"Usama Bin Laden's greatest fear was not capture or death, but the exposure of al-Qaeda's secrets. At great risk to themselves and the entire mission, the U.S. Special Operations Forces, who carried out the Abbottabad raid that killed Bin Laden, took an additional eighteen minutes to collect Bin Laden's hard drives and thereby expose al-Qaeda's secrets.0 In this ground-breaking book, Nelly Lahoud dives into Bin Laden's files and meticulously distills the nearly 6,000 pages of Arabic private communications. For the first time, al-Qaeda's closely guarded secrets are laid bare, shattering misconceptions and revealing how and what Bin Laden communicated with his associates, his plans for future attacks, and al-Qaeda's hostility toward countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. Lahoud presents firsthand accounts of al-Qaeda from 9/11 until the elimination of Bin Laden, as told through his own words and those of his family and closest associates"--Publisher's description.
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- PART I -- 1. Who Is the Terrorist? -- 2. Make the Umma Great Again -- 3. Post-Colonial Hangover -- PART II -- 4. Islam Made Me Do It -- 5. Poverty of Hope -- 6. Dis-Integrated -- 7. Mirror, Mirror -- 8. Counterproductive -- PART III -- 9. Spiritual Counterterrorism -- 10. Radicalizing Inclusion -- 11. Can't We All Just Belong? -- 12. Show Me the Money -- 13. Peace Pays and Morality Trumps -- Notes -- Index -- Acknowledgments -- About the Author
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How long have the United States and their Saudi allies been sponsoring and financing the radical Islamists, and why doesn't anyone stop them? Labévière uncovers the money-laundering, the organized crime and the interlocking world of business and politics
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Consideration of anti-terrorism policy has focused almost exclusively on deterrence that seeks to fend off terrorism by raising the costs of undertaking terrorist acts. This paper suggests an alternative approach to anti-terrorism policy that is based on reducing the expected benefits of undertaking terrorist acts to prospective terrorists rather than raising the costs of doing so. Specifically, it is argued that strengthening decentralized decision-making in the polity & economy provides disincentives for terrorist attacks. 24 References. [Copyright 2004 Elsevier B.V.]
Terrorism is a crime against humanity and civilization and is one serious threat to the sovereignty of every country. As a manifestation of the handling and handling of terrorist acts of terrorism the Indonesian government established national legislation. Referring to international conventions and legislation relating to terrorism, the government issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002, which was then approved by the House of Representatives into Law No. 15 of 2003 on Combating Terrorism Crimes. Along with the enactment of the Act on Criminal Acts of Terrorism, it appears that some of the weaknesses of the Act is one of them that is related to the process of investigation in Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Law on Combating Terrorism Criminal which is considered too long process to the exclusion that the criminal act of terrorism is Extra Ordinary Crime (extraordinary crime). Based on the above description of the issues discussed there are 2 (two), namely: First, Is the formulation of the investigation policy in Law Number 15 Year 2003 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism can prevent the occurrence of criminal acts of terrorism. Second, how is the formulation policy of investigation in the Anti-Terrorism Penal Code in the future.
The 9/11 suicide attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, triggered a number of security responses both in the United States of America and other Countries in the World. Kenya, which is an ally and a close partner to North America and Europe, was not left behind. While many states had been parties to numerous terrorism conventions, their response in implementing them had been slow and needed this catalyst. This special case offered a window of opportunity for many "security conscious" regimes in cementing their legal-criminological and political security apparatus. At the international level, the 9/11 case led to the hasty adoption of Security Council resolution 1373 in 2001, which called upon states to adopt wide-ranging and comprehensive steps and strategies to combat international terrorism and to become parties to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Since then, Kenya has responded with speed in devising social-legal-criminological-political actions.
This ebook consists of a summary of the ideas, viewpoints and facts presented by Colonel David Hunt in his book 'They Just Don't Get It: How '. This summary offers a concise overview of the entire book in less than 30 minutes reading time. However this work does not replace in any case Colonel David Hunt's book.Colonel Hunt provides a game plan for winning the war on terrorism.
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Although South Korea has had minimal exposure to terrorism, it recently adopted a controversial Anti-Terrorism Act that is characterised by arbitrary and vague definitions of 'terrorism' and 'terrorism'-related crimes. The Act risks manufacturing the 'terrorism' phenomenon with the unnecessary curtailing of civil liberties and stifling of political dissent. This article argues that the legislation's objectives are more a rhetorical device to solidify power than to sustain the vibrancy of democratic politics and provide effective human security.
This article analyses the relationship between rules on terrorism in international law and international humanitarian law (IHL), with the special emphasis on the European Union's standpoint on this issue. To this end, the article will present EU regulation in this field and the 2014 judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Tamil Tigers case will be analysed. Having in mind that the relation between the scope of application of the rules on terrorism and international humanitarian law is one of the contentious issues that burden and prologue adoption of the Comprehensive convention on terrorism under the auspices of United Nations, this article will point out to the standpoint which the CJEU took regarding that relation and whether it can be instructive for this process. In order to present differing viewpoints of the states about the issue of relation between rules on terrorism and IHL, process of negotiations in the Ad hoc committee whose task is to draft the Convention on terrorism will be addressed firstly. It is concluded that the Western states and those states that are members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation have opposite views about the aforementioned relation and that these disagreements prevent them from adopting the final draft of the future convention on terrorism. On the other hand, European Union (EU) adopted the regulation on the fight against terrorism, and based on that regulation certain number of organizations is marked as terrorist organizations and economic measures are imposed upon them. Among these organizations is the organization of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, Tamil Tigers) which challenged this decision before the CJEU. The main object of the analysis is therefore the judgment of the CJEU in this case and especially the part of the judgment in which Tamil Tigers contest the application of the EU rules on terrorism, stating that it cannot be applied in the armed conflict occurring between them and the government of Sri Lanka, since the only norms applicable in this case are the rules of international humanitarian law. The Court found that the rules about financing terrorism apply all the time and that in the situation of armed conflict they are applicable alongside the rules of IHL. The Conclusion of the article is that the CJEU approach in this judgment can give useful guidelines for the resolution of a burdening issue of the relation between rules on terrorism and IHL. The rules on terrorism should be divided into two distinct categories, and each category should have its own relation with the IHL norms - rules on financing terrorism should be applied alongside IHL in armed conflict while the rules on incrimination of terrorist acts should not be applicable in situations of armed conflict. Also, the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello should be preserved, therefore the application of the rules on terrorism and IHL should not depend upon the expressed motives of the parties to the conflict. In the end, it is also pointed out that the EU regulation has some shortcomings when it comes to the definition of terrorism and some recommendations are given for its overcoming.
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- Chapter One: The History of ISIS -- Al-Qaeda in Iraq -- Islamic State in Iraq -- Islamic State in Iraq and Syria -- The Islamic State -- Chapter Two: Attacks by ISIS in the Islamic World -- ISIS Affliliates -- ISIS Territory -- The Middle East, North Africa & Asia -- Expansion into Africa -- Chapter Three: Attacks by ISIS in the West -- ISIS in the West -- Attacks in the West -- ISIS Supporters in the United States -- Chapter Four: How We Learn About ISIS -- Finding Sources -- Other Terrorist Groups -- Documents -- Chapter Five: How Can We Stop Attacks by ISIS? -- Stopping Radicalization -- Fighting ISIS on the Ground -- Comprehensive Counterterrorism -- Chapter Six: The Future of ISIS -- Timeline -- Glossary -- For More Information -- For Further Reading -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author -- Photo Credits -- Back Cover
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