous Political Systems -- Brazil -- Brazilian Democracy and the US -- India -- Indian Democracy -- South Africa -- The Winning of South African Democracy -- Towards a Non-Western Democratic Framework: A Growing Literature -- Conclusion -- Bibilography -- 3 Brics, Brazil and Africa: Economic Potential and Challenges -- BRICS Challenges and Potential: The Monetary-Financial Dimension -- BRICS Challenges and Potential: The Productive Dimension -- Brazil-Africa: Economic Relations (1997-2017) -- Conclusions -- Bibliography -- 4 Ambiguity or Strategic Play? Distilling India's BRICS Relations -- Introduction -- India's Economic Profile -- India's Trade -- India's Aggregate Exports for One Year (September 2017-August 2018) -- Imports -- Indian Foreign Policy -- Geographical Factors.

This volume represents the first, in-depth, inter-disciplinary, analysis of the past, present and future of the European Union's relations with countries, non-state actors and other partners across the Asia-Pacific region. The book is situated in the developing, interdisciplinary, discourse of EU foreign policy towards countries and regions across Asia, and it offers a research-led critique of the construction and the elements of the EU-Asia 'political space'. Written by an international team of experts from both Asia and Europe, the volume investigates the historical and cultural background, as well as diverse representations and imaginations in regard to the Asia-Europe inter-continental dialogue. The book examines the varied patterns, policies and priorities of the contemporary political, economic and cultural relations linking the EU with its interlocutors in Asia. Moreover, this collection throws light on a selected number of issues pertinent to current EU-Asia interaction, such as human rights promotion, learning and educational exchange, and the role of the mass media in the construction of Asia-Europe relations. The twelve chapters in this book cover a wide scope of subjects, including the EU's Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the summitry of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), EU foreign policy choices in Asia and EU contacts with Central Asia, Australia and New Zealand. This text is of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students, lecturers, the business community, decision-makers and practitioners in Politics, European Studies, Asia-Pacific Studies, International Relations, Law, Human Rights and Business Studies.

This volume represents the first, in-depth, inter-disciplinary, analysis of the past, present and future of the European Union's relations with countries, non-state actors and other partners across the Asia-Pacific region. The book is situated in the developing, interdisciplinary, discourse of EU foreign policy towards countries and regions across Asia, and it offers a research-led critique of the construction and the elements of the EU-Asia 'political space'. Written by an international team of experts from both Asia and Europe, the volume investigates the historical and cultural background, as well as diverse representations and imaginations in regard to the Asia-Europe inter-continental dialogue. The book examines the varied patterns, policies and priorities of the contemporary political, economic and cultural relations linking the EU with its interlocutors in Asia. Moreover, this collection throws light on a selected number of issues pertinent to current EU-Asia interaction, such as human rights promotion, learning and educational exchange, and the role of the mass media in the construction of Asia-Europe relations. The twelve chapters in this book cover a wide scope of subjects, including the EU's Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the summitry of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), EU foreign policy choices in Asia and EU contacts with Central Asia, Australia and New Zealand. This text is of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students, lecturers, the business community, decision-makers and practitioners in Politics, European Studies, Asia-Pacific Studies, International Relations, Law, Human Rights and Business Studies.