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Abstract
Novels and thought experiments can be pathways to different kinds of knowledge. We may, however, be hard pressed to say exactly what can be learned from novels but not from thought experiments. Headway on this matter can be made by spelling out their respective conditions for epistemic failure. Thought experiments fail in their epistemic role when they neither yield propositional knowledge nor contribute to an argument. They are largely in the business of 'knowing that'. Novels, on the other hand can be an epistemic success by yielding 'knowledge how'. They can help us to improve our competences.

AbstractWe investigate the impact of informal arguments on judgments about thought experiment cases in light of Deutsch and Cappelen's mischaracterization view, which claims that philosophers' case judgments are primarily based on arguments and not intuitions. If arguments had no influence on case judgments, this would seriously challenge whether they are, or should be, based on arguments at all—and not on other cognitive sources instead, such as intuition. In Experiment 1, we replicated Wysocki's (Rev Philos Psychol 8(2):477–499, 2017) pioneering study on a Gettier-style case, and we confirmed that the informal arguments used by him had no significant effect. However, we also included an improved argument for ascribing knowledge, which did have a significant effect even in Wysocki's original design. We therefore followed up with Experiment 2 on three Gettier-style cases, where we used a more natural dialogical format for presenting both case descriptions and informal arguments. Overall, we found a clear impact of prima facie good pro and con arguments on case judgments. The issue of argument impact is thus no obstacle to arguing about thought experiments.

The use of fictional narratives as a conduit for experimentation and speculation in architecture has been widely practised by paper architects and students alike; but what are the qualities of fiction that give it credibility as a tool for such investigations? What is the nature of fiction that can enable an architectural discourse? Is it a form of a thought experiment? Can it be seen as an instrument for experimentation that can reveal new insights, understanding or even new knowledge? This essay will seek to answer these questions, especially the idea of architectural fiction as a thought experiment. After defining these notions, it will look at how the structure and makeup of fiction can enable it to be thought of as an experimental instrument. It will look at the differences and similarities between literary fiction and architectural fiction before looking into the creation of possible worlds as a starting point for fictional scenarios. The question arises what role does possible world and modal statements that sometimes accompany it play in the experiment? Modal statements are important as architectural fiction can be used for a source of bibliomancy; or a way to investigate political, social, cultural or environmental tensions through the conduit of architecture. Fiction, as a thought experiment, has been debated. Philosophers have long held that literary fictions are thought experiments all be it a particular kind (Egan.2016. p.139). Can this be said of architectural fiction? The dichotomy when considering fiction as a thought experiment is that fictions are a nonfactual poiesis; yet, it said to reveal some truth in the form of knowledge. There has been debate about the epistemic value of thought experiments in fiction (Egan.2016. p.139). They, like real experiments, "seek to raise, make salient, or answer question or set of questions, by exploring the relationship between two or more variables"(Egan.2016. p.140). Real experiments, however, are done in the lab under controlled conditions and thought experiments are done, in the "Laboratory of the Mind"(Brown. 2011 quoted in Egan.2016. p.140). Fictional thought experiments are set up as allegories (Frey (1957) cited in Egan.2016. p.141, Frey 1957.p.80); it uses meaning constructed through the tools of language including signs, signifiers, symbolism and metaphors to enable more abstract thinking and imaginative cognitive engagement. Margherita Arcangeli states that "Once imagination is seen as the key to the ' cognitive black box' of the thought experiment, we will move a step closer to a simulative imagining-based account of thought experimentation' (Arcangeli, 2010.p.571). It is the mining of imagination and possible epistemic value that lies within it that make thought experiments a possible instrument for gaining knowledge. The use of language in literary fiction provides an aesthetic value to narratives, as does visual representation play a similar role in fictional architectural discourse. The aesthetic value has been said to be irrelevant to the thought experiments; however, when discussing literary fiction Egan states that it enables the investigation to be more vivid and therefore plays a role in the arguments (Egan.2016. p.146). What role does the media and aesthetics used in architectural fiction play in the experiment? Through the analysis and critique of a number of fictional architectural projects; this essay seeks to understand the use of fiction as an experimental, speculative instrument in architecture.

This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book.This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology.

Abstract
This article aims to complicate the opposition between "thick description" and "thin" thought experiments by constructing a thought experiment of its own. It compares the use of examples—thick and thin—in the work of Malinowski and Wittgenstein, who came to extremely similar conclusions about the importance of context to meaning, the former around a decade before the latter. By imagining the—by no means implausible—possibility that Wittgenstein read Malinowski, the article asks how it might change anthropological views about thickness and thinness if it turned out that one of the major philosophical sources of our disciplinary preference for "thick description" as a generalized prescription for ethnography took some inspiration for such ideas from Malinowksi's more modest and restricted empiricism.

AbstractAnimalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity.

Abstract
This article is a speculative investigation into the depiction of "body hopping"—an entity inhabiting a string of different bodies—in popular cinema since the 1980s. This trope features in genres ranging from horror and sci-fi to teen films and romantic comedies. Although often a narrative premise of dubious logic, body hopping offers us a way, as spectators, to enter into an imaginatively projected fantasy of the human body and its powers. I contrast this "neurotic" but creative logic of conceptualizing the body with the more recent philosophical school of "embodiment." My case study is the career of actor Claudia Christian, who moved from 1980s genres to general recognition on the TV series Babylon 5 in the 1990s—but always retaining her persona of an "ideal" woman who is also "off-norm" in appearance and behavior. Christian's published autobiography and her role in the body-hopper special The Hidden (1987) are discussed.

Preliminary Material /K. Ierodiakonou and S. Roux -- Introduction: The Emergence Of The Notion Of Thought Experiments /S. Roux -- Remarks On The History Of An Ancient Thought Experiment /K. Ierodiakonou -- Thought Experiments In The De Anima Commentaries /P. Lautner -- Thought Experiments In Late Medieval Debates On Atomism /C. Grellard -- Thought Experiments And Indirect Proofs In Averroes, Aquinas, And Buridan /S. Knuuttila and T. Kukkonen -- Galileo's Use Of Medieval Thought Experiments /C.R. Palmerino -- On Kant's Critique Of Thought Experiments In Early Modern Philosophy /S. Virvidakis -- Philosophical Thought Experiments: In Or Out Of The Armchair? /P. Engel -- On The Very Idea Of A Thought Experiment /J.-Y. Goffi and S. Roux -- Thought Experiments And Mental Simulations /J. Zeimbekis -- Bibliography /K. Ierodiakonou and S. Roux -- Index Nominum /K. Ierodiakonou and S. Roux.

AbstractPhilosophers have debated at length the epistemological status of scientific thought experiments. I contend that the literature on this topic still lacks a common conceptual framework, a lacuna that produces radical disagreement among the participants in this debate. To remedy this problem, I suggest focusing on the distinction between the internal and the external validity of an experiment, which is also crucial for thought experiments. I then develop an account of both kinds of validity in the context of thought experiments. I show that we can naturally conceptualise internal validity in terms of games of make-believe. Then, I argue that external validity is best defined as accurate representation of a target system. Finally, I turn back to the current debate on thought experiments and show that my diarchic account provides a general framework that can be shared by the competing philosophical views, as well as a fruitful guide for their reconciliation.