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Corporate governance is a recent concept that encompasses the costs caused by managerial misbehavior. Corporate governance is concerned with how organizations in general, and corporations in particular, produce value and how that value is distributed among the members of the corporation, its stakeholders. The interrelation of value production and value distribution links the ubiquitous technological aspect (the production of value) with the moral and ethical dimension (the distribution of value). Corporate governance is concerned with this link in general, but more specifically with the moral and ethical dimensions of distributing the generated value among the stakeholders. Value in firms is created by firm-specific investments, and the motivation and coordination of value enhancing activities and investment is protected by the power concentrated at the pyramidal top of the organization. In modern companies, it is the CEO and the top management deciding how to create value and how to distribute it among the relevant stakeholders. Due to asymmetric information and the imperfect nature of markets and contracts, adverse selection and moral hazard problems occur, where delegated (selected) managers could act in their own interest at the costs of other relevant stakeholders. Corporate governance is a two-tailed concept. The first aspect is about identifying the (most) relevant stakeholder(s), separating theory and practice into two different and conflicting streams: the stakeholder value approach and the shareholder value approach. The second aspect of the concept is about providing and analyzing different mechanisms, reducing the costs induced by moral hazard and adverse selection effects, and to balance out the motivation and coordination problems of the relevant stakeholders. Corporate governance is an interdisciplinary concept encompassing academic fields like finance, economics, accounting, law, taxation and psychology, among others. Like countries differ according to their institutions (i.e. legal and political systems, norms, and rules), firms differ according to their size, age, dominant shareholders or industries. Thus concepts in corporate governance differ along these dimensions as well. And while the underlying characteristics vary in time, continuously or as an exogenous shock, concepts in corporate governance are dynamic and static, offering a challenging field of interest for academics, policy makers and firm managers.

This book seeks to pose and explore a question that sheds light on the contested but largely cooperative nature of Arctic governance in the post-Cold War period: how does power matter – and how has it mattered – in shaping cross-border cooperation and diplomacy in the Arctic? Each chapter functions as a window through which power relations in the Arctic are explored. Issues include how representing the Arctic region matters for securing preferred outcomes, how circumpolar cooperation is marked by regional hierarchies and how Arctic governance has become a global social site in its own right, replete with disciplining norms for steering diplomatic behaviour. This book draws upon Russia's role in the Arctic Council as an extended case study and examines how Arctic cross-border governance can be understood as a site of competition over the exercise of authority.

The following chapter identifies the meaning and main features of corporate governance, underlines the importance of an entity, which regulates and balances the interests of shareholders, stakeholders, and managers in order to realize a corporation's long-run goals. Currently, all models of corporate governance can be divided by their characteristics into three types: Anglo-American, German, and Japanese; each of these models has some unique elements that are required by a particular country. The process of forming and development of corporate governance in transitional economies are described as well. As the accuracy of corporate government influences the wiliness of investors to sink their capital, it is crucial to understand the methods of corporate governance efficiency evaluation by international rating agencies. Moreover, the example of Enron Corporation's failure shows the exceptional role of corporate governance in protecting and ensuring the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, solving the conflict between managers seeking higher bonuses and investors' goals on stable future return and potential growth.

Governance is a highly contested concept that concerns the exercise of collective control towards common goals. In higher education institutes' (HEIs) context, the concept of governance refers to their internal structure, organisation and management. Simply explained, academic governance is the way in which universities are operated; it concerns both the internal (institutional) and external (system) governance of the institution. Internal governance refers to the institutional arrangements within universities (e.g., lines of authority, decision making processes, financing and staffing) whereas external governance refers to the institutional arrangements on the macro- or system-level (e.g., laws and decrees, funding arrangements, evaluations). The principal academic governance model for both public and private universities, until the 1980s, was based on a collegial shared form of governance. The tradition of shared governance rests on the assumption that faculty should hold a substantive role in decision making alongside the institution's key stakeholders; these stakeholders include the university Rector/President/CEO, and representatives from the management, administrative staff, and the students. The most visible vehicle for faculty involvement is typically a faculty senate or a similar body with a different name; such senates currently exist in more than 90 percent of colleges and universities in the U.S.A. and with small variations in Europe and the rest of the world. During the 1980s the idea of the so called corporate or entrepreneurial university emerged; it was based on the notion that, even non-profit public universities should be run as a business in order to address both the society and market needs and be able to control their own budgets. In practical terms this meant that universities should develop relationships with the industry, secure external (other than government) funding, and be able to at least break even in terms of managing their finance. Today, both models co-exist in a delicate balance: the traditional model advocates for free public higher education (HE) for anyone at any cost, whereas the new model argues for a market-driven performance-led university for those who can afford it. This entry is about the existing models of academic governance, their structure, key issues, and the current and future perspectives.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations & -- Acronyms -- Introduction -- Section One: A Conceptual Basis for Understanding Governance of Transitions and Transitions of Governance -- Chapter 1: The Governance of Transitions and the Transitions of Governance -- Chapter 2: Learning Required for Sustainable Transition -- Section Two: Rules of Engagement Derived from Case Studies in Southern Africa -- Chapter 3: Co-produced Spaces for Community-Based Tourism -- Chapter 4: Impediments to Meaningful Municipal Participatory Budgeting -- Chapter 5: Delivering the Post-2015 Development Agenda -- Chapter 6: Public Sector Reforms and Limits of Institutional Mimicking -- Chapter 7: Morality, Corruption and Trust -- Section Three: Spaces of Engagement: Learning by Doing and Doing by Learning -- Chapter 8: Managing the Energy-Food-Water Nexus in Developing Countries -- Chapter 9: City Government Resilience, Smart Cities and Big Data -- Chapter 10: Renewable Energy for the Hessequa Municipality -- Conclusion -- About the Editors -- About the Authors.

Geoengineering—the deliberate interference in the climate system to affect global warming—could have significant global environmental and social implications. How to shape formal geoengineering governance mechanisms is an issue of debate. This paper describes and analyses the geoengineering governance landscape that has developed in the absence of explicit geoengineering regulation. An Earth System Governance perspective provides insight into the formation of norms resulting from an overlap in international treaties and from the actions of engaged non-state agents. Specifically, the paper explores the instruments and actors having effect in existing formal and informal geoengineering governance mechanisms. It finds that geoengineering is subject to a form of 'governance-by-default'. This is due to a situation in which state actors have not resolved the tension between two legal norms: that of 'precaution' and that of 'harm minimisation'. This governance-by-default is characterised by uneven regulation from existing multilateral agreements established for other purposes, an absence of regulation specifically focused on geoengineering, guidance from an international ambition to hold global average warming below 2 °C and to achieve net-zero emissions in the second half of the century, and strong normative engagement by the research community. Governance-by-default is likely to be a stopgap development until more enduring and focused governance emerges.