Suchergebnisse

Political scientists often assume that parties listen to some voters more than others. However, this theoretical perspective has rarely been applied to explain political responsiveness to advocacy groups. This article argues that the type of voter mobilised by protest activities plays a role in determining whether advocacy groups are able to influence political decisions. The explanatory value of this approach is demonstrated by a study of the geographic distribution of school closures among Swedish local governments during the 2002–10 period. School issues have been important drivers of contentious politics in Sweden. Two hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis predicts that protesters in districts with numerous swing voters are more likely to achieve their goals. The second hypothesis predicts that protesters in districts with numerous core voters are more likely to achieve their goals. In line with the swing hypothesis, the main results suggest that protesters are more likely to stop school closures in volatile polling districts.

This article describes Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko's policy-focused struggles in an environment where voters swing, then swing away soon.

The ?swing voter? occupies a cherished place in American political lore. Candidates court swing voters, consultants target them, and pundits speculate constantly on which way they will lean. But nobody has adequately defined them as a group. What exactly is a swing voter? No one really seems to know.The Swing Voter in American Politics fills this conceptual gap. The book brings political scientists and pollsters together to answer four basic questions: What is a swing voter? How can analysts use survey data to identify swing voters? How do swing voters differ?if at all?from the rest of the ele

Although the presidential election will be a referendum on the incumbent, as it always is, the 2004 campaign may shift from targeting swing voters to motivating activists & ideologues on each side. Adapted from the source document.

When journalists, commentators, and political strategists talk about elections, few terms come up more frequently than that of the swing voter, yet this concept has been almost entirely ignored by academic analysts of voting and elections. In an attempt to fill that void, this article first develops a definition of the swing voter and then offers a simple way of locating swing voters in a mass sample survey. Using data from the American National Election Studies, the article then provides an initial look at the swing voters and how they differ from the rest of the electorate.

Despite strong theoretical claims that politicians should target swing voters with distributive benefits, empirical evidence in the United States is inconclusive. This paper addresses the puzzle by focusing on two factors overlooked in previous work. First, I show that, owing to the bimodal distribution of partisanship among the U.S. public, swing voters can be targeted efficiently through the allocation of federal resources to areas where the opposition is strong. Secondly, I hypothesize that presidents limit swing-voter targeting to times when they are actually up for reelection; thus, the opposition county advantage appears only in first presidential terms. An analysis of the geographic distribution of federal project grants awarded between 1986 and 2009 supports the theory. Presidents target swing voters within competitive states; they do so only in the years when they seek reelection, however, and they channel benefits to counties where the opposition party maintains a stronghold.

AbstractThis paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re‐election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.

This paper develops an infinite-horizon, political agency model with a continuum of political districts, in which incumbent politicians can improve their re-election probability by attracting swing voters in key states through strategic trade protection. A unique equilibrium is shown to exist where incumbents build a reputation of protectionism through their policy decisions. We show that strategic trade protection is more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free-trade supports in states with relatively strong electoral competition that represent a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. US data is used to test the hypothesis that industrial concentration in swing and decisive states is an important determinant of trade protection of that industry. The empirical findings provide support for the theory and highlight an important, and previously overlooked, determinant of trade protection in the US Electoral College.