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- PREFACE -- Ten Years of Contemporary Austrian Studies -- TOPICAL ESSAY -- Introduction -- I. A FIRST ASSESSMENT -- The European Union and Fundamental Rights -- II. FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES -- Regionalization and Globalization in Austrian Foreign Policy since 1918 -- The Austrian Crisis as Seen by a French Scholar of Germanic Culture -- Small States-Big States: Who Has the Political Clout in the European Union? -- The European Council and EU Summitry: A Comparative Analysis of the Austrian and German Presidencies -- III. DOMESTIC POLITICS PERSPECTIVES -- Haider's Revolution or The Future Has Just Begun -- The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)-an Austrian and a European Phenomenon? -- Austria's Welfare State: Withering Away in the Union? -- "Preventive Hammer Blow" or Boomerang? The EU "Sanction" Measures against Austria 2000 -- NONTOPICAL ESSAY -- Jews and Other Victims: The "Jewish Questions" and Discourses of Victimhood in Postwar Austria -- FORUM: World War II Crimes against Jews in Austria and Their Prosecution in Austrian Courts after the War -- Introduction -- The Aryanization of 1938-1939 in Vienna and the People's Court Trials After 1945 -- Holocaust on Trial: The Deportation of the Viennese Jews between 1941 and 1942 and the Austrian Judiciary After 1945 -- Austrian and British Trials Over Massacres of Jews at the End of World War II -- REVIEW ESSAYS -- The State of Intelligence Studies in Austria-Breaking Ground -- 1968 in Austria -- BOOK REVIEWS -- Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945 -- Ein Frühling, dem kein Sommer folgte. Französisch-österreichische Kulturtransfers seit 1945 -- Frankreich-Österreich Wechselseitige Wahrnehmung und wechselseitiger Einflu seit 1918

Such self-reflection lies at the core of the final article collected here, Pat Mooney's 'Stop the "Stockholm Syndrome!" Lessons learned from 30 years of UN summits'. An activist for more than thirty years & a participant in numerous international conferences in the field of environment & development, Mooney sets out by taking stock of the achievements of the summits & major conferences held at the international level over the past three decades. His view is plain: they have yielded meagre results, if any at all. In addition to accomplishing very little politically, these international high-level meetings have also had a detrimental impact on the work of civil society, Mooney argues. They serve to exhaust the energy of CSOs through, for example, long & complicated preparatory processes, & to divert attention away from work that could otherwise have been carried out. Civil society groups should therefore, he contends, consider to boycott future 'gala international fora'. But such a tactic may be difficult to achieve, as many CSOs suffer from the 'Stockholm Syndrome': that is, they have been 'taken hostage' by the logic & appeal of international summitry. Mooney sketches two possible treatments for the 'Stockholm Syndrome'. One is for civil society to devote more of its time to influencing & restructuring the UN & its agencies as well as other international organisations. The other is to engage in an intensified dialogue among civil society organisations themselves in order to strengthen information flows & probe strategic possibilities for increased cooperation. Mooney's article is a revised & updated version of a paper previously published by the ETC Group. Adapted from the source document.

Diplomacy and its institutions have been constantly changing. The manner in which diplomacy was practised in the earlier centuries is vastly different from how it is being practised in the twenty-first century. These changes range from the emergence of the training of messengers, the start of record keeping of diplomatic exchanges, the establishment of resident embassies, codification of formal diplomatic processes, widening domain of actors and issues, the use of multilateral conferences, use of summitry and many others. This evolution has been both a result of and further resulted in changing the larger socio-political-economic dimensions that the world has undergone. Among the myriad contextual changes, the revolution in communications, information and media technology has been phenomenal. This has brought into focus terms like the CNN effect and Vietnam War Syndrome where it is argued that media has had an influence in directing foreign policy choices of countries. Hence, this article seeks to analyse the media's interface with the most important institution of diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It specifically focuses on the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India. Has the news media acted either as an impediment or an accelerator to diplomatic practice? Has the information overload caused the diplomatic fraternity to face a loss of autonomy in any manner? With the objective of seeking an answer to these questions from diplomacy's perspective, the article explores the evolution of the External Publicity Division of the MEA, India. The External Publicity Division as it is generally known has been the nodal division leading the institutions' interface with the media. The actuality of media's interface with diplomacy in India's case will be set in the backdrop of the existing literature in the fields of media, diplomacy and foreign policy.

