Suchergebnisse

The aim of this article is to analyse the role of supranational actors in European neighbourhood space seeking to present the forms and instruments of these institutions getting involved in processes in the neighbourhood. The research was done by analysing the official EU documents, scientific literature, by participating in the debates with the employees and the members of the European Parliament in the European Parliament in October, 2010. The conclusion can be made that both institutions (the Commission and the Parliament) use bilateral and multilateral frameworks for the communication and active engagement with the neighbours. The Commission acts within its official competences (such as negotiations for the action plans, implementation and monitoring processes) and this institution is very important as the expert and evaluator of the progress made in a neighbouring country, but it cannot make the political influence or get involved in internal party disputes in the third countries. But this is a free space for the Parliament activities. The Parliament actively involves itself in the neighbourhood processes by using its "soft power" instruments. Both supranational institutions also are visible within multilateral regional frameworks. The difference between them is that the Parliament creates new frameworks like Parliamentary Assemblies (Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, Euronest) and the Commission gets involved in created regional institutions or frameworks as an. [to full text]

The aim of this article is to analyse the role of supranational actors in European neighbourhood space seeking to present the forms and instruments of these institutions getting involved in processes in the neighbourhood. The research was done by analysing the official EU documents, scientific literature, by participating in the debates with the employees and the members of the European Parliament in the European Parliament in October, 2010. The conclusion can be made that both institutions (the Commission and the Parliament) use bilateral and multilateral frameworks for the communication and active engagement with the neighbours. The Commission acts within its official competences (such as negotiations for the action plans, implementation and monitoring processes) and this institution is very important as the expert and evaluator of the progress made in a neighbouring country, but it cannot make the political influence or get involved in internal party disputes in the third countries. But this is a free space for the Parliament activities. The Parliament actively involves itself in the neighbourhood processes by using its "soft power" instruments. Both supranational institutions also are visible within multilateral regional frameworks. The difference between them is that the Parliament creates new frameworks like Parliamentary Assemblies (Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, Euronest) and the Commission gets involved in created regional institutions or frameworks as an. [to full text]

The aim of this article is to analyse the role of supranational actors in European neighbourhood space seeking to present the forms and instruments of these institutions getting involved in processes in the neighbourhood. The research was done by analysing the official EU documents, scientific literature, by participating in the debates with the employees and the members of the European Parliament in the European Parliament in October, 2010. The conclusion can be made that both institutions (the Commission and the Parliament) use bilateral and multilateral frameworks for the communication and active engagement with the neighbours. The Commission acts within its official competences (such as negotiations for the action plans, implementation and monitoring processes) and this institution is very important as the expert and evaluator of the progress made in a neighbouring country, but it cannot make the political influence or get involved in internal party disputes in the third countries. But this is a free space for the Parliament activities. The Parliament actively involves itself in the neighbourhood processes by using its "soft power" instruments. Both supranational institutions also are visible within multilateral regional frameworks. The difference between them is that the Parliament creates new frameworks like Parliamentary Assemblies (Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, Euronest) and the Commission gets involved in created regional institutions or frameworks as an. [to full text]

Authors examine the nature and scope of the tourism law and its place in the Lithuanian legal system according to the theory of law, assess the main legal acts regulating the tourism sector, their relation to each other and problematic aspects of their application in practice, disclose the status of the legal framework of the tourism sector at national, international and supranational levels, examine the impact of European Union law on the Lithuanian tourism law. Authors conclude that currently the tourism law may be treated not as a separate branch of law, but, according to its subject and method of regulation, as a separate inter-branch law institute. Legal norms of this law institute regulate the whole spectrum of social relations formed between various subjects acting in the field of tourism industry when organizing a travel (directly or through agents), providing tourist information, accommodation, health and wellness, transportation, catering, entertainment, conference organisation and other tourist services. After discussing the complex nature of legal norms regulating the tourism field it is concluded that the scope of the tourism law is changing, by encompassing new more complex relations with greater diversity, therefore the institute of the tourism law may gradually transform into an independent branch of law. The authors also discuss the legislative trends at national, international and supranational levels in the tourism law area with particular attention to the new Package Travel Directive. The article, inter alia, concludes that this Directive, due to a maximum harmonisation approach (as opposed to an earlier minimum harmonisation approach), is of particular importance to the national tourism law in Lithuania.

