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Many of the Corp's activities—such as flood control and recreation area management—should be turned over to state governments.

If international relations as a field is to have a just purpose—not just justifying the power-hoarding and power-wielding of a ruling class—it needs more concepts to critique power, relate policy to peaceful ends, and surface rather than shroud the price that others pay for what our states do in the world. Most IR scholars imagine […]

The timing and nature of a negotiated peace, or truce, in Ukraine are the subject of uncertainty and speculation. Adding to the uncertainty is the question of how to sustain peace if it were achieved. ...

Vietnam has become the third country in the Association of South East Asian Nations to adopt a national action plan for the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, promoting meaningful inclusion of women in peace ...

This week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky offered his starkest warning yet about the need for new military aid from the United States."It's important to specifically address the Congress," Zelensky said. "If the Congress doesn't help Ukraine, Ukraine will lose the war."Unfortunately for Zelensky, Congress does not appear to be listening. In fact, Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) is now on the verge of losing control of the House due to deep Republican disagreements over Ukraine aid and a host of other issues. If Johnson fails to rein in his colleagues, the House may be unable to pass much of anything for the rest of the year.As Kyiv's ammunition shortage worsens, a Wednesday dispute revealed just how weak of a hold the speaker has on his caucus. Johnson is trying to renew a spying authority before it expires on April 19, but a last-minute intervention from former President Donald Trump led Republicans to kill his bill before it even reached the floor.Ukraine and its allies seem to have internalized the lesson that Johnson is now learning: As the presidential election season gets into gear, the center of gravity in Republican politics has shifted southward. Hence why British Foreign Minister David Cameron's pro-Ukraine charm tour made its first stop in Palm Beach, Florida.Cameron met with Trump Monday at Mar-a-Lago, where he pushed the Republican candidate on aid. "[I]t's in everybody's interest that Ukraine is in a strong position and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is in a weak position at the end of this year," Cameron said following the meeting. "Whoever is president wants to be able to push forward in a way that is backing success and not trying to overturn failure."The former British prime minister then went to Washington, where he met with congressional leaders, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). Cameron did not, however, sit down with Johnson. A British source told Politico that there were scheduling issues, though the symbolism is hard to ignore.The Biden administration, for its part, has made some efforts to bridge the gap in hopes that the House will eventually pass a new aid package. The White House authorized a $138 million weapons sale on Tuesday, and it followed up by sending Ukraine thousands of Iranian guns and ammunition that the U.S. had seized en route to Yemen last year. But this pales in comparison to the billions of dollars worth of weapons that Kyiv received each month in the early stages of the war.All of this is further complicated by the fact that corruption in Ukraine has led to price gouging on some items purchased by Ukraine's Defense Ministry. "Corruption has been deeply ingrained in Ukraine's defense sector since Soviet times, with manufacturers routinely bribing officials to purchase equipment at inflated prices," the Wall Street Journal reported. "Changing those practices would be hard enough in peacetime, let alone in the midst of war."This leaves Ukraine in its weakest position since the early weeks of the war. Without new aid, Kyiv risks losing both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, with Moscow holding an apparent advantage in each domain.This wasn't always the case. In late 2022, when Ukrainian forces pushed Russia from the outskirts of Kyiv all the way back to the Donbas, Ukraine had the momentum in every domain. As George Beebe of the Quincy Institute wrote at the time, "Ukraine's successes on the battlefield have provided it with substantial