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This article considers the implications of the tax salience literature for the United Kingdom. First, the different categories, and definitions, of tax salience that have developed in the literature are reviewed, and some of the prescriptive implications of these terms are introduced. Tax salience refers, essentially, to the capacity of taxpayers to understand legislation. Thus, the potential reasons behind tax complexity and the potential beneficiaries of it are addressed. The article considers the contribution that the tax salience literature may make to existing analyses in the United Kingdom, particularly, in the (1) debate surrounding principles-based legislation and (2) context of newly formed government offices devoted, to some extent, to considering the role and value of salience. It is suggested that it is worth heeding the admonitions of Schenk, Gamage and Shanske, and others, that 'salience' is a layered term that should be employed with specific reference to political, economic and legal contexts. It is also acknowledged that the conclusions of some portions of the tax salience literature that legislative clarity should be included only within a list of priorities for legislative drafting, and not necessarily at the top of that list, is evocative of existing analyses of 'principles-based drafting' in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and elsewhere. Neither salience nor principles-based drafting have the potential, on their own, to 'fix' the problem of tax complexity. The article, however, considers the implications of either raising or lowering salience on the list of desirable factors in drafting, in the particular context of fostering trust between taxpayers and the state.

All Direct and Indirect taxes accompanied by tax laws, accounting, auditing and tax returns, can be abolished if a new tax system called "TOP Tax system" is adopted and implemented by all nations. Ultimate economic reforms will relieve 7 billion people of the world from the cobweb of ambiguous and complex tax structures, plethora of tax laws, mandatory and cumbersome accounting, auditing, tax returns and consequent quagmire of all tax related cases. Taxation, tax collection, tax enforcement, tax compliance, allocation of revenues to various ministries or departments and money supply into the economy are unified and integrated in the banking system. In this new tax system there will be no Direct taxes, Indirect taxes, tax laws, tax returns, tax collection departments, tax enforcement agencies and tax tribunals. Citizens need not maintain separate account books and submit tax returns annually for paying either Direct taxes on personal incomes or Indirect taxes while running business or industry. Yet, the tax revenues collected by banks from single tax called TOP Tax will be 30 to 40% more when compared to total tax revenues accrued from all Direct and Indirect taxes in the present tax system. TOP Tax system" will make the budget preparation of any country to be simple, easy and time saving exercise. 100% tax collections without tax collection departments. There will be no tax collection expenditure for the Governments and no tax compliance cost for the people. There will be no check posts, way bills, accounting, auditing, tax laws, tax raids, etc., Tax component on any commodity or service will be less than 11%, unlike more than 30% in the present tax system. The prices will be substantially decreased. There will be no tax evasion and its main product black money. Read full article. http://taxationreforms.com. This record was migrated from the OpenDepot repository service in June, 2017 before shutting down.

Surveys on tax compliance and non-compliance often rely on ad hoc formulated items which lack standardization and empirical validation. We present an inventory to assess tax compliance and distinguish between different forms of compliance and non-compliance: voluntary versus enforced compliance, tax avoidance, and tax evasion. First, items to measure voluntary and enforced compliance, avoidance, and evasion were drawn up (collected from past research and newly developed), and tested empirically with the aim of producing four validated scales with a clear factorial structure. Second, findings from the first analyses were replicated and extended to validation on the basis of motivational postures. A standardized inventory is provided which can be used in surveys in order to collect data which are comparable across research focusing on self-reports. The inventory can be used in either of two ways: either in its entirety, or by applying the single scales independently, allowing an economical and fast assessment of different facets of tax compliance.

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government takes into account these effects when pursuing his own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.