Authors examine the nature and scope of the tourism law and its place in the Lithuanian legal system according to the theory of law, assess the main legal acts regulating the tourism sector, their relation to each other and problematic aspects of their application in practice, disclose the status of the legal framework of the tourism sector at national, international and supranational levels, examine the impact of European Union law on the Lithuanian tourism law. Authors conclude that currently the tourism law may be treated not as a separate branch of law, but, according to its subject and method of regulation, as a separate inter-branch law institute. Legal norms of this law institute regulate the whole spectrum of social relations formed between various subjects acting in the field of tourism industry when organizing a travel (directly or through agents), providing tourist information, accommodation, health and wellness, transportation, catering, entertainment, conference organisation and other tourist services. After discussing the complex nature of legal norms regulating the tourism field it is concluded that the scope of the tourism law is changing, by encompassing new more complex relations with greater diversity, therefore the institute of the tourism law may gradually transform into an independent branch of law. The authors also discuss the legislative trends at national, international and supranational levels in the tourism law area with particular attention to the new Package Travel Directive. The article, inter alia, concludes that this Directive, due to a maximum harmonisation approach (as opposed to an earlier minimum harmonisation approach), is of particular importance to the national tourism law in Lithuania.

Summary The recent development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has recently become the most debating issue in the EU integration process. Discussion on this topic has significantly increased as a result of changes in the security concept, geopolitical issues, terrorism, transatlantic unity challenges, Brexit, EU Institutions' positions and the Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative (PESCO) which was agreed by 25 EU countries to join. The purpose of this work is to examine the role of supranational institutions of the European Union in the CFSP policy-making process by conducting the PESCO case study analysis. In order to achieve the goal of this research work, the dominant European Integration theories - neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism were used. The paper presents a case study of PESCO – its' definition, key characteristics, chronology of decision-making and the role of Member States and EU supranational institutions in it. According to the analysis presented, the correspondence between the two analyzed theoretical approaches is compared. By doing that, author is trying to answer which theory better explains the adopted ruling - neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism. Using Critical Selection Approach, two main theories suggested 3 different variables from each, that were used to review the role of Member states and EU institutions in the PESCO acceptance process, were elaborated. The main questions that were asked in this work were these: what role does the EU supranational institutions play in the development of the EU CFSP? What were the main driving forces of PESCO - the national interests of the Member States or the interest of supranational institutions and which of two used EI theories could better explain the adoption of the PESCO? The results of this work show that in the most of the scientific analysis PESCO is considered to be a states' agreement, which was mainly influenced by the state-level interests and pressure from the countries with the highest negotiating power, such as Germany and France. However, EU supranational institutions and other supranational actors have had a huge influence not only on initiating discussions on PESCO, but have also retained this power when PESCO started its action. For this reason, in response to the main question and purpose of this study, the carried out analysis implies that supranational institutions are a powerful actor even in a socially sensitive area of the CFSP, and the PESCO ruling can be better justified on the basis of neofunctionalist theory rather than intergovernmental theory.

Summary The recent development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has recently become the most debating issue in the EU integration process. Discussion on this topic has significantly increased as a result of changes in the security concept, geopolitical issues, terrorism, transatlantic unity challenges, Brexit, EU Institutions' positions and the Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative (PESCO) which was agreed by 25 EU countries to join. The purpose of this work is to examine the role of supranational institutions of the European Union in the CFSP policy-making process by conducting the PESCO case study analysis. In order to achieve the goal of this research work, the dominant European Integration theories - neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism were used. The paper presents a case study of PESCO – its' definition, key characteristics, chronology of decision-making and the role of Member States and EU supranational institutions in it. According to the analysis presented, the correspondence between the two analyzed theoretical approaches is compared. By doing that, author is trying to answer which theory better explains the adopted ruling - neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism. Using Critical Selection Approach, two main theories suggested 3 different variables from each, that were used to review the role of Member states and EU institutions in the PESCO acceptance process, were elaborated. The main questions that were asked in this work were these: what role does the EU supranational institutions play in the development of the EU CFSP? What were the main driving forces of PESCO - the national interests of the Member States or the interest of supranational institutions and which of two used EI theories could better explain the adoption of the PESCO? The results of this work show that in the most of the scientific analysis PESCO is considered to be a states' agreement, which was mainly influenced by the state-level interests and pressure from the countries with the highest negotiating power, such as Germany and France. However, EU supranational institutions and other supranational actors have had a huge influence not only on initiating discussions on PESCO, but have also retained this power when PESCO started its action. For this reason, in response to the main question and purpose of this study, the carried out analysis implies that supranational institutions are a powerful actor even in a socially sensitive area of the CFSP, and the PESCO ruling can be better justified on the basis of neofunctionalist theory rather than intergovernmental theory.

