Suchergebnisse

A significant aspect of anarchism, which brings it close to Russian nihilism and in the minds of some people is responsible for the erroneous identification of the two, is individual terrorism. Individual acts of violence, known especially in the last century as "propaganda by deed," have been regarded by some anarchists as part and parcel of the over-all revolutionary activity which is to culminate in the overthrow of the existing social system by acts of mass violence. There were and are anarchists of different schools opposed to violence as a means towards the establishment of an anarchist society, and they include not only religious anarchists like Leo Tolstoy and individualists like Benjamin Tucker, but also many of those who at one time or another could be classed as anarchist communists, for instance, Francisco Ferrer, Louisa S. Bevington, and Gustav Landauer. The so-called philosophical anarchists are also opposed to violence, if by them are meant people who believe in the possibility or at least the desirability of realizing the ideals of anarchism but do not accept the usual anarchist analysis of the existing system or the methods generally advocated by anarchist groups for the achievement of anarchism. Thus Godwin, Tolstoy, and Tucker, could be included in this group, and among our contemporaries Bertrand Russell.In the present century anarchists have almost ceased in theory and practice to view individual terrorism as important. Violent acts have been usually perpetrated by people who had practically no significance as thinkers and writers. Alexander Berkman is probably the only notable exception here, while men like Kropotkin, fortunately for anarchism, propagated anarchist ideas by the written and spoken word rather than by "deed."

Translated by Regina Eldor.

Undergrounds - & guerrilla & sabotage units - are groups in frustration. They develop gradually, by discernable & symptomatic steps, in response to soc & pol'al discontents. Active members are volunteers & presumably feel deeply the sense of frustration which is at the root of the movement. Though a local pop will not be totally involved in guerrilla & sabotage activities a widespread popular sympathy with the movement is necessary for sustained operations. Counterterror measures appear to be important in motivating individuals to participate actively, in the hope of gaining security or revenge against the enemy. Cultural & geographical factors limit & influence methods of operation. The pol'al or military background of the leadership also influences the choice of org'al & operational alternatives. Regardless, the application of violence must be morally rationalized; control must be balanced against security in deciding how much to centralize; considerations of weapons availability must precede the appraisal of tactical possibilities, & a formulation of strategy. Assuming success, the revolutionary movement contains the seeds of future counterrevolution, for no pol'al leadership can satisfy all the aspirations of the rank & file, & recourse to violence may be taken again. Always, the local pop is the key to success or failure in pursuing or combating guerrilla & sabotage operations. AA.

A study of how people perceived a generalized threat, interviewing 1,392 New Yorkers at the time of the Mad Bomber scare in 1956-1957. R's were asked questions re: what kind of person the Bomber was, how often they talked about him or her, how interested & worried they were, the Bomber's sex, nationality, religion, pol'al associations, & degree of intelligence, & the degree to which they felt threatened by the Bomber A question re their general comments on the Bomber elicited responses in the following categories: bomber & the world, sympathy, elusiveness of the bomber, paranoid reaction, bomber as protest, the role of the mass media, & punishment. Results indicated that: the Bomber elicited the expression of much free-floating anxiety in part of the pop; he provided an opportunity for latent anxieties, prejudices, & fears to be expressed; many R's felt that a religious person could not do what the Bomber was doing, but those who did identify his religion associated him with a religious group hostile to the R's own religion; identification with nationality suggested that xenophobia manifests itself in unstructured circumstances; a relatively high % saw the Bomber as a Socialist, suggesting that many did not know the diff between Communists, Socialists, & Anarchists; a large number of people described the Bomber as intelligent, suggesting a fair degree of understanding of what is involved in this kind of behavior; & the ability of approximately 66% of the R's to ascribe religion & race to the Bomber may be a projection of their hostility toward various religions or racial groups. I. Taviss.