leverage to shape the terms of any settlement.""This success story does not mean that either Russia or Ukraine is yet ready for serious negotiations," Beebe, who previously led Russia analysis at the CIA, argued. "But it offers a window of opportunity for the United States to prepare the diplomatic ground for an eventual settlement of the conflict — a window that may get smaller over time if we do not act now."Beebe's prediction has proved prescient. Russia, now in a much stronger position, has far fewer reasons to grant concessions to Ukraine than it did a year ago. This does not necessarily mean that all is lost. If Congress can pass a new Ukraine aid package, then Kyiv may be able to at least hold onto the stalemate that has prevailed for much of the past year. This would create an opportunity to sue for peace, though likely on less favorable terms than were previously possible.But it does mean that maximalist goals — including the reconquest of Crimea, which Russia has held since 2014 — are that much less realistic now than they were in 2022. Even some mainstream Democrats are coming around to this position, as exemplified by recent comments from Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee."Realistically, Crimea is not coming back to Ukraine, and we can absolutely win this war and absolutely make a difference even in that reality," Smith said in a hearing Wednesday."We do not have to have Crimea to make it 1000% worth it to give Ukraine the money," he argued. "We need a sovereign democratic Ukraine that can survive."In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Three drones slammed into a Russian-occupied nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on Sunday, reigniting fears that the war could spark a nuclear accident, according to the BBC. Russia blamed Ukraine for the strikes, while Ukrainian officials argued that the Kremlin may have staged it as a "false flag" attack. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said the attack was the first direct hit on the plant since late 2022 but noted that there are "no indications of damage to critical nuclear safety or security systems."— European states penned a new deal to enhance cooperation on protecting undersea infrastructure in the North Sea, according to Reuters, which noted that attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022 has focused attention on security issues along Europe's northern coast. Not noted in the Reuters report is the increasingly popular view that Ukraine or pro-Ukrainian forces were behind the attack. The pact — signed by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom — mostly focuses on sharing information about threats to underwater cables and pipelines, with a focus on potential Russian malfeasance.— The European Union tightened restrictions on imports of Ukrainian produce in an effort to stem concerns that European farmers are being undercut by cheap goods from Ukraine, according to Politico. The issue has taken on particular salience in the run-up to the EU elections, with politicians anxious to avoid political costs from drawn-out fights with farmers, who have staged major protests in Poland and France. As Politico notes, the short-term tug of war over Ukrainian imports signals a larger problem: If Ukraine joins the EU, then farmers across the continent risk being put out of business by Kyiv's massive agricultural sector.— In The Hill, Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) argued that "peace talks remain the only viable option" to end the war in Ukraine. "No hard power endgame is viable for the U.S. in Ukraine, and the terms for Ukrainians get worse every minute the U.S. enables the continuation of this war," Lee wrote. "Our best hope to stop the bleeding is at the negotiating table. The blank checks must end, and American statecraft must start."U.S. State Department news:In a Monday press conference, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller renewed the U.S. call for Russia to withdraw from the Zaporizhzhia power plant following this week's attacks. "Russia is playing a very dangerous game with its military seizure of Ukraine's nuclear power plant, which is the largest in Europe," Miller said. "We continue to call on Russia to withdraw its military and civilian personnel from the plant, to return full control of the plant to the competent Ukrainian authorities, and refrain from taking any actions that could result in a nuclear incident at the plant."