Summary The recent development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has recently become the most debating issue in the EU integration process. Discussion on this topic has significantly increased as a result of changes in the security concept, geopolitical issues, terrorism, transatlantic unity challenges, Brexit, EU Institutions' positions and the Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative (PESCO) which was agreed by 25 EU countries to join. The purpose of this work is to examine the role of supranational institutions of the European Union in the CFSP policy-making process by conducting the PESCO case study analysis. In order to achieve the goal of this research work, the dominant European Integration theories - neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism were used. The paper presents a case study of PESCO – its' definition, key characteristics, chronology of decision-making and the role of Member States and EU supranational institutions in it. According to the analysis presented, the correspondence between the two analyzed theoretical approaches is compared. By doing that, author is trying to answer which theory better explains the adopted ruling - neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism. Using Critical Selection Approach, two main theories suggested 3 different variables from each, that were used to review the role of Member states and EU institutions in the PESCO acceptance process, were elaborated. The main questions that were asked in this work were these: what role does the EU supranational institutions play in the development of the EU CFSP? What were the main driving forces of PESCO - the national interests of the Member States or the interest of supranational institutions and which of two used EI theories could better explain the adoption of the PESCO? The results of this work show that in the most of the scientific analysis PESCO is considered to be a states' agreement, which was mainly influenced by the state-level interests and pressure from the countries with the highest negotiating power, such as Germany and France. However, EU supranational institutions and other supranational actors have had a huge influence not only on initiating discussions on PESCO, but have also retained this power when PESCO started its action. For this reason, in response to the main question and purpose of this study, the carried out analysis implies that supranational institutions are a powerful actor even in a socially sensitive area of the CFSP, and the PESCO ruling can be better justified on the basis of neofunctionalist theory rather than intergovernmental theory.

Summary The recent development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has recently become the most debating issue in the EU integration process. Discussion on this topic has significantly increased as a result of changes in the security concept, geopolitical issues, terrorism, transatlantic unity challenges, Brexit, EU Institutions' positions and the Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative (PESCO) which was agreed by 25 EU countries to join. The purpose of this work is to examine the role of supranational institutions of the European Union in the CFSP policy-making process by conducting the PESCO case study analysis. In order to achieve the goal of this research work, the dominant European Integration theories - neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism were used. The paper presents a case study of PESCO – its' definition, key characteristics, chronology of decision-making and the role of Member States and EU supranational institutions in it. According to the analysis presented, the correspondence between the two analyzed theoretical approaches is compared. By doing that, author is trying to answer which theory better explains the adopted ruling - neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism. Using Critical Selection Approach, two main theories suggested 3 different variables from each, that were used to review the role of Member states and EU institutions in the PESCO acceptance process, were elaborated. The main questions that were asked in this work were these: what role does the EU supranational institutions play in the development of the EU CFSP? What were the main driving forces of PESCO - the national interests of the Member States or the interest of supranational institutions and which of two used EI theories could better explain the adoption of the PESCO? The results of this work show that in the most of the scientific analysis PESCO is considered to be a states' agreement, which was mainly influenced by the state-level interests and pressure from the countries with the highest negotiating power, such as Germany and France. However, EU supranational institutions and other supranational actors have had a huge influence not only on initiating discussions on PESCO, but have also retained this power when PESCO started its action. For this reason, in response to the main question and purpose of this study, the carried out analysis implies that supranational institutions are a powerful actor even in a socially sensitive area of the CFSP, and the PESCO ruling can be better justified on the basis of neofunctionalist theory rather than intergovernmental theory.

