Russian authorities do not recognize their participation in the Donbass war. Participation concealment in military conflicts is a long-standing Russian political tradition. The Soviet Union, which was modernized by Russia, did not recognize that it had fought in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, and Ogaden. Modern Russia, which has deployed its forces to Donbass, is officially convincing the world community and Russians that this war is an internal civil conflict in Ukraine. Although all information is available on the Internet about which Russian units are fighting in Donbass, who controls them and where the flows of Russian equipment, weapons, ammunition, soldiers, officers and even where the killed Russian soldiers are buried come from. That is why films about the Donbass war help the mass audience to understand who is actually fighting in Eastern Ukraine. An article is devoted to this topic, which analyzes feature films about the Russian-Ukrainian war that lasts in Donbass. In particular, Oleksiy Shapariev's series "The Guard", films of Akhtem Seitablaiev "Cyborgs. Heroes never die", Serhiy Loznytsia "Donbass", Zaza Buadze "Call sign 'Banderas'", Ivan Tymchenko "Ilovaisk 2014. Battalion 'Donbass'", Valentyn Vasyanovych "Atlantis", Volodymyr Tykhyi "Our cats". In the context of world cinematography and peculiarities of the national character, it is presented how modern Ukrainian cinema develops the comedic traditions of war films. The reaction to films about the war by Ukrainian spectators, critics, Russian politicians and public officials, film awards at film festivals are shown.
The proposed article aims to explore the discursive dynamics of Ukraine caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war. The semantic and pragmatic dominants of relevant political texts were revealed by the method of discursive and content analysis. The article considers the peculiarities of the political discourse of Ukraine after the beginning of the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014. Discursive changes in wartime are analyzed through comparisons with the pre-war state, the leading feature of which was the mode of "brotherhood" with Russia. In the course of the analysis it was established that there was no logical immediate change to a "hostile" discourse with the beginning of the Russian aggression. Ukraine was unprepared for an adequate response to Russia's military aggression not only in real but also in discursive terms. Instead, a euphemistic complex was formed in Ukrainian political discourse to present Russia's aggressive actions as something else, something different. In this regard, an attempt is made to analyze the reasons for the belated response of Ukrainian society, especially the leading echelon of Ukrainian politics, to external aggression. Particular attention as a reason for this state of affairs is paid to post-totalitarian influences, which remain relevant to the socio-political dynamics of Ukraine. Among the key ones is the lack of a full-fledged historical and political narrative and the reproduction of mental schemes of the totalitarian past. Along with this, positive changes in the representation of the Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation as such were identified and studied. The discursive mechanisms of creating a narrative adequate to the military situation and discursive means that oppose Russian aggression are analyzed. At the same time, it was found that in the process of forming a specific discursive order, certain canons and standards of the former metropoly remain relevant in the Ukrainian context. First of all, it concerns the inclusion of substandard elements in the official communicative repertoire as a tool of information confrontation in hybrid aggression. The article concludes that a holistic historical and political narrative is the cornerstone for the formation of national and state identity. Without this, the establishment of a full-blooded state subjectivity of Ukraine appears to be an extremely difficult task. In modern Ukrainian realities, we have not a uniquely specific political discourse as part of a detailed historical and political narrative, but a post-totalitarian discursive surrogate, in the mirror of which even the contrasting notions of war and peace lose the necessary clarity. Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, political discourse, historical and political narrative, post-totalitarian consciousness.
This book is the first to provide an in-depth understanding of the 2014 crisis, Russia's annexation of Crimea and Europe's only war between Russia and Ukraine. The book provides a historical and contemporary understanding behind President Vladimir Putin Russia's obsession with Ukraine and why Western opprobrium and sanctions have not deterred Russian military aggression. The volume provides a wealth of detail about Russia's inability in the Tsarist Empire, Soviet Union and since 1991 in accepting Ukraine as an independent country and Ukrainians as a separate people, pointing to the sources of this unacceptance in Russian national identity. In the USSR, Russian identity identified with the USSR and not the Russian SFSR. A post-imperial Russian civic identity grounded in the Russian Federation was unpopular and has been dwarfed by a far larger Russian 'imagined community.' Integration of Tsarist Russian historiography and White Russian émigré chauvinism prior to the 2014 crisis transformed and hardened Russian nationalist denial of the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Ending Crimea's occupation and the Russian-Ukrainian war will meet obstacles from de facto President-for-life Putin and Russia's national identity towards Ukraine and Ukrainians.
Aspects of the creative activity of representatives of the artistic environment of front-line Kharkiv were analyzed. Its main directions and fields are considered, concrete examples of concerts, festivals, and creative meetings both offline and online are given. The names of numerous participants of these creative actions that took place in the city during the period from the beginning of full-scale Russian aggression to the end of October 2022 are given. With the beginning of the full-scale war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the country as a whole, and especially the front-line Kharkiv, faced an urgent task not only to preserve independence, but also to resist the brutal attack of the aggressor, to preserve its own rich cultural and artistic heritage. Numerous Kharkiv artists played a big role in this: musicians, artists, poets and writers, actors, etc.
The purpose of the article: to analyze the versatile activity of creative people during the Russian-Ukrainian war.
The methodology: we applied the cooperative method and the induction method in this paper.
