There are no simple answers when it comes to explaining what information technologies would change in public management. Conceptually the electronic government is a rather new research field, therefore it lacks universally accepted definitions & causal models. Therefore this article attempts to make a contribution in theoretical terms: it develops the idea that technologies provide an impetus towards development of a new institutional public management model, which is fundamentally different from the traditional rational bureaucracy & New Public Management. Having defined the main features of the IT-based model, the article discusses the possible mechanism of change -- ie., to what extent within this mechanism the IT can be considered an independent variable? Adapted from the source document.
The contemporary information & communication technologies (ICT) will not, by themselves, resolve the issues, faced by Lithuanian public administration in designing & implementing its policies. This is the major argument of the article, supported by the available empirical information & various secondary sources. Why the bureaucracy, which is often considered as being slow, inflexible & inertic should suddenly change due to the mere fact of ICT being purchased & installed? The answer is often based on some intuitive logic, which is called in this article the "ideal model of e-government." The first of the assumptions in this model claim that the public sector has the right skills to select the relevant technology. The next assumption is that once the technology is installed, it will be used competently & open-mindedly -- with the right capacities, motivations & leaders available to do that. In turn, if the technology is used competently, one can indeed expect improvements in public policy making & implementation: organizational change, better inter-institutional co-operation, development of e-services, etc. Notably, many ICT projects in the public sector fail & Lithuania is no exception in this respect. The investment does not necessarily lead to a meaningful organizational change, it does not enhance co-operation between institutions & does not improve communication & trust between the citizens & the state. Surely, the e-government is a rather new development, so one should hardly expect that all the visions will be successful outright. However, while at least some of the major problems may be anticipated in advance, the solutions are not always clear-cut. In order to take a full advantage of the ICT potential in the public sector, a clear choice of an actual model of public administration is necessary. Here a number of classic dilemmas may be identified -- regarding the relations between the public & the private sectors, internal control within the organization, sharing of responsibilities between organizations, etc. It is argued in the article that the answers to these questions in Lithuania are clear only in the official strategies & statements. Meanwhile the practice shows, that the relations between the public & the private sector are unbalanced, organizations lack the culture of critically assessing their achievements, institutions are carefully avoiding "interference" from outside into their internal matters & government is far from being conceived as a "service" to the citizens. It is also noted, that the differences between the official rhetoric & the practice may well be explained by the experience of both the soviet period as well as the accession to the EU: the institutions developed the skill of flexible adjustment to the dominant discourse without finding it necessary to change the essence of policy process. All in all, while the ICT do provide opportunities for improvement of public management, in order to take a full advantage of these opportunities it is necessary to resolve some of the classical dilemmas of public administration. In order to do that, some deeper changes of attitudes, values, & culture are necessary both in the public sector as well as in the society at large. Therefore, notwithstanding the expectation of the big change towards modernization of public sector the old saying of "plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose" is applicable for estimating the potential of the ICT to change the public sector. Adapted from the source document.
Aim of the article is to explore whether existing possibilities to join online political discussions have any politicizing effect on social networks. Politicizing effect is defined both in quantitative & qualitative terms. Internet may enlarge existing networks by providing opportunities to connect to new people & to engage with them in political conversations. Internet may also provide new experiences of political talk, assuming that offline political conversations tend to avoid disagreement, while online communication is better adapted to expression of divergent opinions & discussions. Yet such potential of the Internet to expose people to cross-cutting conversation depends on the motivations of its users. To explore the actual effect of the Internet on politicization of social networks data of representative survey of Lithuanian population is analyzed. Adapted from the source document.
The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.
