Suchergebnisse

Bei der Bundestagswahl am 22. September 2002 entschied sich eine knappe Mehrheit der Wähler für die Fortsetzung der rot-grünen Regierungskoalition. In den Vorwahlumfragen hatte das bürgerliche Lager lange Zeit vorn gelegen. Auslöser dieses Stimmungsumschwungs war ein Themenwechsel: Anstatt der bis Anfang August dominierenden Themen Wirtschaftslage und Arbeitslosigkeit bestimmten nun die Jahrhundertflut und der aufziehende Irakkonflikt die öffentliche Diskussion. Der Kanzler nutzte nicht zuletzt in den beiden TV-Duellen die Chance, sich als führungsstarker und entscheidungsfreudiger Krisenmanager zu profilieren, was ihm vor allem Stimmen der ostdeutschen Wähler einbrachte. Mit seiner deutlichen Absage an eine Kriegsbeteiligung besetzte er ein wesentliches Kompetenzfeld der PDS, was maßgeblich zu deren Scheitern an der Fünf Prozent-Hürde beitrug und damit erst die Voraussetzung für eine Regierungsmehrheit von Rot-Grün schuf. Wesentliche Voraussetzung für den Stimmungsumschwung war die anhaltende Skepsis gegenüber der Problemlösungskompetenz der Union und eine in breiten Wählerschichten spürbare Zurückhaltung gegenüber ihrem Spitzenkandidaten. Trotz der insgesamt kritischen Beurteilung der Politik der Bundesregierung herrschte deshalb zu keinem Zeitpunkt eine ausgeprägte Wechselstimmung. Auch wenn sich der Wahlkampf schließlich auf die Kanzlerfrage zuspitzte und es darüber zur Polarisierung der Wähler kam, ist am Wahlverhalten 2002 auch eine Präferenz für unterschiedliche Gesellschaftsmodelle abzulesen: für eine offene, tolerante Gesellschaft, die eher auf sozialen Ausgleich bedacht ist - wofür SPD und Grüne und auch Schröder standen - oder für eine stärker auf traditionelle Werte ausgerichtete und effizienzorientierte Leistungsgesellschaft, die eher mit Schwarz-Gelb und mit Stoiber verbunden wurde. (Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen / FUB)

THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENTARY (STORTING) ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1985, RESULTED IN A SWING IN FAVOUR OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TO THE LEFT. THESE OPPOSITION PARTIES DID NOT OBTAIN A MAJORITY IN THE NEW STORTIG, HOWEVER, OWING TO AN ELECTORAL REFORM INTRODUCED BEFORE THE ELECTION BY THE BOURGEOIS COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE COALITION REMAINED IN OFFICE AFTER THE ELECTION, BUT ONLY AS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT, SINCE TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RIGHT-WING PROGRESS PARTY HOLD THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST AND BOURGEOIS BLOC IN THE NEW STORTING. IN THE ELECTION OF 1985 THE VOTERS WERE FACED WITH TWO COMPETING GOVERNMENT ALTERNATIVES: EITHER MAINTENANCE OF THE BOURGEOIS COALITION, OR A MINORITY GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE LABOUR PARTY WITH SUPPORT FROM THE SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY AND THE TINY LIBERAL PARTY. THREE ASPECTS OF THE 1985 STORTING ELECTION ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTING:

In this paper the author statistically analyses the main results of the 2004 elections for Italian Members of the European Parliament. Compared to the previous European elections, of 1999, there was an increase in turn out of 1.9 percent, thus bringing to a halt the negative trend which characterized Italian European elections from 1979 to 1999. In terms of the distribution of valid votes among the official lists, there was a significant swing away from Forza Italia & from the Bonino-Pannella list, a minor worsening of the position of the main Centre-left list (Uniti nell'Ulivo), & an improvement for Rifondazione Comunista, Alleanza Nazionale, Unione di Centro, the Lega Nord, Comunisti Italiani & the Greens (Verdi). Finally, it is noted that in terms of preferences in favour of the candidates of the lists voted for, although in each of Italy's five constituencies voters were allowed to express up to three preferences, the number of preferences expressed was in fact lower than in 1999. Adapted from the source document.