The fiscal federalism theory was developed to explain budget formation in independent states. At present, this theory is often applied to supranational institutions like the European Union (hereinafter EU), without paying enough attention to the unique characteristics of this level of analysis. This article identifies which assumptions of the classical fiscal federalism theory cannot be applied to the supranational level. This paper answers the question of whether changes in the EU budget of 2014 were in line with the normative principles of the fiscal federalism. Recommendations to the policy makers how the EU budget could be improved are presented in the conclusions. Meanwhile, funding for the remaining three areas consists of ~40.6% of the EU budget. On this basis, we cannot say that the first of the EU budgets in the new multiannual financial framework is more in line with the principles of the fiscal federalism than the previous financial framework's first budget. Adapted from the source document.

This paper discusses the main nuances associated with the implementation and protection of consumer rights to the digital content. In particular, the main regulatory legal acts of the national and, if possible, supranational level will be considered, license agreements with the consumer will also be considered. Within the framework of these legal acts, the basic rights of the consumer, the rights of the campaign and possible ways of resolving disputes will be established. Also in this paper, specific examples of paragraphs of user agreements and their relationship with the legislation of the countries in question will be given. Examples of court decisions regarding consumer protection of digital content will be provided. Also, these decisions will be analyzed, in which cases of violation of consumer rights will be presented, and how the court applied national law to relations containing a foreign element between the consumer and the seller. Also, based on an analysis of the national law, supranational law, paragraphs of user agreements and court decisions, I will provide a list of recommendations for the further development of legal norms in this area and recommendations to administrative bodies and independent organizations. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate two things: the availability of modern law that meets the basic changes of our time is not a guarantee of observing consumer rights in the following cases: when companies engaged in cross-border or transnational activity do not make the necessary modifications of user agreements; administrative bodies and citizens are inactive, as a result of which the courts do not make decisions that would establish justice in this matter.

This paper discusses the main nuances associated with the implementation and protection of consumer rights to the digital content. In particular, the main regulatory legal acts of the national and, if possible, supranational level will be considered, license agreements with the consumer will also be considered. Within the framework of these legal acts, the basic rights of the consumer, the rights of the campaign and possible ways of resolving disputes will be established. Also in this paper, specific examples of paragraphs of user agreements and their relationship with the legislation of the countries in question will be given. Examples of court decisions regarding consumer protection of digital content will be provided. Also, these decisions will be analyzed, in which cases of violation of consumer rights will be presented, and how the court applied national law to relations containing a foreign element between the consumer and the seller. Also, based on an analysis of the national law, supranational law, paragraphs of user agreements and court decisions, I will provide a list of recommendations for the further development of legal norms in this area and recommendations to administrative bodies and independent organizations. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate two things: the availability of modern law that meets the basic changes of our time is not a guarantee of observing consumer rights in the following cases: when companies engaged in cross-border or transnational activity do not make the necessary modifications of user agreements; administrative bodies and citizens are inactive, as a result of which the courts do not make decisions that would establish justice in this matter.

The study aims to explain why European banks had different positions towards establishing the EU banking union. Most of the academic publications dedicated to analyze the very recently implemented EU financial sector reforms give particular attention to explaining why different EU member states opposed the creation of a full banking union as it was proposed by the European Commission while there is a lack of academic discussions raising the question of how to explain that European banks also had different positions towards the implementation of single supervisory and resolution mechanisms. The research poses the question of how to explain different banks' positions towards the creation of the EU banking union. While some international banks were strongly promoting the new supranational supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to the whole EU banking sector the others voiced strong opposition to the points of governance and application scope of proposed EU banking sector reforms. The overall aim of the study is to give the possible explanation of why different banks had different positions towards shaping the EU banking union. The study is based on the hypothesis that highly internationalized banks preferred greater European regulatory harmonization in the banking supervision and resolution (creating single supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would include all euro zone banks, supranational governance of banking resolution and high degree of risk sharing) while low internationalized banks preferred more the national regulatory autonomy. The research is based on the theoretical framework suggested by A. Spendzharova. The author argues that the level of bank internationalisation is an important determinant of the extent to which governments were prepared to endorse European solutions in banking supervision and resolution or prefer the national regulation. The proposed framework of the analysis has been applied to analyse countries' positions but it has not been applied to explain banks' preferences on the proposed elements of the EU banking union. The conducted analysis revealed that the internationalisation level alone cannot fully explain the positions of the banks on the creation of the EU banking union. The analysis of 20 biggest European banks varying from global to local banks revealed that despite being internationalized differently the majority of the banks supported the creation of the common supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to all euro zone banks. Even banks having a low internationalisation level supported the creation of the proposed EU banking union and vice versa. It can be also noted, that the majority of the banks voiced the support for the supranational governance of the single resolution mechanism but opposed the high degree of risk sharing – the creation of the ex ante resolution fund.