Background: In 2017, the G20 health ministers convened for the first time to discuss global health and issued a communiqué outlining their health priorities, as the BRICS and G7 have done for years. As these political clubs hold considerable political and economic influence, their respective global health agendas may influence both global health priorities and the priorities of other countries and actors. Methods: Given the rising salience of global health in global summitry, we analyzed the health ministerial communiqués issued by the BRICS, G7 and G20 after the SDGs were adopted in 2015. We compared the stated health priorities of the BRICS, G7 and G20 against one another and against the targets of SDG 3 on health, using a traffic light system to assess the quality of their commitments. Results: With regard to the SDG 3 targets, the BRICS, G7 and G20 priorities overlapped in their focus on emergency preparedness and universal health coverage, but diverged in areas of environmental pollution, mental health, and maternal and child health. Health issues with considerable associated burdens of disease, including substance use, road traffic injuries and sexual health, were missing from the agendas of all three political clubs. In terms of SDG 3 principles and ways of working, the BRICS, G7 and G20 varied in their emphasis on human rights, equity and engagement with non-state actors, but all expressed their explicit commitment to Agenda 2030. Conclusions: The leadership of BRICS, G7 and G20 on global health is welcome. However, their relatively narrow focus on the potential impact of ill-health primarily in relation to the economy and trade may not be sufficiently comprehensive to achieve the Agenda 2030 vision of promoting health equity and leaving no-one behind. Recommendations for the BRICS, G7 and G20 based on this analysis include: 1) expanding focus to the neglected SDG 3 health targets; 2) placing greater emphasis on upstream determinants of health; 3) greater commitment to equity and leaving no-one behind; 4) adopting explicit commitments to rights-based approaches; and 5) making commitments that are of higher quality and which include time-bound quantitative targets and clear accountability mechanisms. ; Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies ; Non UBC ; Reviewed ; Faculty

В статье рассматривается подход Японии к проведению саммита «Группы восьми». Автор дает прогноз итогов саммита «Группы восьми» 2008 г., на основе анализа истории участия Японии в клубе, сочетания таких факторов как внешние глобальные кризисы и внутри политические события в странах «Группы восьми» и странах участницах расширенного диалога. Автор уделяет большое внимание повестке дня и приоритетам председательства Японии, которая была сформулирована в течение подготовительного периода. Главными темами саммита «Группы восьми» 2008 года стали охрана окружающей среды, развитие Африки, мировая экономика, интеллектуальные права, ядерная безопасность и нераспространение. Автор анализирует ход подготовительного процесса, включающего цикл встреч министров, шерп, а также двусторонние визиты лидеров стран «Восьмерки». В статье рассматриваются факторы потенциального успеха саммита. Эти факторы включают террористические угрозы, расширяющиеся финансовый и продовольственный кризисы, экологический и энергетический шоки, несостоятельность многосторонних организаций. По мнению автора, спровоцированные сочетанием внешних глобальных шоков уравнивающиеся возможности стран-членов «Группы восьми» могут способствовать достижению успеха саммита. Автор также полагает, что успех саммита может быть определен такими факторами, как широкий круг участников, необходимость решать недавно возникшие проблемы, преемственность между глобальными вызовами, долговременными приоритетами «Группы восьми», а также повесткой саммита. ; The paper was prepared for the international seminar From Heiligendamm to Toyako Summit and Beyond: Priorities for the Future Agenda and Options for Reform sponsored by the International Organizations Research Institute of State University Higher School of Economics, which was held on 15-16 May 2008. The paper looks into Japan's approach to G8 Summitry. The author forecasts 2008 G8 Summit outcomes on the basis of the analysis of Japan's historic performance, external global shocks end internal events in G8 and O5 countries. The author also highlights Japanese host's agenda which was formulated over the preparatory period. The key topics for 2008 G8 Summit are environment, African development, world economy, intellectual property, nuclear safety and non-proliferation. The author considers the role of the preparatory process, embracing a series of ministerial meetings, a set of sherpa meetings and bilateral visits of G8 leaders. Most importantly, Dr. Kirton examines the propellers of the performance. According to him shocks-activated equalizing vulnerability of the G8 members may serve for the summit possible success. These vulnerabilities come from terrorists threats, contagious financial and food crisis, energy and ecological shocks, multilateral organizations' failure and poor domestic political situations in some G8 countries. And last but not least the author outlines prospects for the summit performance. He suggests that the summit success way may be further propelled by a wide range of participants, need to tackle the newly arising problems and continuity between the predominant global challenges, Japan's longstanding agenda and the summit agenda.