The theory of economic voting has extensively explored the influence of national economic conditions on votes for the incumbent party during elections. Such literature has never, however, explored the potential effects of economy on other types of voting swings in the sense of change in votes for non-governing parties. This is owed to the limitations of the theory of economic voting, which we attempt to remedy by suggesting a more comprehensive theoretical framework based on ideological voting. From an empirical point of view, investigating the total electoral volatility appears an appropriate means to test the determinants of the votes for all parties. Using time-series data on 46 democratic elections held in France from 1889 to 2011, we provide evidence that the total electoral volatility has been determined by specific economic determinants that differ from the ones influencing the vote share of the incumbent. Another finding is that the voters' punishment of the incumbent at the heart of the theory of economic voting explains only a marginal part of total electoral volatility.

The measure of political mobility (PM) among French citizens which has emerged from the statistics of successive elections makes possible an estimate of the permanent instability of the French multi-party system. That which is called 'the rate of mobility' is calculated as follows: an estimate is made of the % of votes for each list of electors in the elections under consideration & of the % of abstentions; the diff between the %'s in each election is then calculated & these diff's totaled up. A comparison between the 'rate of mobility' in France on the one hand & Switzerland & the US on the other indicates that the rate is much higher in France. 3 other features of French PM are further evident in such studies: (1) the shifts in opinion are due to pol'al conversion rather than to the periodic mobilization of non-voters (as is the case in the US during presidential elections); (2) PM in France is cumulative; there is no stable structure here, as in Switzerland, which would allow the pendulum to swing back (a redistribution of power among a pre-determined number of party members); & (3) the number of parties increases this tendency toward PM in France, though such mobility is not inevitably the result of such a multiplicity of parties. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

Populism and democracy / Yascha Mounk -- Reconstructing our constitutional democracy / K. Sabeel Rahman -- Restoring healthy party competition / Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson -- When democracy becomes something else : the problem of elections and what to do about it / Andrew Gumbel -- The best answer to money in politics after Citizens United : public campaign financing in the empire state and beyond / Chisun Lee -- Remaking the presidency after Trump / Jeremi Suri -- The problem of presidentialism / Stephen Skowronek -- Renewing the American democratic faith / Steven C. Rockefeller -- American land, American democracy / Eric Freyfogle -- Race and democracy : the Kennedys, Obama, Trump, and us / Michael Eric Dyson -- Liberty and justice for all : Latina activist efforts to strengthen democracy in 2018 / Maria Hinojosa -- What Black women teach us about democracy / Andra Gillespie and Nadia E. Brown -- Engines of democracy : racial justice and cultural power / Rashad Robinson -- Civics and environmental education : protecting the planet and our democracy / Judy Braus -- The Supreme Court's legitimacy crisis and constitutional democracy's future / Dawn Johnsen -- Can democracy survive the internet? / David Hickton -- The new New Deal : how to re-regulate capitalism / Robert Kuttner -- First understand why they're winning : how to save democracy from the anti-immigrant far right / Sasha Polakow-Suransky -- No time left : how the system is failing to address our ultimate crisis / Bill McKibben -- Powering democracy through clean energy / Denise G. Fairchild -- The long crisis : American foreign policy before and after Trump / Jessica Tuchman Mathews -- The case for strong government / William S. Becker -- The states / Nick Rathod -- Democracy in a struggling swing state / Amy Hanauer -- Can independent voters save American democracy? Why 42 percent of American voters are independent, and how they can transform our political system / Jaqueline Salit and Thom Reilly -- Philanthropy and democracy / Stephen B. Heintz -- Keeping the republic / Dan Moulthrop -- The future of democracy / Mayor Ras Baraka -- Building a research university where all people matter / Michael M. Crow, William B. Dabars, and Derrick M. Anderson -- Biophilia and direct democracy / Timothy Beatley -- Purpose-driven capitalism / Mindy Lubber -- Restoring democracy : nature's trust, human survival, and constitutional fiduciary governance / Mary Christina Wood.