"... [T]here is an urgency to revise the ways in which the value of nature is integrated into current existing peacebuilding and development policies in Uganda."

The cry of "No Justice, No Peace!" was, by best estimates, not heard on American streets until the 1980s. Its first mention in The New York Times was in 1987 following the acquittal of a police officer for the shooting of a Black man. The phrase appeared often in the Times in the 1990s, then […]

In 1874, the British magazine "Punch" published a cartoon showing a conversation between a young girl and her mother:"Mamma, shall you allow me to go to the Wilkinsons' ball?""No, darling," the mother responded"You've been to a great many balls, mama?""Yes darling – and I have seen the folly of them all," she said."Mightn't I just be allowed the folly of one, mamma?"This comic, which may have reminded readers of the one-sided settlement of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, would have a lasting resonance. Over the course of the 20th century, European and American leaders imposed harsh terms on their vanquished enemies in the grand peace conferences that formally ended World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.In each case, the winner excelled in sowing the seeds for the next conflict. Those who seek a peaceful Europe should keep these lessons in mind when the time finally comes to end the war in Ukraine.In 1871, Prussia chose the Chateau de Versailles — the masterpiece and symbol of French might — as the ideal place to proclaim the German Empire. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were incorporated into the new German polity despite the majority of the population feeling French.WWI ended with a German defeat in November 1918, after which the victors dictated peace terms to Germany and left it no option but to sign. Alsace and Lorraine reverted to France. Germany found itself too weak to protest the terms but too proud to bear their consequences.The opportunity for revenge came in 1939. Adolf Hitler's hubris led him to attack Poland. Ultimately Germany lost WWII to a grand coalition of Britain, France, the U.S., and the Soviet Union.The winners chose to carve out almost all of the province of Prussia and give it to Poland. The rest morphed into the Federal Republic of Germany, which chose the Western camp, and the German Democratic Republic, which joined the Soviet system. Germany today bears no resemblance to the Germany of 1871 to1945 and is still struggling to find an identity.Fast forward to 1991, when the victors of the Cold War rather unceremoniously stamped their mark on a new global power balance.The Warsaw Pact, established in 1955 as a counterweight to NATO, was immediately dissolved. NATO, for its part, gradually expanded to include ten countries that were formerly either a part of the Soviet Union or a member of the Warsaw Pact.Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, was left without the "buffer zone" of Eastern European states that had been vital for the Czars and the communist leader Josef Stalin. Russian rulers had long deemed this area imperative due to their lack of natural geographical defenses like north-south rivers or mountains.For centuries many Central and Eastern European countries were compulsorily included in the Czarist and Communist Empire. Not surprisingly, they do not trust Russia and are not willing to grant it influence on their choice of security. Russia and Central and Eastern European countries are each impinging on what the other party considers to be its vital interests.Russia was too weak to block the role assigned to it by the victors but too strong to be kept down for long — a picture sorely reminiscent of Germany in 1919. Now, Moscow hopes to rescind what it perceives as the wrongs of history by reintegrating Ukraine in its sphere of interest or even as a part of the Russian Federation. Ukraine's vigorous defense illustrates Kyiv's defiance in the face of this unilateral attempt to resuscitate Russian power and global role. Ukraine has ferociously defended its independence after several hundreds of years in a Russian empire. Russia and Ukraine, then, are each impinging on what the other party considers to be its vital interests.Russia has the largest resources, including manpower, but mobilizing them comes at a cost. Western observers have estimated that Russian troops have suffered about 300,000 casualties. And even if the economy is doing relatively well despite sanctions, this pressure comes at a cost.Russian President Vladimir Putin said earlier this month that peace would come when Russia's war aims had been achieved, reiterating that he sought Ukraine's denazification, demilitarization, and neutrality. He didn't lift the veil much, which gives him room to maneuver without hinting at how he might contemplate using it. President Putin speaks exclusively to the Russians – and the Russian voters — so Western observers should be reluctant to interpret it.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been fairly intransigent when it comes to peace talks, which is necessary to rally the troops. He addresses both the domestic and foreign audience, which also complicates any rash interpretation. There are – unsubstantiated – inklings that inside his close circle opinions may differ. Allegedly, some argue time is not on Ukraine's side. The summer 2023 offensive did not play out as hoped. Ukraine is dependent on Western aid, and no one knows for sure how solid the commitment is.The European Union laid down a marker December 14 by formally deciding to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. It now seeks ways to continue financial aid by overcoming Hungarian opposition.It is conventional thinking that a President Trump, if elected in 2024, will close shop vis-à-vis Ukraine. He has indeed declined to commit to continued military assistance, saying only that he would get a deal done in a day and warning both sides of consequences if that doesn't come to pass.The rest of the world should remind both sides that they need to be cognizant of history and not try to use demands to crush or humiliate the other side so as to sow the seeds of the next conflict. A sore point is obviously territory, where outside parties should be wary about voicing strong views. It must be done in a way that closes the chapter once and for all. Otherwise, the risk is that Donetsk and Luhansk could go the way of Alsace and Lorraine.The Russian attack on Ukraine may be perceived as an isolated and regional conflict, but it isn't. The Western world should realize that the background for the war is, to a large extent, about Russian feelings of insecurity and dissatisfaction with the world order. This feeling is widespread outside the Western camp and helps explain China's stance.Only a genuine attempt to produce a global power balance that takes into account how the world looks today can bring about lasting peace and stability — not only in Ukraine but in other hot spots around the world.

The prospect of an exchange of hostages taken by Hamas and prisoners held by Israel, to be accompanied by a pause in fighting, is of course welcome news. It's a constructive moment in the tragic ...

Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., said the Senate's immigration bill created an "asylum corps" of thousands of "bureaucrats" making asylum easier to get. The bill expanded asylum officers' powers, but they already existed.

This article is the second post on China’s stance on Ukraine. For the first text in this series, click here. The content and tone of the Chinese proposal for the settlement of the war in Ukraine is one of pro-Russia "neutrality". China has interests in bringing the war to an end and in presenting itself … Continued

In her book, Séverine Autesserre investigates the persistence of an "unlikely peace" in certain conflict-ridden areas like Idjwi in Congo and Somaliland in Somalia. She argues that locally-led grassroots peacebuilding efforts uphold a unique peace in these regions.

On 15 October, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon headquarters was hit by a missile of unknown origin. This isn't the first time UNIFIL has been caught in the crossfire of conflict between the ...