Представляем Вашему вниманию перевод статьи известного ученого и эксперта в области глобального управления и международных отношений, профессора Университета Торонто (Канада), директора Исследовательского центра «Группы восьми» Университета Торонто (Канада) Дж. Киртона. В статье проводится систематическое, аналитически обоснованное сопоставление саммитов «Группы восьми» и «Группы двадцати» для ответа на такие исследовательские вопросы, как: «Почему миру нужны саммиты «Группы восьми» и «Группы двадцати?» и «Какими станут их взаимоотношения?» в будущем. В предпринятом исследовании, во-первых, оба эволюционирующих института сопоставляются по таким параметрам, как способ учреждения, миссия, институционализация, членство, участие, повестка дня, механизмы подотчетности, продолжительность существования. Во-вторых, рассматривается, насколько эффективно функционировал каждый институт в рамках реализации собственной миссии, а также осуществления таких функций, как политическое управление на национальном уровне, обсуждение, определение направления действия, принятие решений, исполнение, а также содействие развитию глобального управления. В-третьих, статья определяет, какие именно задачи могут быть реализованы двумя институтами на саммитах в Мускоке 25-26 июня 2010 г., Торонто 26-27 июня 2010 г., и в Сеуле 11-12 ноября 2010 г. И, наконец, в-четвертых, в статье предпринимается прогноз развития отношений между двумя институтами в текущий период и после 2010 г. Подводя итог, статья резюмирует благоприятное развитие отношений между обоими институтами для создания глобального общественного блага. ; The article presents the translation of the paper Why the World Needs G8 and G20 Summitry: the Prospects from 2010 and Beyond prepared by John Kirton for the Center for Dialogue and Analysis on North America (CEDAN), Tecnologico de Monterrey (ITESM), Mexico City Campus, Mexico City in 11-12 March, 2010. The paper turns to the systematic, analytically grounded comparison of the G8 and G20 summits to answer two questions: Why does the world need the G8 and G20 summits? And what will be their relationship? It argues that the world needs both for the foreseeable future, because they do different jobs, because the G8 has proven it can do the job of both if need be, while the G20 has not yet shown it can do even its own job well. To develop this argument, the study first compares the two evolving institutions in their creation, mission, institutionalization, membership, participation, agenda, accountability, and durability, and finds that on most of these key institutional components, the G8 thus far has a superior claim. Second, it examines how well each institution has worked in accomplishing its core mission and in providing domestic political management, deliberation, direction setting, decision-making, delivery and the development of global governance. Third, it looks ahead to identify what the two institutions are likely to do at the G8 Muskoka Summit on June 25-26, the G20 Toronto Summit on June 26-27, and the G20 Seoul Summit on November 11-12. Fourth and finally, it looks at the prospective relationship between the two institutions, both now and beyond this year. The study concludes that they will work increasingly well with each other, for the greater global good.

