Suchergebnisse

In seiner "Theory of Global Governance" argumentiert Michael Zürn, Staaten seien gegenwärtig in ein globales politisches System eingebettet, das eine Vielzahl internationaler Institutionen umfasst. Dieser Forumsbeitrag unternimmt den Versuch einer Annäherung an die Gestalt des von Zürn identifizierten globalen politischen Systems. Er schlägt vor, global governance als ein polyzentrisch strukturiertes System zu konzeptualisieren, das aus vielen Entscheidungszentren besteht, die formal voneinander unabhängig sind, sich aber faktisch wechselseitig beeinflussen. Der Beitrag verdeutlicht zunächst, worin die zentralen Merkmale der polyzentrischen Struktur des von Zürn identifizierten globalen politischen Systems bestehen. Anschließend skizziert er, wie die polyzentrische Struktur staatliches Verhalten beeinflusst und das Problem politischer Ordnungsbildung jenseits des Nationalstaates akzentuiert. Abschließend wird vor dem Hintergrund gegenwärtiger Herausforderungen für zwischenstaatliche Kooperation angedeutet, worin die institutionellen Stärken einer polyzentrischen Regelungsstruktur liegen.

AbstractThis article examines how modes of governance are reconfigured as a result of using algorithms in the governance process. We argue that deploying algorithmic systems creates a shift toward a special form of design‐based governance, with power exercised ex ante via choice architectures defined through protocols, requiring lower levels of commitment from governing actors. We use governance of three policy problems – speeding, disinformation, and social sharing – to illustrate what happens when algorithms are deployed to enable coordination in modes of hierarchical governance, self‐governance, and co‐governance. Our analysis shows that algorithms increase efficiency while decreasing the space for governing actors' discretion. Furthermore, we compare the effects of algorithms in each of these cases and explore sources of convergence and divergence between the governance modes. We suggest design‐based governance modes that rely on algorithmic systems might be re‐conceptualized as algorithmic governance to account for the prevalence of algorithms and the significance of their effects.

ABSTRACTThe state often struggles to meet citizens' demands but confronts strong public pressure to do so. What does the state do when public expectations exceed its actual governing capacity? This article shows that the state can respond by engaging in performative governance—the theatrical deployment of language, symbols, and gestures to foster an impression of good governance among citizens. Performative governance should be distinguished from other types of state behavior, such as inertia, paternalism, and the substantive satisfaction of citizens' demands. The author illustrates this concept in the realm of environmental governance in China. Given the severity of China's environmental pollution, the resulting public outcry, and the logistical and political challenges involved in solving the problem, how can the state redeem itself? Ethnographic evidence from participant observation at a municipal environmental protection bureau reveals that when bureaucrats are confronted with the dual burdens of low state capacity and high public scrutiny, they engage in performative governance to assuage citizens' complaints. This study draws attention to the double meaning of "performance" in political contexts, and the essential distinction between the substantive and the theatrical.

Abstract
Since the 1990s, western, developed countries have moved away from rule-making and standard-setting in multilateral intergovernmental organizations and have increasingly collaborated on those matters in clubs of developed countries, such as trans-governmental regulatory networks. Although clubs often generate rules or standards that affect developing countries, the latter have not had a voice in rule-making, resulting in a 'participation gap', for which clubs are being criticized. Against this background, I analyse a recent development that has largely gone unnoticed: Clubs have been integrating previously excluded developing countries. From small and exclusive clubs, they are growing into larger and more inclusive clubs. I call this trajectory of the past seventy years – the establishment of intergovernmental organizations, their increasing displacement in favour of clubs, and the recent reversion towards larger clubs – accordion governance. Like an accordion that expands or contracts as needed, so too have governance models and rule-making adjusted to changing conditions and preferences by becoming more or less inclusive. Focusing on club expansion, I address three questions: (1) How has participation – and the rules governing it – evolved over time? (2) Why are governments voluntarily sharing rule-making authority with new participants? (3) Can these reforms close the participation gap in international rule-making?

In this study, we analyze the quality of governance in Turkey by using worldwide governance indicators (WGIs), namely, voice and accountability (VA), political stability and absence of violence (PV), government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), and control of corruption (CC) which aggregate 6 dimensions of governance. In that regard, we employ principal component analysis (PCA) to construct a composite governance index (CGI) for Turkey over the 2002-2017 period. We find that the CGI creates proper signals to both economic and political disequlibriums observed in the post-2001 financial crisis era. Our findings underline an effective regulatory framework for monitoring the quality of governance and accordingly suggests the CGI as a policy tool.

<p>Scholars and practitioners are increasingly questioning formal disaster governance (FDG) approaches as being too rigid, slow, and command-and-control driven. Too often, local realities and non-formal influences are sidelined or ignored to the extent that disaster governance can be harmed through the efforts to impose formal and/or political structures. A contrasting narrative emphasises so-called bottom-up, local, and/or participatory approaches which this article proposes to encapsulate as Informal Disaster Governance (IDG). This article theorises IDG and situates it within the long-standing albeit limited literature on the topic, paying particular attention to the literature's failure to properly define informal disaster risk reduction and response efforts, to conceptualise their far-reaching extent and consequences, and to consider their 'dark sides.' By presenting IDG as a framework, this article restores the conceptual importance and balance of IDG vis-à-vis FDG, paving the way for a better understanding of the 'complete' picture of disaster governance. This framework is then considered in a location where IDG might be expected to be more powerful or obvious, namely in a smaller, more isolated, and tightly knit community, characteristics which are stereotypically used to describe island locations. Thus, Svalbard in the Arctic has been chosen as a case study, including its handling of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, to explore the merits and challenges with shifting the politics of disaster governance towards IDG.</p>

In informal urban areas throughout the developing world, and even in some US and UK neighborhoods, tens if not hundreds of millions of people live under some form of criminal governance. For them, states' claims of a monopoly on the use of force ring hollow; for many issues, a local criminal organization is the relevant authority. Yet the state is far from absent: residents may pay taxes, vote, and even inform on gangs as punishment for abusive behavior. Criminal governance flourishes in pockets of low state presence, but ones that states can generally enter at will, if not always without violence. It thus differs from state, corporate, and rebel governance because it is embedded within larger domains of state power. I develop a conceptual framework centered around the who, what, and how of criminal governance, organizing extant research and proposing a novel dimension: charismatic versus rational-bureaucratic forms of criminal authority. I then delineate the logics that may drive criminal organizations to provide governance for non-members, establishing building blocks for future theory-building and -testing. Finally, I explore how criminal governance intersects with the state, refining the concept of crime–state "symbiosis" and distinguishing it from neighboring concepts in organized-crime and drug-violence scholarship.