Suchergebnisse

This paper deals with the issue of whether the Revenue Service (RS) should be allowed, or even encouraged, to negotiate settlement agreements with taxpayers subject to examination. We consider the case in which the RS enjoys discretion at the settlement stage, its stance being guided by officers' professional judgment. We show that discretionary settlements serve a desirable function, as they allow the RS to better exploit taxpayer‐specific information and to take advantage of the bargaining power it can wield at the negotiation stage.

Various taxes influence wage and employment outcomes in efficiency wage models. These findings are extended by incorporating more comprehensive tax functions, additional tax parameters, union-firm wage bargaining, and balanced budget restrictions. Moreover, the importance of different effort functions is evaluated. It is shown that higher marginal tax rates, holding constant the level of taxes, reduce wages and increase employment. Higher level of taxes on income, labour cost and value-added can raise unemployment.

This book examines the politics of revenue bargaining in Africa in a time when attention to domestic revenue mobilisation has expanded immensely. Measures to increase taxes and other revenues can -but do not always- lead to a process of bargaining, where revenue providers negotiate for some kind of a return. This book offers in-depth analyses of micro-instances of revenue bargaining across five African countries: Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda. All case studies draw on a common theoretical framework combining the fiscal contract theory with the political settlement approach, which enables a systematic exploration into what triggers revenue bargaining; how these processes unfold; and finally, if and when they reach an agreement (whether a fiscal contract or not). From the empirically rich case narratives emerges a story of how power and initial bargaining position influence not only whether bargaining emerges in the first place, but also the processes and their outcomes. Less resourceful taxpayers are in a more difficult position to raise their voice, but in some cases even these groups manage to ally with other civil society groups to protest against tax reforms they perceive as unfair. Indirect taxes such as VAT often trigger protests, and so do sudden changes in tax practices. Revenue providers rarely call for improved services in return for paying tax, which would be expected to nurture the foundation for a fiscal social contract. Instead, revenue providers are more likely to negotiate for tax reductions, implying that governments' effort to increase revenue is impeded. We do find many instances of state-society reciprocity when ruling elites try to be responsive to revenue providers' demands. Hence, this book gives insight into the nature and dynamics not only of revenue bargaining but of policy-making in general as well as the implications hereof for state-society reciprocity in Africa.

One may view current Canadian tax reform as an episode in a tax reform cycle arising from a continual public choice game. Both the positions of the Canadian players and the rules of the game may provide a rationale for these reforms. Revenue, equity, efficiency, and bargaining constraints determine the evolution of the tax code.

Collective bargaining is the US route to industrial democracy. Some unionists & others, however, have advocated a widening & deepening of the participative role of workers & unions in managerial decision-making. Examples of union-management cooperation outside of the conventional collective bargaining boundaries can be found as far back as the 1920s, but only a small number of cases have survived to the present day. Since 1970 the federal government has encouraged joint union-management committees & autonomous work group experiments to improve productivity & the quality of working life. A National Center for Productivity & Quality of Working Life has been established by Congress. A number of companies have, independently or in cooperation with unions, introduced job enrichment programs, flexible work schedules, & semiautonomous work groups. Many companies have taken advantage of tax laws benefits to adopt profit-sharing & employee stock ownership plans. Union leaders have generally been suspicious of such management schemes as well as productivity plans unless safeguards are provided for worker job security & employment conditions. They have rejected the German codetermination system of worker-directors. There appears to be little prospect of dramatic change during the foreseeable future although collective bargaining may gradually extend worker participation in managerial decision-making. Modified HA.

The purpose of this study was to examine how local governments are responding to budget shortfalls and to explore how compensation practices across the United States are correlated to changes in service delivery. One hundred thirty-four of the largest cities and counties responded to a mail survey, for a response rate of 45 percent. A large percentage (95 percent) of local governments reported experiencing budget shortfalls. In response, local governments are reducing their workforces, laying employees off and/or utilizing reserves rather than raising taxes and/or scaling back wages and benefits. Type of government (county or city) and collective bargaining were associated with budget shortfalls. Despite the fiscal distress of governments, average cost of living increases were between 2 and 3 percent for each of the two years surveyed and nearly half of respondents reported increases in employee benefits (fewer than 10 percent reported any decreases). Collective bargaining was significantly associated with higher increases in benefits, increased cost-of-living adjustments, and responses to budget shortfalls. Adapted from the source document.

In a social custom model of union membership with wage bargaining, higher levels of company taxes lower wages while having uncertain employment effects. A higher marginal income tax rate increases employment. Changes solely in the level of income taxation, retaining marginal rates, have ambiguous wage and employment consequences. Endogenising union membership therefore does not alter the effects of tax changes in comparison to a right-to-manage model with exogenously fixed level of density.

OECD economies were able to reconcile the pursuit of welfare state expansion and full employment during the first decades of the postwar period. Yet the trade-off between these two policy objectives widened in recent decades. To explore the question ofwhy this change occurred, this article extends familiar models of wage determination by adding a number of parameters that capture cross-national differences among welfare states. The model identifies the conditions under which unions deliver wage moderation in exchange for social policy benefits and transfers and explores how different labor-market institutions magnify or decrease the impact of wage choices on the equilibrium level of employment. Next, the author examines the impact of changes in the composition of social policy expenditures and in the level of the tax burden on. unions' wage choices. She shows that mature welfare states, characterized by high tax burdens and a high share of transfers devoted to labor-market outsiders, reduce the effectiveness ofwage moderation in lowering unemployment. The author tests the main propositions using OECD panel data for the period 1960–95.

Collective bargaining is the American route to industrial democracy. Some unionists and others, however, have advocated a widening and deepening of the participa tive role of workers and unions in managerial decision mak ing. Examples of union-management cooperation outside of the conventional collective bargaining boundaries can be found as far back as the 1920s. But only a small number of cases have survived to the present day. Since 1970 the federal government has encouraged joint union-management committees and autonomous work group experiments to im prove productivity and the quality of working life. A National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life has been established by Congress. A number of companies have, independently or in cooperation with unions, introduced job enrichment programs, flexible work schedules, and semi- autonomous work groups. Many companies have taken ad vantage of tax law benefits to adopt profit-sharing and em ployee stock ownership plans. Union leaders have generally been suspicious of such management schemes as well as productivity plans unless safeguards are provided for worker job security and employment conditions. They have rejected the German codetermination system of worker-directors. There appears to be little prospect of dramatic change during the foreseeable future although collective bargaining may gradually extend worker participation in managerial de cision making.