The study aims to explain why European banks had different positions towards establishing the EU banking union. Most of the academic publications dedicated to analyze the very recently implemented EU financial sector reforms give particular attention to explaining why different EU member states opposed the creation of a full banking union as it was proposed by the European Commission while there is a lack of academic discussions raising the question of how to explain that European banks also had different positions towards the implementation of single supervisory and resolution mechanisms. The research poses the question of how to explain different banks' positions towards the creation of the EU banking union. While some international banks were strongly promoting the new supranational supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to the whole EU banking sector the others voiced strong opposition to the points of governance and application scope of proposed EU banking sector reforms. The overall aim of the study is to give the possible explanation of why different banks had different positions towards shaping the EU banking union. The study is based on the hypothesis that highly internationalized banks preferred greater European regulatory harmonization in the banking supervision and resolution (creating single supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would include all euro zone banks, supranational governance of banking resolution and high degree of risk sharing) while low internationalized banks preferred more the national regulatory autonomy. The research is based on the theoretical framework suggested by A. Spendzharova. The author argues that the level of bank internationalisation is an important determinant of the extent to which governments were prepared to endorse European solutions in banking supervision and resolution or prefer the national regulation. The proposed framework of the analysis has been applied to analyse countries' positions but it has not been applied to explain banks' preferences on the proposed elements of the EU banking union. The conducted analysis revealed that the internationalisation level alone cannot fully explain the positions of the banks on the creation of the EU banking union. The analysis of 20 biggest European banks varying from global to local banks revealed that despite being internationalized differently the majority of the banks supported the creation of the common supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to all euro zone banks. Even banks having a low internationalisation level supported the creation of the proposed EU banking union and vice versa. It can be also noted, that the majority of the banks voiced the support for the supranational governance of the single resolution mechanism but opposed the high degree of risk sharing – the creation of the ex ante resolution fund.

The study aims to explain why European banks had different positions towards establishing the EU banking union. Most of the academic publications dedicated to analyze the very recently implemented EU financial sector reforms give particular attention to explaining why different EU member states opposed the creation of a full banking union as it was proposed by the European Commission while there is a lack of academic discussions raising the question of how to explain that European banks also had different positions towards the implementation of single supervisory and resolution mechanisms. The research poses the question of how to explain different banks' positions towards the creation of the EU banking union. While some international banks were strongly promoting the new supranational supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to the whole EU banking sector the others voiced strong opposition to the points of governance and application scope of proposed EU banking sector reforms. The overall aim of the study is to give the possible explanation of why different banks had different positions towards shaping the EU banking union. The study is based on the hypothesis that highly internationalized banks preferred greater European regulatory harmonization in the banking supervision and resolution (creating single supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would include all euro zone banks, supranational governance of banking resolution and high degree of risk sharing) while low internationalized banks preferred more the national regulatory autonomy. The research is based on the theoretical framework suggested by A. Spendzharova. The author argues that the level of bank internationalisation is an important determinant of the extent to which governments were prepared to endorse European solutions in banking supervision and resolution or prefer the national regulation. The proposed framework of the analysis has been applied to analyse countries' positions but it has not been applied to explain banks' preferences on the proposed elements of the EU banking union. The conducted analysis revealed that the internationalisation level alone cannot fully explain the positions of the banks on the creation of the EU banking union. The analysis of 20 biggest European banks varying from global to local banks revealed that despite being internationalized differently the majority of the banks supported the creation of the common supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to all euro zone banks. Even banks having a low internationalisation level supported the creation of the proposed EU banking union and vice versa. It can be also noted, that the majority of the banks voiced the support for the supranational governance of the single resolution mechanism but opposed the high degree of risk sharing – the creation of the ex ante resolution fund.