Suchergebnisse

Honour-related violence is increasingly recognised as a human rights problem in a number of countries. However, the scope of State obligations to prevent such acts remains largely unexplored, with the exception of so-called honour killings. This article analyses other forms of honour-related violence from the perspective of the right to private life. It argues that a positive obligation to prevent honour-related violence arises under this right. The extent of the obligation is exemplified by demonstrating to which honour-related acts the right to private life is applicable and which measures authorities can be expected to take in order to prevent these acts.

The question raised in this master thesis was: "Whether the legislation of the compulsory children's vaccination does not infringe the right to private life?". After the Minister of Health of the Republic of Lithuania initiated a new regulation which states that children who are not vaccinated against polio, measles and rubella will not be able to attend the pre-school or other primary education institutions. This master thesis conducts a study whether the new legal regulation will not infringe a person's right to private life.

The question raised in this master thesis was: "Whether the legislation of the compulsory children's vaccination does not infringe the right to private life?". After the Minister of Health of the Republic of Lithuania initiated a new regulation which states that children who are not vaccinated against polio, measles and rubella will not be able to attend the pre-school or other primary education institutions. This master thesis conducts a study whether the new legal regulation will not infringe a person's right to private life.

The question raised in this master thesis was: "Whether the legislation of the compulsory children's vaccination does not infringe the right to private life?". After the Minister of Health of the Republic of Lithuania initiated a new regulation which states that children who are not vaccinated against polio, measles and rubella will not be able to attend the pre-school or other primary education institutions. This master thesis conducts a study whether the new legal regulation will not infringe a person's right to private life.

Fight against terrorism is an important public interest. Data on natural persons that belongs to the area of their private life could help the state in the aforementioned fight. Therefore, the state may be interested in collecting the data on all the natural persons within its jurisdiction in order to prevent terrorist attacks. This raises the question if the state could collect that information without any legal restrictions. In this work, the relevant provisions of universal international law, the law of the Council of Europe, the European Union and Lithuania will be examined and the answer to the question will be provided. In the universal international law, 17 "sectorial" treaties describe certain types of behaviour that can be called terrorism. Therefore, the present concept of terrorism is very fragmented, i. e. different treaties directly or indirectly provide the definition of terrorism applied just for that certain treaty. It is important to mention that the inclusion of certain features in the concept of terrorism endangers the human rights protected by the international law and may unreasonably restrict the possibilities of freedom fighters to defend themselves from illegal foreign occupation or to seek to realise the right to self-determination. For example, the inclusion of substantial harm to the environment in the definition of terrorism as an alternative feature of this crime may unreasonably restrict the possibilities of freedom fighters, as they may have no viable alternatives to resist illegal violence used against them. The serious harm to property, as an alternative feature of terrorism, may lead to the infringement of the rights of legal protesters. It is also important to mention that some features of the crime of terrorism are not comprehensively defined concepts, e. g. serious harm to property, serious injury or substantial harm to the environment. Therefore, there is the risk that even not considerably dangerous behaviour may be mistakenly called terrorism. As a result, various human rights may be infringed. On the other hand, many of these problems could be avoided by the appropriate interpretation of the provisions of the treaties, as all of them directly or indirectly emphasize the necessity to respect human rights, provides for the possibility to reject a request for extradition if it is reasonably believed that the person will be prosecuted for his nationality, ethnic origin, race, religion or political opinion and as states have other international obligations. The Council of Europe defines the concept of terrorism by making references to universal "sectorial" treaties, but it also define some aspects of the crime of terrorism directly. The European Union has chosen a different way, as it provides the general definition of the crime of terrorism. It is important to mention that both the law of the Council of Europe and the law of the European Union recognize the need to respect human rights during the fight against terrorism. Concerning the definition of terrorism, Lithuania has obliged itself by some universal international treaties and certain treaties of the Council of Europe. Moreover, Lithuania is a member of the European Union therefore the law of the latter is also applied in this country. Thus the provisions of the aforementioned types of law have affected the national criminal law of Lithuania. The criminal code of Lithuania defines two groups of crimes related to terrorism, i. e. the crimes of terrorism and the crimes related to terrorist activities. It is important to mention that the two groups of crimes are not necessarily especially dangerous. All the aforementioned levels of law emphasize the necessity to respect human rights in the fight against terrorism. And the right to private life is one of them. According to the universal international law, the law of the Council of Europe, the European Union and Lithuania, the private life of an individual is a concept that cannot be defined comprehensively. This concept is a very broad one and the essence of it is explained by giving examples of different aspects of the private life of natural persons. All the aforementioned levels of law recognise that the right to private life can be limited. However, this may be done only if certain legal requirements, including the principles of necessity and proportionality, are met. It must be noted that the sensitive areas of the private life of individuals have greater protection, therefore it is harder to justify the interference into them. Automatic measures may also cause problems as, in certain cases, they may be inconsistent with the obligation of the state to take into account the circumstances of the situation and to follow the principles of necessity and proportionality (Lithuanian law does not allow such measures, as, according to the Constitution, the information about the private life of an individual can be collected only if a court has authorized it by a reasoned decision). According to the universal international law, the law of the Council of Europe and Lithuanian law, it may be derogated from the right to private life in an extraordinary situation, but certain legal requirements, including the principles of necessity and proportionality, must also be fulfilled. In conclusion, the state may limit the right to private life of individuals during the fight against terrorism. However, there are legal restrictions for such interference.

