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This article describes and explains patterns of electoral governance in Africa's emerging democracies through a systematic examination of election management bodies (embs), the formal units principally responsible for the organization and conduct of elections. The effectiveness of embs as institutional linchpins of electoral governance depends largely, but not exclusively, on their autonomy from the government. The article measures the degree of autonomy of embs as an indicator of the varying patterns of electoral governance in Africa's emerging democracies and employs an ordered probit model to account for them. The model confirms the expected combined effects of the institutional legacies of colonial governance and postcolonial neopatrimonial regimes, ethnopolitical fragmentation and political negotiations over new democratic institutions on the relative autonomy of embs. Predicted probabilities calculated from the probit coefficients accurately predict the separate impact of each independent variable on the likelihood of African countries choosing non-autonomous, semi-autonomous or autonomous embs.

In May 2000 the government proposed the introduction of a new offence of corporate killing founded on the concept of "management failure". Two specific corporate risks are investigated; the risk that the company's operations will kill one of its employees or a member of the public and the risk that the company will be convicted of an offence indicating corporate responsibility for that killing. The article demonstrates, firstly, that the risks associated with corporate killing fall within the ambit of the Turnbull Guidance. More importantly, it uses this particular, not directly financial, example to illustrate the proposition that Turnbull should not be associated with closure; rather it should be associated with the opening of a new level of corporate governance debate that will focus on corporate behaviour rather than corporate policy.

It has become popular to advocate partnership arrangements. Such partnerships may be seen as new forms of governance, which fit in with the imminent network society. However, the idea of partnership is often introduced without much reflection on the need to reorganize policy‐making processes and to adjust existing institutional structures.In this contribution, we discuss the ambiguity of partnerships. An empirical basis is provided by means of an analysis of the policy making on the expansion of the Rotterdam harbor. This case indicates that although new governance schemes are being proposed and explored, they still have to comply with the existing procedures in which they are imbedded. Governments especially are not prepared to adjust to governance arrangements. Policy making continues to be based on self‐referential organizational decisions, rather than on joint interorganizational policy making. This raises questions about the added value of intended cooperative governance processes.

Electoral governance is a crucial variable in securing the credibility of elections in emerging democracies, but remains largely ignored in the comparative study of democratization. This article develops some basic analytical tools to advance comparative analysis and understanding of this neglected topic. It conceptualizes electoral governance as a set of related activities that involves rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication. It identifies the provision of procedural certainty to secure the substantive uncertainty of democratic elections as the principal task of electoral governance. It argues that electoral governance, while socially and institutionally embedded, matters most during the indeterminate conditions that typically attend democratization. Finally, it outlines a research agenda that covers the comparative study of the structures as well as the processes of electoral governance.