В статье представлен анализ результатов председательства ЮАР в БРИКС, формально начавшегося с саммита в Дурбане 15-17 марта 2013 г. и завершившегося в июле 2014 г. встречей глав государств и правительств БРИКС в г. Форталеза. Для оценки эффективности председательства использована модель обеспечения баланса внешних условий и национальных приоритетов страны-председателя в неформальных институтах, таких как БРИКС, «Группа двадцати», «Группа семи». В данной модели (модели «спрос-предложение») эффективность председательства рассматривается как способность председателя обеспечить: 1) высокую степень отражения в повестке дня и решениях саммита ключевых проблем глобального управления; 2) баланс внутреннего спроса (собственных приоритетов и интересов) и внешнего спроса (проблем глобального управления и приоритетов стран-партнеров по институту); 3) максимальное использование сложившегося потенциала института. Ключевое значение при этом имеет соответствие выбранной роли страны-председателя (организатора, посредника, политического лидера, представителя национальных интересов) внешним условиям и внутренним обстоятельствам. Для оценки соответствия спроса предложению были использованы методы контент-анализа документов, сравнительный анализ и функциональный подход. Основные источники исследования документы БРИКС, национальные документы стран-членов БРИКС, программные выступления лидеров ЮАР и других лидеров стран БРИКС. Результаты исследования показали, что значимыми факторами эффективности председательства ЮАР стали приверженность осуществлению согласованных на саммите в Дурбане решений и плана действий, а также стремление к использованию БРИКС для реализации задач развития стран Африки и лидерского потенциала ЮАР на континенте. Причем если в первом случае в основе успеха лежал выбор председателем роли организатора, то во втором случае оптимальным было сочетание роли политического лидера и представителя национальных интересов. ; The paper presents the analysis of South Africa's BRICS Presidency which formally started with the summit in Durban on March 15-17, 2013 and finished in June 2014 with the BRICS leaders' Fortaleza meeting. To assess the Presidency effectiveness the author applies "supply-demand" model fine-tuned to achieve a balance of external conditions and national priorities of the country chairing informal summitry institutions, such as BRICS, G20 or G7/8. This analytical paradigm allows reveal to what extent the Presidency has managed to ensure: 1) a high level of response to the key global governance challenges in the summit agenda and decisions; 2) a balance between internal demand (domestic priorities) and external demand (other members' interests and global governance challenges) in the Presidency priorities; 3) maximal use of the institution's capabilities. Conformity of the role chosen by the Presidency (organizer, mediator, political leader, national representative) to the combination of external and internal conditions is also considered as it is a major factor of the presidency success. Content analysis, comparative analysis and functional approach were used in the study. The primary sources of the research included the BRICS documents, national documents of the member states, the leaders' addresses. The study reveals that the major factors of the South African BRICS presidency success were commitment to implementation of the Durban decisions and action plan as well as the will to utilize the BRICS capabilities for African countries development and South African regional leadership. In the former case the foundation of success was reinforced the chair' choice of the organizer role, whereas in the latter a combination of the political leader and national representative roles proved to be the most productive for the presidency.

In the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union (EU) communitarized civil justice by transferring competence over "judicial cooperation in civil matters" from the EU's Third Pillar to its First Pillar. Soon afterwards, the European Council prepared a detailed five-year plan ('Tampere Milestones') at its 1999 summit in Finland. These two steps unleashed a deluge of law- and policy-making aimed at reforming the European legal system. While consisting largely of technocratic issues dealing with procedural law, the conflict of laws (private international law), and the administration of justice (e.g., judicial networks and judicial training), the changes introduced since communitarization took effect in 1999 have transformed the European legal system, and have ongoing potential to transform it further. Part II maps the changes, places them in historical context, and provides an analytical framework for grasping their significance.Part III of this dissertation explains my two case studies: the communitarization of civil justice in Amsterdam and the long-term policy planning process in Tampere. My data is drawn from 70 qualitative interviews with (mostly) legal elites and the available documentary sources. My explanation draws on theories of European (dis)integration as well as on neoinstitutional (new institutional) theories and others that provide insight into the agency of legal elites in transnational governance settings, such as the EU.The 'Grand Debate' between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism provides the theoretical starting point for my analysis. My findings provide considerable