The regional reverberations of the Israel-Gaza war demonstrate why the White House should scrap, not reinforce, America's outdated and unnecessarily provocative troop presence in Syria and Iraq.
President Joe Biden should redeploy these forces to a safer position offshore and leave it to self-interested Syrians and Iraqis to prevent ISIS from reemerging. As Biden's own policy on Afghanistan demonstrated — and as I observed on the ground earlier this fall — withdrawing U.S. soldiers and Marines can bolster American security by turning the fight against Islamic State over to well-motivated local belligerents while freeing up U.S. personnel to serve in more vital areas.
Likewise, pivoting out of Syria and Iraq will not make Americans any less safe, but it will deny local militias, and their presumptive patrons in Iran, the chance to use unneeded outposts for leverage over our national strategy.
Since October 17, some 900 U.S. troops in Syria and 2,500 in Iraq have been taking fire from Iran-linked militias and, subsequently, drawing retaliatory air support, including an attack by a C-130 gunship that killed eight members of the Kataib Hezbollah group in Iraq last week. The U.S. service members are the lingering footprint of Operation Inherent Resolve, which began in 2015 to defeat the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and succeeded in 2019 in eliminating the physical ISIS caliphate, thereby reducing ISIS to "a survival posture" without territory. Rather than taking the win and packing up, the Trump and Biden administrations kept in place some troops, who have become a recurring target of opportunity for Iran and its surrogates during moments of tension. In the past five weeks, the Iran-linked militants' rockets and one-way attack drones have injured over sixty of these Americans.
The prolonged American deployment, driven by policy inertia more than strategic necessity, has added tinder to a potential U.S.-Iranian conflagration that would eclipse the Israel-Gaza War. One Pentagon official has remarked in defiance, "Iran's objective… has been to force a withdrawal of the U.S. military from the region… What I would observe is that we're still there [in Iraq and Syria]."
This reluctance to relinquish former ISIS territory to independently-minded governments recapitulates the mindset that made the Afghanistan and Iraq wars so unnecessarily costly. Rather than cutting its losses, the White House and Pentagon have doubled down, with two aircraft carrier groups in the Eastern Mediterranean, an airstrike on an Iran-linked weapons depot in Syria, and an additional 1,200 troops for staffing regional air defenses, and now strikes inside Iraq — over the objections of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, whose coalition is linked to Kataib Hezbollah.
When it comes to escalating or winding down U.S. military interventions, the deciding factor should not be what Iran's leaders want in largely deserted corners of Iraq and Syria, but what policies best serve American interests. On this question, Biden's controversial decision in 2021 to pull all U.S. forces from Afghanistan offers an important lesson. As I have seen firsthand, complete withdrawal can serve Washington's counterterrorism and strategic goals, even if the policy cedes physical terrain to governments with which U.S. officials do not see eye to eye.
When the Israel-Gaza war broke out the weekend of October 7, I was wrapping up an uneventful three weeks of visiting what were once the deadliest zones of America's recent wars: Kabul, Kandahar, and Helmand provinces in Afghanistan; and the cities of Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, and Mosul in Iraq. I traversed dozens of Taliban and Iraqi government checkpoints, as I toured cities and rural areas without any sense of threat from officials or terrorists. The physical security I experienced in both countries dispels the most common fear about withdrawing American troops, that exiting will increase the danger to Americans and our interests while strategically advantaging recalcitrant governments.
It is difficult to overstate the level of internal stability Afghanistan has enjoyed since August 2021. In the wake of America's flawed evacuation from Kabul airport, analysts and policymakers expected the country to implode and spread armed conflict onto its neighbors and the world. Instead, political violence in Afghanistan plummeted by 80% in the first year after American forces left. Crucially, the Taliban's security forces curbed the threat of mass-casualty attacks by Islamic State's local offshoot, accomplishing in a matter of months what the Pentagon and CIA had been trying to achieve since 2015. While yes they are under the thumb of the oppressive Taliban regime, Afghans are experiencing their longest respite from war since the Soviet Army invaded on Christmas Eve 1979.
Meanwhile, U.S. forces that would be committed to high-risk, low-reward combat missions in land-locked Afghanistan are available for "deterring and responding to great-power aggression." If the Taliban can hobble Islamic State's operations in an impoverished agrarian country with a supposedly "weak and failing state" ripe for transnational jihadism, there is every reason to expect the armed forces of Syria and Iraq can be equally effective. The Syrian military, backed not only by Iran but also Russia, has the wherewithal and materiel to deal with the dead-enders of ISIS's defunct caliphate. Next door, last year's spike in oil prices allowed Baghdad to adopt the largest budget in its history, including $23 billion for the security sector. Further, I can report that the roadways of Iraq are festooned with billboards of the "martyred" Iranian special forces commander Qasem Soleimani. His ubiquitous visage, in addition to al-Sudani's high-profile visit to Tehran after Secretary of State Blinken's furtive November 5 drop-in, puts paid to the idea that American boots on the ground can "check Iranian influence" in Iraq or other Shia-led states such as Syria.
ISIS has long since been defeated and Operation Inherent Resolve should be shuttered at the first opportunity. The August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan offers a vivid — if unexpected — precedent for making this timely and prudent shift. This further demonstrates that letting local actors handle Islamic State fighters — and whatever lands those jihadists claimed — will not empower America's challengers, but can enable a nimbler U.S. foreign policy.

It's a landscape where the very act of speaking out often comes at a steep cost, both in terms of personal sacrifice and the relentless pressure they face.