The results. The tragic and, at the same time, heroic events of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war stimulated a huge burst of creative activity in many representatives of the artistic sphere of activity, because any creative person in extreme conditions of life seeks and finds the realization of his feelings, sensations from what he saw and experienced acutely in new compositions, paintings, poems, tapes, projects. Difficult living conditions in the front-line city for many months provoked and determined the search by creative people for new forms and means of implementing their ideas and plans. Artists are increasingly actively using various forms of online communication with potential audiences. But in addition to online projects, in a slightly transformed form, artists in various fields also implement numerous offline actions. Currently, the characteristic features of these actions are: most often the smallness of the composition of performers and, compared to the pre-war cultural and artistic life, small premises where creative events take place, creativity in the use of these premises, forms of information dissemination about such events, the prevalence of domestic authors in concert programs, the use of topical texts and plots, and, perhaps most importantly, the huge thirst of artists for self-realization. The vast majority of them have a charitable purpose: it is no coincidence that in the announcements of such events, as a rule, instead of the usual ticket price, it is stated: "any donation". Thanks to such creative actions, considerable sums are constantly collected for the needs of Ukrainian defenders, which brings us all closer to Victory.
Prospects for further research. Cultural life in the city continues and, despite daily deadly challenges, is enriched, acquiring new meaning and new shades, which is a symbolic confirmation of the indomitability of Kharkiv as a powerful eastern cultural outpost of Ukraine in the victorious struggle against the soulless Russian aggressor. A deeper understanding of the artistic processes currently taking place in Kharkiv, as well as in all regions of Ukraine not occupied by the enemy, will eventually lead to a scientific generalization of their common features, among which we can already highlight the active promotion of Ukrainian spiritual heritage and cultural innovations, the mobility and creativity of artists and creative collectives in adapting to the specific conditions of one or another creative action, altruism of all participants in creative events. The accumulation of specific facts of the creative life of Kharkiv and the whole of Ukraine, with further understanding and in-depth analysis of the events we are witnessing, will lead to a deeper understanding of the historical and cultural processes in which our Motherland and each of its citizens are now, because along with military cultural resistance to the aggressor is no less important and relevant.
AbstractEthnic differences are often considered to be powerful sources of diverse economic behaviour. In this article, we investigate to what extent ethnicity affects Ukrainian labour market outcomes. Using microdata from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey and the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition of earnings, we find a persistent and increasing labour market divide between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians throughout Ukraine's transition era. We establish that language, rather than nationality, is the key factor behind this ethnic premium favouring Russians. Our findings further document that this premium is larger amongst males than females.
The Orange Revolution unveiled significant political and economic tensions between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine. Whether this divide was caused by purely ethnic differences or by ethnically segregated reform preferences is unknown. Analysis using unique micro data collected prior to the revolution finds that voting preferences for the forces of the forthcoming Orange Revolution were strongly driven by preferences for political and economic reforms, but were also independently significantly affected by ethnicity; namely language and nationality. Russian speakers, as opposed to Ukrainian speakers, were significantly less likely to vote for the Orange Revolution, and nationality had similar effects.
The Orange Revolution unveiled significant political and economic tensions between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine. Whether this divide was caused by purely ethnic differences or by ethnically segregated reform preferences is unknown. Analysis using unique micro data collected prior to the revolution finds that voting preferences for the forces of the forthcoming Orange Revolution were strongly driven by preferences for political and economic reforms, but were also independently significantly affected by ethnicity; namely language and nationality. Russian speakers, as opposed to Ukrainian speakers, were significantly less likely to vote for the Orange Revolution, and nationality had similar effects.
The main objective of the study is to analyse the Poland's position towards the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the annexation of Crimea and the regulation of the situation in Donbas. Concerning methodology the systematic method was used for studying of the Polish politicians' perception of the occupation of Donbas and annexation of Crimea and a comparative analysis was used for studying of the positions of European and Polish leaders towards the Poland's hypothetical participation in the Normandy format or other format for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The Poland's official position on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 2014-2020 has been analysed. It has been proved that for Poland Ukraine is a zone of special interests. Official Warsaw seeks to play a significant role in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, because the failure of Ukraine will mean for Poland the deterioration of its own security situation. Currently, the Polish border with Ukraine is the EU's and NATO's border, so it would be optimal for Poland to move the borders of these organizations in the future to the East of Ukraine, so Poland strongly defends Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic ambitions. It was concluded that Polish politicians have an understanding that turning the conflict in the Donbas into a frozen one will mean the presence of a permanent explosive situation. It is recommended that the clear signals to the official Warsaw from the official Kyiv about the interest in the practical implementation of the Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership would be important and farsighted. It is highlighted that the implementation of Polish strategy on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict depends on the strategies of the main players of the European strategic space. The Polish position is perceived as pro-American by French and German authorities, so the official Paris and Bonn avoid involving Poland in the negotiations on the situation in the Donbas. However, Poland alone is not capable of influencing the regulation of the ...
"Drawing on tens of thousands of historical and legal documents, Jon Roozenbeek offers the first comprehensive analysis of the key role of propaganda in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and its use in modern military conflict. Suitable for scholars and students in political science, peace and conflict studies, psychology, and communication"--