support for neofunctionalism (Haas 1958, Niemann 2006) and little support for intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993 & 1998a). As to the former, I trace the complex interactions among national and supranational actors and find strong evidence of functional, social, and cultivated spillover, but no evidence of exogenous spillover. As to the latter, I find virtually no evidence that the preferences articulated by national legal elites were oriented towards preserving national legal culture or institutions. Rather, legal elites treated the exercise of preference formation as a collaborative effort to imagine and construct an ideal European legal order, which might, in some cases, benefit from particular national legal institutions or from the experience of subregional legal cooperation, such as in the Nordic countries. The one exception that provides some support for an intergovernmentalist explanation is that the decision to communitarize civil justice was indirectly driven by the preferences of some Member States not to communitarize criminal justice issues. In this sense, civil justice was the easier and less intrusive path. The traditional theories – neofunctionalism and, to a lesser extent, intergovernmentalism – go a long way towards explaining my two case studies (i.e., Amsterdam and Tampere), but are not adequate standing alone. For this reason, I draw upon postfunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks 2009a) to explain the role of communal identity as a driver. My findings show that subregional identity oriented towards Nordic legal culture and cooperation were an important factor in Finnish preference formation. Finland plays a key role in explaining both case studies, not least because the Tampere summit took place in Finland during the first Finnish Presidency. Chapter 7 shows, however, that Finland also played a key role in regard to the communitarization of civil justice in Amsterdam. Mine is not, however, a single-actor explanation, since the efforts of Finland were partly shaped by the work of other (national but especially supranational) actors who were active in the field, notably the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and the European Parliament. Although the treaty-revision and summitry processes in the EU are highly path dependent, they leave considerable room for contemporaneous actors – including strong-willed civil servants – to leave their mark on the course of European integration.My explanation draws on neoinstitutional theories oriented towards the "logic of consequences" and the "logic of appropriateness." Both contribute towards an understanding of the role of the Dutch Presidency (Amsterdam, 1997) and the Finnish Presidency (Tampere, 1999). In addition, neoinstitutionalism contributes to my explanation of the specific agency of legal elites. Sociological institutionalism, in particular, affords deep insights into the role of "knowledge-bearing occupational groups" (Ziegler 1997) – such as legal elites – as does the literature on epistemic communities (Haas 1992, Cross 2013). Using my data, I link particular outcomes to the professional worldviews and ideational predisposition of key legal elite actors.

With opinion polls showing Donald Trump ahead of Joe Biden in the 2024 race, Washington policymakers are contemplating the possibility of another Trump administration.No doubt there would be dramatic changes in U.S. foreign policy. Including, it appears, in Washington's approach to North Korea.As Politico reported: "Donald Trump is considering a plan to let the Democratic People's Republic of Korea keep its nuclear weapons and offer its regime financial incentives to stop making new bombs, according to three people briefed on his thinking." This would overturn decades of international insistence that the North eschew nuclear weapons, commonly called CVID: complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement/denuclearization. Until now, questioning this policy triggered wild wailing, gnashing of teeth, and rending of garments among Korea-watchers.The conventional wisdom is that Washington must stand firm — until the end of time, or beyond, if necessary — despite the growing North Korean nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang has enough fissile material to make at least 45-55 weapons, and perhaps twice that number, though estimates vary widely. Moreover, the DPRK continues to add nukes. One controversial study warned that the North could amass as many as 242 weapons in the next few years, which would place it ahead of Israel, Pakistan, India, and the United Kingdom.Virtually no one believes that Pyongyang will denuclearize. Only South Africa, with just six weapons (and another being constructed), has eliminated an existing arsenal. Almost certainly disarming the DPRK would require either defeat or collapse of the Kim dynasty. Regarding North Korea, fantasy has seemingly become policy.However, it appears that Trump is prepared to overturn conventional wisdom when it comes to Pyongyang — again. After threatening war in 2017, he turned to summitry with Kim Jong-un, a switch widely denounced in Washington. Distrust of Trump as a negotiator was pervasive, with the greatest fear that he would succeed and agree to something other than CVID. After the 2019 Hanoi summit collapsed without a deal, Kim appears to have decided that Trump was unwilling