AUSTRALIA WENT TO THE POLLS ON 5 MARCH 1983 FOR THE SIXTH TIME IN JUST OVER 10 YEARS. AND IN AN ORDERLY, UNEXCITING ELECTION THEY THREW OUT MALCOLM FRASER'S SEVEN-YEAR-OLD LIBERAL COALITION GOVERNMENT AND GAVE THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY ITS BEST CHANCE SINCE THE 1940S TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS THE PARTY OF GOVERNMENT. THE BASIC EXPLANATION FOR THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT, WITH A 4 PER CENT SWING FROM 1980, PROBABLY LIES IN THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY. AUSTRALIA IS A DEEPLY GROWTH-ORIENTED COUNTRY AND THE SURGING ADVANCES OF THE 1950S AND 1960S CAME TO A HALT WITH THE WORLD DEPRESSION AT THE END OF THE 1970S. BY 1982 THE OECD PUT AUSTRALIA AT THE BOTTOM OF ITS LEAGUE TABLE FOR INFLATION AND FOR STAGNATION AND IT LOOKED AS IF IT WOULD SOON BE AT THE BOTTOM FOR UNEMPLOYMENT. 'IN BAD TIMES, THROW THE RASCALS OUT' IS A FAMILIAR ADAGE. IN SOME COUNTRIES, NOTABLY BRITAIN, OBSERVERS CLAIM THAT THERE IS A NEW AWARENESS OF HOW MUCH BAD TIMES ARE DUE TO EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND OF HOW LITTLE POLITICIANS CAN DO; THIS COULD TURN THE ADAGE UPSIDE DOWN. MR FRASER'S ADVISERS HOPED THAT HE WOULD BE SAVED BY POPULAR SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE LABOR PARTY AND ITS LEADER. BUT HIS RUBBISHING OF HIS OPPONENTS MAY HAVE PROVED COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE: AFTER ALL, THE LABOR TEAM, FAR MORE THAN WHEN GOUGH WHITLAM WON IN 1972, WAS MADE UP OF PRUDENT, MODERATE MEN WHO WERE NOT GOING TO FRIGHTEN EVEN THE CAUTIOUS CONSERVATIVE VOTERS OF AUSTRALIA.

"This book analyzes data from a variety of sources to understand the mainstreaming of racism today. The book puts this research in a historical context. Today with issues of globalization, immigration and demographic diversification achieving greater public salience, racism is more likely to manifest itself more in the form of a generalized ethnocentrism that expresses "outgroup hostility" toward a diverse set of groups, including Latinos and Muslims as well as African Americans. Both changes in structure and agency have facilitated the mainstreaming of racism today. Changes in the "political opportunity structure," as witnessed by the rise of the Tea Party Movement, facilitated the mainstreaming of white extremists into the Republican Party and lay the basis for an electoral politics focused on giving voice to white people more generally acting on their outgroup hostility. Changes in the political structure were matched by the appearance of a charismatic leader in the person of Donald Trump who made great use of a transformed media landscape to stoke white people's outgroup hostility. Trump won the presidency most strategically deploying his demagoguery to mobilize white non-voters in swing states, with the end result greatly accelerating the mainstreaming racism and placing it at the center of policymaking in the White House. With the extensive empirical evidence provided, this book documents how the mainstreaming of racism today began before Trump started to run for the presidency but then increased under his leadership and it likely to be a troubling presence in U.S. politics for some time to come. The findings provided create the basis for suggestions on how to push racism back to the margins of American politics"--

"In a richly reported, behind-the-scenes portrait of the Supreme Court and the secret world of its nine justices, veteran national journalist David A. Kaplan shows how the Court, far from being the "least dangerous branch" of government, in the words of Alexander Hamilton, has become in many respects the most dangerous branch, subverting democracy and betraying the Constitution. Never before has the Supreme Court been more central to American politics. A sizable percentage of voters in the most recent presidental election chose a candidate based largely on who they thought Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump would nominate to replace the fiery Antonin Scalia. In the face of a dysfunctional and paralyzed Congress, it is the Court, rather than our elected officials, that decides such divisive issues as gerrymandering, abortion, gun rights, voting rights, same sex marriage, immigration, and campaign finance. In a sweeping narrative that examines the personalities and quirks of the Justices, The Most Dangerous Branch shows how, going as far back as Roe v Wade, the Court has re-shaped America's political and social landscape in key cases on the left and the right. As much as the Chief Justice claims to be only calling balls and strikes, in fact the Court has not hesitated to put its collective thumb on the scale of justice to swing the law in the majority's direction. As a result, nine nonelected life-tenured lawyers, trained at but two elite universities (Harvard and Yale) have taken it upon themselves to decide the fate and direction of the nation. Kaplan's book gets at the heart of who these Justices are, and uncovers their personal agendas -- including that of Neil Gorsuch, President Trump's impatient and quietly radical new appointee. And with the retirement of even a single justice, the Court could, under Trump and a filibuster-proof Senate, be transformed into a insurrmountable conservative voting block that will reign even more supreme over America for a generation"--