Tax Complexity as Price Discrimination
In: NHH Dept. of Business and Management Science Discussion Paper No. 2024/4
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In: NHH Dept. of Business and Management Science Discussion Paper No. 2024/4
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The purpose of this dissertation is to examine an unexplored aspect of tax expenditures: the tax-price implications of tax exemptions, deductions and credits. Although this implication of tax expenditures has not been adequately examined, two separate lines of analysis have been suggested by the existing literature. Some authors have emphasized the welfare costs of tax expenditures. To the extent that tax expenditures narrow the tax base the introduction or extension of a tax expenditure undoubtedly makes the cost of raising revenue more than it would be otherwise. This kind of cost, denoted as a welfare cost, can be incorporated into a model of individual tax-price determination. On the other hand, other authors have emphasized another tax-price implication of tax expenditures: that the introduction or extension of a tax expenditure changes the cost-shares faced by each taxpayer, exclusive of any welfare cost. Since an individual's cost-share is nothing more than his personal tax base divided by the aggregate tax base, this result emerges because a tax expenditure usually changes the individual's tax base in a manner disproportionate to the change in the aggregate tax base. This dissertation will explore and combine each line of analysis, both theoretically and empirically. In the first portion of the dissertation a model of tax-price determination is developed that explicitly incorporates the welfare cost of taxation. Various tax expenditures are then introduced into the model and their effects on individual tax-price schedules discerned. In this way the influence a tax expenditure has on an individual's choice over public sector size can be surmised. The next portion develops within the confines of a simple median voter model some potential allocative implications of various tax expenditures. This portion traces out the expected change in the median voter's desired quantity of the collective good, given various tax expenditures, via an analysis of the cost-share impact of the various tax expenditures. Although in this section welfare costs are not explicitly considered or all possible political cases outlined, the analysis does look at a set of cases that are of general interest. The final portion of the dissertation considers the influence tax expenditures taken in toto have on both the cost-sharing arrangement among individual taxpayers and the welfare cost to individual taxpayers. The results are used to gauge both the distributive and allocative implications of tax expenditures. ; Ph. D.
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The accuracy of a tax return is usually interpreted as an outcome of the tax evasion decision by an individual. However, in non-democratic regimes with predatory blackmail tax systems it is possible that large sums voluntarily reported by influential politicians or businessmen may be used as political statements. By openly acknowledging one's personal income an individual can signal the strength of one's position, or, on the contrary, the submissiveness to the political leadership. In this paper we explore the idea of the tax return as a political statement and test it using a unique dataset of the tax returns filed by the Russian regional governors and the members of their families for the year 2009. Our results conjecture that Russian governors may deliberately file their tax return as a political statement to signal their strength vis-à-vis the central government.
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In: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 16-01
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Working paper
In: The Australian economic review, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 15-21
ISSN: 1467-8462
In: The Australian economic review, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 14-18
ISSN: 1467-8462
In: The Australian economic review, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 20-27
ISSN: 1467-8462
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 22, Heft 126, S. 92-98
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 214, Heft 1, S. 148-156
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: Pacific economic review, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 231-256
ISSN: 1468-0106
Abstract'Ramsey taxes' are commodity taxes that minimize deadweight loss. Evidence has shown dramatic differences in the extent of price rigidity across goods: while the prices of some goods change frequently, the prices of other goods seldom change. This paper examines Ramsey taxes in the presence of heterogeneous price rigidity. We find that, to minimize deadweight loss, lower (higher) tax rates should be imposed on goods with rigid prices if their relative prices are too high (low) relative to the would‐be situation of no price stickiness. Intuitively, Ramsey taxes remedy the relative price distortion caused by the price rigidity of some goods. We calibrate our model to data from Taiwan and the USA, showing a significant cut in welfare cost if Ramsey rather than uniform taxes are applied.
In: The Journal of the American Taxation Association, Band 44, Heft 2
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In: Alcohol and alcoholism: the international journal of the Medical Council on Alcoholism (MCA) and the journal of the European Society for Biomedical Research on Alcoholism (ESBRA), Band 50, Heft 6, S. 629-630
ISSN: 1464-3502