to agree to sanctions relief without a commitment to full denuclearization. The former then ended his dialogue with the US (and South Korea).Biden continues to insist on CVID, instructing the DPRK not to conduct another nuclear test. Despite his proposals for contact, which at times came perilously close to begging, Kim has refused to talk. Rather, the latter is expanding North Korea's nuclear capability, testing ballistic missiles, launching satellites, developing submarine-launched and tactical weapons, and threatening first use of nukes. These efforts may now be aided by Russia, which is relying on the North to provide artillery shells and perhaps more for the Ukraine war.The future looks no better. Last year after the Supreme People's Assembly enshrined the North's nuclear status in law, Kim declared that "As long as nuclear weapons exist on Earth, and imperialism and the anti-North Korean maneuvers of the US and its followers remain, our road to strengthening our nuclear force will never end." This policy, he added, is "irreversible." He is likely strengthening his nuclear deterrent to prepare for talks with Washington — presumably offering to trade nuclear limits for sanctions relief.Policymakers almost uniformly reject this course since arms control won't deliver denuclearization, Washington's preferred outcome. However, the result still would be better, likely far better, than Pyongyang continuing to augment its stockpile and replacing Pakistan as a global Nukes 'R Us. However, that doesn't matter to critics.Some simply insist that the North cannot have nuclear weapons. Of course, it shouldn't have them, but successive U.S. presidents repeating that point have left North Korea as an undisputed nuclear state. Another argument is that dropping CVID would undermine the nonproliferation regime. However, the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons, not America's recognition of that reality, poses the real nonproliferation challenge. Another claim is that the Republic of Korea and Japan would doubt Washington's commitment to denuclearization of the North. But Washington's attitude matters little if North Korea rejects that objective. Alliance cooperation does not require blinkered dogmatic futility.For some analysts the greatest fear is that acknowledging the North's nuclear status would fuel ROK support for an independent nuclear deterrent. Again, pretending that the DPRK does not possess nuclear weapons does not make them disappear. Washington's hapless CVID policy will not comfort South Koreans worried about nuclear threats from the North and Washington's willingness to respond militarily.Indeed, the latter poses the biggest problem for today's Ostrich policy. Since everyone knows Pyongyang is expanding its arsenal and means of delivery, the critical question is what to do in response. South Koreans might accept the pretense that CVID is a serious objective so long as Washington is willing to risk the American homeland and potentially millions of American lives to defend the South in the event of war.Alas, the "Washington Declaration," which grew out of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol's visit to the US, engaged in magical thinking. Announced the two governments: "The ROK has full confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments and recognizes the importance, necessity, and benefit of its enduring reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent." Wonderful rhetoric, and hardly surprising, given how well the two presidents got along. However, the more and more sophisticated North Korea's armaments, the less credible this policy becomes.The DPRK is not going to launch a first strike on America. Indeed, absent U.S. security guarantees to and troops in the South, Pyongyang would pay little more attention to Washington than to Brussels or, frankly, to New Delhi or Sydney. However, the U.S. is prepared to strike the North, and in the event of war almost certainly would attempt to overthrow the Kim dynasty. Hence, Pyongyang's desire for an expansive deterrent — a mix of tactical and strategic weapons, with the latter distributed among submarine- and land-based missiles, the latter sporting multiple warheads. What American president then would be so reckless and irrational to put South Korea before the U.S.? Defending the ROK, a country well able to protect itself, is not worth risking millions of Americans' lives.In short, no amount of presidential karaoke is likely to preserve confidence in extended deterrence once Pyongyang credibly threatens the U.S. homeland. The best way to at least moderate the North Korean nuclear threat would be to abandon the CVID campaign and instead promote arms control, meaningful and verifiable limits on the DPRK's program in exchange for sanctions relief. And to do so sooner rather than later. At least, setting realistic objectives would be more likely to yield success. And if diplomacy restrained the North, Washington could resurrect CVID in future negotiations. Perhaps North Korean policy, leadership, or regime will eventually change. Donald Trump's foreign policy mistakes were many, but on the North's nuclear challenge he has been farsighted compared to most foreign policy analysts. That continues with his reported willingness to deal with the DPRK as it is, not how everyone wishes it were. North Korea is a nuclear state. It is time to confront that reality.