Suchergebnisse

Drawing on Sekulić, Massey and Hodson's seminal article 'Who were the‎ Yugoslavs?', this paper compares the share and determinants of identifying as‎ Yugoslavs during socialism with the panorama of primary European identification.‎ Eurobarometer surveys containing data on European identification are‎ utilized to that end. The study takes in consideration social and political contexts ‎that shaped supranational identification in particular Yugoslav socialist‎ republics and EU member states. Our findings show low levels of Europeans‎ and Yugoslavs in both polities. The results also show that nationally specific‎ contexts affect both the prevalence of European identification and its determinants.‎ There are considerable differences in the level of European identification‎ among EU countries, and statistical analyses of the Belgian, French and‎ German cases further showed that different factors shape it. Of all the variables,‎ non-exclusive nationalities have been the strongest predictors of supranational ‎identification in both Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU.‎

AbstractThe emergence of strong authorities beyond the nation state has raised questions about the absence of democratic legitimacy at the supranational level. The usual response to this dilemma has been an attempt to uncouple the strict link between national statehood and democracy, and in the process, to confer a degree of legitimacy on supranational authorities. This article argues that such an uncoupling is unconvincing, and that within the legitimacy-democracy-statehood triangle, the uncoupling of legitimacy and democracy is a more promising strategy. The legitimacy of supranational authorities is grounded in their appeal to 'public reason' – a legitimacy-conferring device well-suited to supranational authorities, as illustrated in this article by the examples of the European Court of Human Rights and the WTO dispute settlement system. On this basis, the article argues that we should not see the relationship between statehood legitimacy (based optimally on electoral democracy) and supranational legitimacy (based on public reason) as mutually antagonistic and engaged in zero-sum competition. Rather, this relationship allows scope for synergy, with supranational authorities often playing an important role in supporting democracy at the nation-state level.

AbstractThe sovereign debt crisis and the euro crisis have prompted heads of state and government in Europe to intensify supranational cooperation. However, some political leaders and policy makers aim for more. They propose the introduction of a common European economic government that would prevent Europe from experiencing further financial threats and stabilise national budgets and financial markets, as well as the euro. The results of a survey among well‐informed people imply a rather ambivalent attitude towards this venture. While a slim majority favours the general idea of centralised economic governance in Europe, or in the eurozone, the concrete ideas for the design of such a government are not popular among the respondents. A centralised macroeconomic policy, a common budget that is set centrally and using eurobonds as a common means of debt financing in the eurozone all receive limited approval. So, if they are aiming for more supranational cooperation, public and corporate policy makers need to take clear‐cut steps that offer tangible benefits that influence public opinions favourably.