The Prosecutor as a Subject of the Duty of Proof in Pre-Trial Proceedings in Criminal Cases
In: Teorija i praktika obščestvennogo razvitija: meždunarodnyj naučnyj žurnal : sociologija, ėkonomika, pravo, Issue 4, p. 43-47
ISSN: 2072-7623
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In: Teorija i praktika obščestvennogo razvitija: meždunarodnyj naučnyj žurnal : sociologija, ėkonomika, pravo, Issue 4, p. 43-47
ISSN: 2072-7623
In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 57, Issue 4, p. 49-54
In: The bulletin of the atomic scientists: a magazine of science and public affairs, Volume 57, Issue 4, p. 49-54
ISSN: 0096-3402, 0096-5243, 0742-3829
In: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Volume 57, Issue 4, p. 49-54
ISSN: 1938-3282
In: EYIEL Monographs - Studies in European and international economic law volume 24
In: Portuguese studies: a biannual multi-disciplinary journal devoted to research on the cultures, societies, and history of the Lusophone world, Volume 11, p. 87-109
ISSN: 0267-5315
In: 4 J.L.: Periodical Laboratory of Leg. Scholarship (1 New Voices) 307 (2014)
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In: The ABA Journal of Labor & Employment Law
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 203, Issue 5
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThe proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evidence in a court of law. We accept fallible individual evidence but reject fallible statistical evidence even when the conditional probability that the defendant is guilty given the evidence is the same, a seeming inconsistency. This paper defends a solution to the proof paradox, building on a sensitivity account of checking and settling a question. The proposed sensitivity account of legal proof not only requires sensitivity simpliciter but sensitivity of each relevant step of the proof procedure and/or sensitivity concerning all relevant alternatives. This account avoids problems that have been identified for other sensitivity views of legal proof. Moreover, it is argued that sensitivity, rather than safety, is the crucial modal condition for legal proof. It is, finally, shown that the provided account can fruitfully support very different existing views on the relationship between knowledge and legal proof.
In: Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford University Press, Christian Dahlman, Alex Stein & Giovanni Tuzet eds.) 2020
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In: Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2018/26
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In: Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, Volume 14, Issue 1, p. 1-38
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