This paper covers the problems and dynamics that LGBTQI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer and Intersex) asylum seekers face when they leave their country of origin and enter countries within the European Union. Only a small percentage of people that claim asylum on the basis of reasonable fear of persecution because of sexual orientation are granted asylum within these EU Member States, or some other form of international protection. The paper scans the relevant legislation that is supposed to protect asylum seekers in general and covers the three most important cases of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the treatment and assessment of asylum applications on the basis of fear of persecution because of sexual orientation. The case at hand needs to be seen within this general framework as we know it so far. F v Hungary concerns the case of a Nigerian national claiming asylum on the basis of fear of persecution in his country of origin because of his homosexuality. To determine his general credibility, the Hungarian determining authorities subjected F to three different psychological tests. However, the psychological experts could not confirm or deny F's sexual orientation based on these tests. Consequently, the determining authorities decided that his general credibility could not be established and his claim for asylum was denied. The Hungarian Appeal Court requested a preliminary ruling before the CJEU. The Court ruled that in these cases it is not always necessary to determine the sexual orientation of an applicant. The CJEU stressed that, when assessing an asylum application, it does not matter whether or not an applicant actually identifies with the particular social group that attracts persecution. Scientific reports from medical, psychological or social experts can certainly be of value throughout the asylum application assessment, but determining authorities cannot be bound by such expert reports. Every case should undergo an in concreto assessment, taking into account the individual circumstances and with respect for human dignity, the right to respect for private and family life, and the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by Articles 1, 7 and 47 of the EU Charter. Every interference with these rights should be in line with the proportionality principle. Finally, some suggestions are made to shape a future strategy and the development of asylum application assessment.

The paper analyzes the relationship between freedom of expression and the right to respect for honour and reputation. It was pointed out the importance that is given to freedom of expression nowadays, and it was especially considered the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. On that occasion, the difference that exists between public and private personalities was pointed out, as well as the doubts that may arise from the distinction between factual statements and value judgments. When it comes to the right to privacy, the author referred to the importance of honour and reputation, and on that occasion reminded of the "double" presence of these values. In one case it is Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and in another the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the meaning of the term of the right to privacy from Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Solutions in domestic law and case law are analyzed, and special attention is paid to one case in which the relationship between freedom of expression and violation of honor and reputation was discussed. The specificity of this situation is reflected, inter alia, in the fact that we are talking about university professors.
The author used the normative, comparative and historical method when writing the paper.

This article critically reflects on current mainstream debate on abortion in international human rights discourse and the conception of life underpinning it. The public health focus on access to safe abortion which has dominated this discourse can be detected as committed to a fundamentally liberal idea of bounded and individual subjecthood which mirrors the commitments of the liberal right to life more generally. However, feminist challenges to this frame seeking to advance wider access to reproductive freedoms appear equally underpinned by a liberal conception of life. It is asserted that feminists may offer a more radical challenge to the current impasse in international debate on abortion by engaging with the concept of livability which foregrounds life as an interdependent and conditioned process. The trope of the 'right to livability' developed in this article presents a means to reposition the relation between rights and life and facilitate such radical engagement which better attends to the socio-political conditions shaping our interdependent living and being.