This Review will focus primarily on the conceptual issues affecting the composition of the tax expenditure list and their relevance to current proposals for new tax legislation. In this context,the tax expenditure theory has been preeminently successful in shaping tax reform. The Review will not delve into the other aspect of Surrey's thesis, which calls for executive and congressional action to alter the budget procedure by integrating direct spending programs with the indirect tax expenditure programs and by adopting one amalgamated budget for the purpose of controlling overall federal spending. This facet of the Surrey thesis has not yet gained widespread congressional acceptance on the practical level.For those concerned with tighter control of the federal budget to reduce the deficit, however, this latest work amply describes and persuasively advocates the value of such an integrated budget policy.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine an unexplored aspect of tax expenditures: the tax-price implications of tax exemptions, deductions and credits. Although this implication of tax expenditures has not been adequately examined, two separate lines of analysis have been suggested by the existing literature. Some authors have emphasized the welfare costs of tax expenditures. To the extent that tax expenditures narrow the tax base the introduction or extension of a tax expenditure undoubtedly makes the cost of raising revenue more than it would be otherwise. This kind of cost, denoted as a welfare cost, can be incorporated into a model of individual tax-price determination. On the other hand, other authors have emphasized another tax-price implication of tax expenditures: that the introduction or extension of a tax expenditure changes the cost-shares faced by each taxpayer, exclusive of any welfare cost. Since an individual's cost-share is nothing more than his personal tax base divided by the aggregate tax base, this result emerges because a tax expenditure usually changes the individual's tax base in a manner disproportionate to the change in the aggregate tax base. This dissertation will explore and combine each line of analysis, both theoretically and empirically. In the first portion of the dissertation a model of tax-price determination is developed that explicitly incorporates the welfare cost of taxation. Various tax expenditures are then introduced into the model and their effects on individual tax-price schedules discerned. In this way the influence a tax expenditure has on an individual's choice over public sector size can be surmised. The next portion develops within the confines of a simple median voter model some potential allocative implications of various tax expenditures. This portion traces out the expected change in the median voter's desired quantity of the collective good, given various tax expenditures, via an analysis of the cost-share impact of the various tax expenditures. Although in this section welfare costs are not explicitly considered or all possible political cases outlined, the analysis does look at a set of cases that are of general interest. The final portion of the dissertation considers the influence tax expenditures taken in toto have on both the cost-sharing arrangement among individual taxpayers and the welfare cost to individual taxpayers. The results are used to gauge both the distributive and allocative implications of tax expenditures. ; Ph. D.

It is often feared that tax competition might lead to a "race to the bottom". The consequence of a decline of tax rates on capital income would be shrinking capital income tax revenues and difficulties for national governments to perform their usual tasks. The paper analyzes what happened to tax revenues in a lot of OECD countries. It turns out that taxes on capital income contribute to the financing of public expenditures in a more or less unchanged extent; in addition, there are no significant changes of the level and the structure of total tax revenues.

The features of income tax are expounded in the article, him basic problems and legislative clarifications which arose up after acceptance of Internal revenue Code of Ukraine.

Until recently low-tax jurisdictions have played an important role in the formulation of tax planning schemes by multinational enterprises. However with the onset of global trends towards deoffshorization, existing methods of tax optimization have seen significant changes. As there is currently no one single approach when creating the definition of, or defining a "low-tax jurisdiction", in this article the definition and the main features of lowtax jurisdictions are proposed and the main stages in the formation and development of low-tax jurisdictions are detailed. On the basis of research carried out on the national legislation of low-tax jurisdictions, the main company types which meet the special legal formulae that can be incorporated into low-tax jurisdictions have been analyzed. In order to highlight similar characteristics and to simplify the analysis of the national legislation of low-tax jurisdictions so that general recommendations covering the nature of measures which can be used to counter illegal tax avoidance, tax evasion, money laundering and other illegal financial machinations, different classifications of low-tax jurisdictions have been analyzed. The unfair and perhaps even illegal use of low-tax jurisdictions often leads to violations of core tax principles which may have an impact on the overall size of budget revenues available to high-tax countries. Therefore, deoffshorization measures are being proposed at the international level. Currently the main global trend has been to increase the transparency of tax information and of financial transactions which are carried out by international exchanges. This is supported by the strengthening and expansion of cooperation between tax authorities which serves to counter the abuse of provisions in international tax treaties on the avoidance of double taxation.

