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These original essays describe the internal life of terrorist organizations in fascinating detail. They show how no description of terrorist behaviour is adequate without a grasp of the deep tensions that often characterize such groups, and an appreciation of how firmly implanted in our culture terrorist traditions have become, since the middle of the nineteenth century.

These original essays describe the internal life of terrorist organizations in fascinating detail. They show how no description of terrorist behaviour is adequate without a grasp of the deep tensions that often characterize such groups, and an appreciation of how firmly implanted in our culture terrorist traditions have become, since the middle of the nineteenth century

Terrorist organizations are most often comprised of ideologues, criminal mercenaries, and captive participants. Ideologues provide political purpose and direction and have a strong group commitment. However, every organization needs money to survive. For terrorist organizations this comes through capital support or through criminal activities. Mercenaries serve the organization by providing the latter but have a weak group commitment and may corrupt the organization's ideological purity. Captive participants have neither strong commitments nor strong personal financial interests, but cannot leave without repercussions. Factors are assessed influencing how the composition of an organization evolves through time. The three labor groups value each other differently which impacts their relative strengths. Capital sponsors may view criminal mercenaries as ideologically detrimental to the terrorist organization. Capital sponsoring may cause an ideologically conscious terrorist organization, while lacking capital may cause a criminal organization relying on mercenary labor. If the ideologues lose their commitment, or the mercenaries and captive participants jointly value each other more, the organization may also become criminal or go extinct. The article provides tools for understanding the evolution of terrorist organizations.

Argues for a reconsidered relationship between Russia and NATO because of previous enlargements, the removal of the Soviet Union threat, and the altered international security landscape after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Describes increased sites of agreement and potential for flexibility between Russian foreign policy and the NATO alliance which itself has illustrated internal tensions. Discusses an approach that includes overcoming preconceptions and fears in NATO and Russia about perceived mutual threats, replacing them with a notion of partnership based on mutual respect and preparedness to compromise. Concludes asserting a good possibility for union between NATO and Russia based on coinciding antiterrorist objectives and efforts.

A dynamic model of a terrorist organization is presented with the defining feature being that a succession of operatives is recruited at different points in time. Consequently, a government's counterterror policy must be tailored according to the vintage structure of the terrorist group that it faces. This implies that past history of counterterror policy and attacks matter for the formulation of current and future policy. The authors present the necessary steps to formulate and solve a vintage model, and to deal with the delay differential equations that naturally arise from the vintage structure. The resulting analysis captures the implications of a diverse set of phenomena such as Internet recruiting, training delays for logistically complex plots, age distribution of operatives, and the sensitivity of government impatience/cabinet composition to terrorist events for the inner dynamics of terrorist organizations and counterterror policy. Directions for future research are also suggested.

Violent groups sometimes invest significant resources in social work, notably in the form of charities and NGOs. The present paper models a terrorist group's charities as a means to advertise its cause in order to raise popular support. The analysis explains how different types of organizations arise in equilibrium, depending on government policies. Then, the interaction between a purely terrorist group and an independent local NGO is examined. It is shown that a purely terrorist group always invests in more attacks than an integrated terrorist-charity organization. Furthermore, the latter may have more NGO activity than a separate local NGO. Adapted from the source document.