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This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from u sing tariffs only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second, there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third, the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of ta riffs by NTBs depend on industry characteristics. These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence.

AbstractAfter successive rounds of tariff reductions by GATT/WTO members, non‐tariff measures (NTMs) have increasingly become the focal point of multilateral trade negotiations. It remains an open question whether the liberalization in tariff rates has subsequently been weakened or even erased by increases in NTMs. Using a product‐level global panel of WTO members over the period 1996–2019, this paper systematically examines the empirical link between various tariff measures and the imposition of NTMs. I find that bound or applied tariff reductions do not correlate much on their own with NTM incidence. The relevant trade policy margin for detecting a tariff–NTM nexus is instead tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO members' bound and applied tariff rates. Countries impose more NTMs when their sectoral applied tariffs are close to their respective bound rates, indicating that small tariff overhangs signal limited legal trade policy flexibility.

In this paper some coherent explanations are suggested for tariff reductions and substitution of non‐tariff barriers for tariffs, taking into account both organized special interests and unorganized consumer interests. The focus is on how the presence of informed consumers affects the political equilibrium choice of trade policy. Three effects are identified that interact with each other as an incumbent government substitutes a NTB for a tariff, and, among other things, it is found that an increase in foreign competition will not cause the government to substitute NTBs for tariffs, but a rise in the government's valuation of political contribution might do so. JEL Classification: F13, D72Ce mémoire propose des explications cohérentes de la réduction des droits de douane et de la substitution de barrières non‐tarifaires (BNT) pour les droits de douane dans un cadre d'analyse qui tient compte des groupes d'intérêt organisés et de la désorganisation des groupes de consommateurs. L'analyse insiste sur l'impact de consommateurs informés sur les choix politiques qui sous‐tendent la politique commerciale. Le mémoire identifie trois effets (effet de bienêtre social, effet de lobbying, effet d'information) qui jouent au moment où un gouvernement substitue une barrière non‐tarifaire à un droit de douane. On montre, entre autres choses, qu'un accroissement de la concurrence étrangère n'engendre pas de substitution de BNT pour un droit de douane, mais qu'un accroissement de la valeur accordée aux contributions électorales peut fort bien avoir cet effet.

We characterize the design of an optimal trade agreement when governments are privately informed about the value of tariff revenue. We show that the problem of designing an optimal trade agreement in this setting can be represented as an optimal delegation problem when a money burning instrument is available. In a specification with quadratic payoffs and a uniform distribution, we find that the tariff cap and the probability of binding overhang are higher when the upper bound of the support distribution is higher and when the support distribution has greater width.