Abstract Tax planning is one example of the use of regulatory loopholes. On the other hand for the Fiscal Authority, carrying out tax avoidance practices as a form of tax planning will have a negative effect on the Government and, for this reason, the Government makes fiscal corrections as its remedial. Many also hide their assets in tax heavens countries. This is so that the assets they have are not taxed. Tax heavens countries are usually small countries that apply very low taxes, some even do not impose taxes at all. However, the government has prepared an Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) data exchange plan that occurs in 2018, certainly will make tax evaders unable to run away from the pursuit of the tax authorities, even if they have to flee to tax heavens countries (tax heavens). Keywords: tax heavens, tax planning, Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) Abstrak Perencanaan pajak adalah salah satu contoh penggunaan celah peraturan. Pada sisi lain bagi Otoritas Fiskal, melakukan praktik penghindaran pajak sebagai bentuk perencanaan pajak akan membawa efek negatif bagi Pemerintah dan, untuk itulah, Pemerintah melakukan koreksi fiskal sebagai remedialnya. Banyak juga yang menyembunyikan asetnya di negara-negara tax heavens. Hal ini bertujuan agar aset yang mereka punya tidak terkena pajak. Negara tax heavens biasanya merupakan negara kecil yang menerapkan pajak yang sangat rendah, bahkan ada yang tidak mengenakan pajak sama sekali. Namun, pemerintah telah menyiapkan Rencana pertukaran informasi data perbankan secara otomatis (Automatic Exchange of Information/AEoI) yang terjadi pada 2018, dipastikan akan membuat para pengemplang pajak tidak akan bisa lari dari kejaran otoritas pajak, sekalipun mereka harus kabur ke negara surga pajak (tax heavens). Kata kunci: Tax Heavens, Tax Planning, Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI)

Household-specific growth rates of the tax base imply that the timing of tax collections determines the distribution of tax burdens and wealth across households. Changes in financial policy do not only shift taxes across generations, but also within cohorts. Insitutional deficit constraints settle tax shifting conflicts in favor of individuals with high income growth. With distortionary taxes, policy makers trade off the wealth effects of financial policy and the efficiency cost of household-specific deadweight burdens. I apply the incidence analysis of financial policy to two examples: The financing of the German unifications, and the timing of tax collections over the U.S. business cycle.

China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax system compatible with a market economy, in particular, an efficient tax administration system with capable tax bureaucrats. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which central government attempts to accompany economic transformation via tax farming to tax bureaucratisation in tax administration. Based on empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China's fiscal federalism cannot be analysed and argues that China's emerging tax system depends on the institutional and organizational design that shapes the interaction between central government, local governments and economic agents.

We analyze the impact of tax morality on progressive income (wage) taxation. We assume that transfers (cash-back) and public expenditures are financed from linear wage taxes. We derive the reported wages from individual utility maximization, when individuals obtain partial satisfaction from reporting wages (depending on their tax morality), and cannot be excluded from the use of public services. The government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, also taking into account the utility of public services. The major conjecture is illustrated by numerical examples: the optimal degree of redistribution and the size of the public services are increasing functions of the individuals' tax morality.

International audience ; This paper examines a symmetric Nash equilibria of a two-country model of fiscal competition with a continuum of taxable commodities in each country. The innovation is to impose a uniformity restriction that there can be only two rates of tax on the different commodities, a positive rate and the zero rate. The main results characterize, under two alternative modes of taxation, the equilibrium fiscal rules chosen by countries, i.e., the level of the positive rate and the set of taxed commodities. Under the origin principle, it appears that the equilibrium fiscal base is narrower than the optimal one and the tax rate is too high. In contrast, under the destination principle, the optimal rule is implemented.

International audience ; This paper examines a symmetric Nash equilibria of a two-country model of fiscal competition with a continuum of taxable commodities in each country. The innovation is to impose a uniformity restriction that there can be only two rates of tax on the different commodities, a positive rate and the zero rate. The main results characterize, under two alternative modes of taxation, the equilibrium fiscal rules chosen by countries, i.e., the level of the positive rate and the set of taxed commodities. Under the origin principle, it appears that the equilibrium fiscal base is narrower than the optimal one and the tax rate is too high. In contrast, under the destination principle, the optimal rule is implemented.