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It is often feared that tax competition might lead to a "race to the bottom". The consequence of a decline of tax rates on capital income would be shrinking capital income tax revenues and difficulties for national governments to perform their usual tasks. The paper analyzes what happened to tax revenues in a lot of OECD countries. It turns out that taxes on capital income contribute to the financing of public expenditures in a more or less unchanged extent; in addition, there are no significant changes of the level and the structure of total tax revenues.

"Most people would agree that tax systems ought to be 'just', and perhaps a great deal more just than they are at present. What is more difficult is to agree on what tax justice is. This book considers a range of different approaches to, and ideas about the nature of tax justice and covers areas such as: - imbalances in international tax arrangements that deprive developing countries of revenues from natural resources and allow wealthy taxpayers to use tax havens; - protests against governments and large business; - attempts to influence policy through more technical means such as the OECD's Base Erosion and Profits Shifting project; - interpersonal matters, such as the ways in which tax systems disadvantage women and minorities; - the application of wider philosophical or economic theories to tax systems. The purpose of the book is not to iron out these underlying differences into a grand theory, but rather to gain a more precise understanding of how and why we disagree about tax justice. In doing so the editors are assisted by a stellar cast of contributors from four continents, with a wide variety of views and experiences but a common interest in this central question of how to agree and disagree about tax justice. This is, of course, not only an intellectual exercise but also a necessary precursor to achieving real-world change."

Until recently low-tax jurisdictions have played an important role in the formulation of tax planning schemes by multinational enterprises. However with the onset of global trends towards deoffshorization, existing methods of tax optimization have seen significant changes. As there is currently no one single approach when creating the definition of, or defining a "low-tax jurisdiction", in this article the definition and the main features of lowtax jurisdictions are proposed and the main stages in the formation and development of low-tax jurisdictions are detailed. On the basis of research carried out on the national legislation of low-tax jurisdictions, the main company types which meet the special legal formulae that can be incorporated into low-tax jurisdictions have been analyzed. In order to highlight similar characteristics and to simplify the analysis of the national legislation of low-tax jurisdictions so that general recommendations covering the nature of measures which can be used to counter illegal tax avoidance, tax evasion, money laundering and other illegal financial machinations, different classifications of low-tax jurisdictions have been analyzed. The unfair and perhaps even illegal use of low-tax jurisdictions often leads to violations of core tax principles which may have an impact on the overall size of budget revenues available to high-tax countries. Therefore, deoffshorization measures are being proposed at the international level. Currently the main global trend has been to increase the transparency of tax information and of financial transactions which are carried out by international exchanges. This is supported by the strengthening and expansion of cooperation between tax authorities which serves to counter the abuse of provisions in international tax treaties on the avoidance of double taxation.

Abstract Tax planning is one example of the use of regulatory loopholes. On the other hand for the Fiscal Authority, carrying out tax avoidance practices as a form of tax planning will have a negative effect on the Government and, for this reason, the Government makes fiscal corrections as its remedial. Many also hide their assets in tax heavens countries. This is so that the assets they have are not taxed. Tax heavens countries are usually small countries that apply very low taxes, some even do not impose taxes at all. However, the government has prepared an Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) data exchange plan that occurs in 2018, certainly will make tax evaders unable to run away from the pursuit of the tax authorities, even if they have to flee to tax heavens countries (tax heavens). Keywords: tax heavens, tax planning, Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) Abstrak Perencanaan pajak adalah salah satu contoh penggunaan celah peraturan. Pada sisi lain bagi Otoritas Fiskal, melakukan praktik penghindaran pajak sebagai bentuk perencanaan pajak akan membawa efek negatif bagi Pemerintah dan, untuk itulah, Pemerintah melakukan koreksi fiskal sebagai remedialnya. Banyak juga yang menyembunyikan asetnya di negara-negara tax heavens. Hal ini bertujuan agar aset yang mereka punya tidak terkena pajak. Negara tax heavens biasanya merupakan negara kecil yang menerapkan pajak yang sangat rendah, bahkan ada yang tidak mengenakan pajak sama sekali. Namun, pemerintah telah menyiapkan Rencana pertukaran informasi data perbankan secara otomatis (Automatic Exchange of Information/AEoI) yang terjadi pada 2018, dipastikan akan membuat para pengemplang pajak tidak akan bisa lari dari kejaran otoritas pajak, sekalipun mereka harus kabur ke negara surga pajak (tax heavens). Kata kunci: Tax Heavens, Tax Planning, Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI)

Household-specific growth rates of the tax base imply that the timing of tax collections determines the distribution of tax burdens and wealth across households. Changes in financial policy do not only shift taxes across generations, but also within cohorts. Insitutional deficit constraints settle tax shifting conflicts in favor of individuals with high income growth. With distortionary taxes, policy makers trade off the wealth effects of financial policy and the efficiency cost of household-specific deadweight burdens. I apply the incidence analysis of financial policy to two examples: The financing of the German unifications, and the timing of tax collections over the U.S. business cycle.

The watchword of the policy feedbacks approach to political analysis – that politics shapes policy – suggests that the way in which taxes are designed may influence how the public feels about various levies: their support for those taxes, their perceptions of fairness, and their willingness to pay them. Hypotheses about the design features of different taxes Americans pay, including tax regressivity or progressivity, the manner in which they are exacted, their actual and perceived costs, and the visibility and desirability of resulting benefits, are examined with closed- and open-ended survey data. Taxes with more attractive design features are generally more positively perceived by the public. Open-ended responses help explain the fairness perceptions and popularity of several taxes, including a widespread belief that estate taxes constitute "double taxation" and the considerable embrace of the notion that "everyone pays" state sales tax (as opposed to the federal income tax, where some rich and poor people "get away" without paying). These results help explain why some taxes invite more ire than others.

China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax system compatible with a market economy, in particular, an efficient tax administration system with capable tax bureaucrats. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which central government attempts to accompany economic transformation via tax farming to tax bureaucratisation in tax administration. Based on empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China's fiscal federalism cannot be analysed and argues that China's emerging tax system depends on the institutional and organizational design that shapes the interaction between central government, local governments and economic agents.

We analyze the impact of tax morality on progressive income (wage) taxation. We assume that transfers (cash-back) and public expenditures are financed from linear wage taxes. We derive the reported wages from individual utility maximization, when individuals obtain partial satisfaction from reporting wages (depending on their tax morality), and cannot be excluded from the use of public services. The government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, also taking into account the utility of public services. The major conjecture is illustrated by numerical examples: the optimal degree of redistribution and the size of the public services are increasing functions of the individuals' tax morality.

Intro -- Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Add the Tax -- Kinds of Taxes -- Who Taxes You? -- Tax Rates -- Sales Tax Math -- The IRS and Income Tax -- It's the Law -- Up and Down -- A Long History -- What Taxes Pay For -- Glossary -- For More Information -- Index -- Back Cover.