Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The current ecological crisis and its accompanying environmental consciousness has prodded many to reject Western dualism and instead embrace animism. Taking the Sundarbans forests of India as a starting point, the author shows how several animated, nonhuman agents of the region guide both resource use and social relationships through a set of rules known as the "rules of the jungle." The source of these rules are deities, demons, and spirits—that is, "cosmic polities"—that undeniably govern life in the Sundarbans and across the landscape of South Asia. Mehtta shows how such nonhuman forms of governance and animistic ontologies can act as a source not only of care and an ecological consciousness but also are capable of exclusion and discrimination. Consequently, the South Asian context provides an important cautionary tale about the blind embrace of animism as the sole savior of our ecological crisis by revealing a spectrum of violence within certain strands of animistic ontologies. Simultaneously the author shows how Western repertoires of thought reveal framing devices that transcend dualism and may be read as the precursors of contemporary environmental consciousness. This article ultimately proposes the importance of acknowledging a bricolage of ontologies and realities without entrenching them in a particular identity of caste, tribe, or "indigeneity" or in being of "the West" or of "the rest of the world."

ABSTRACTThe state often struggles to meet citizens' demands but confronts strong public pressure to do so. What does the state do when public expectations exceed its actual governing capacity? This article shows that the state can respond by engaging in performative governance—the theatrical deployment of language, symbols, and gestures to foster an impression of good governance among citizens. Performative governance should be distinguished from other types of state behavior, such as inertia, paternalism, and the substantive satisfaction of citizens' demands. The author illustrates this concept in the realm of environmental governance in China. Given the severity of China's environmental pollution, the resulting public outcry, and the logistical and political challenges involved in solving the problem, how can the state redeem itself? Ethnographic evidence from participant observation at a municipal environmental protection bureau reveals that when bureaucrats are confronted with the dual burdens of low state capacity and high public scrutiny, they engage in performative governance to assuage citizens' complaints. This study draws attention to the double meaning of "performance" in political contexts, and the essential distinction between the substantive and the theatrical.

Abstract
Since the 1990s, western, developed countries have moved away from rule-making and standard-setting in multilateral intergovernmental organizations and have increasingly collaborated on those matters in clubs of developed countries, such as trans-governmental regulatory networks. Although clubs often generate rules or standards that affect developing countries, the latter have not had a voice in rule-making, resulting in a 'participation gap', for which clubs are being criticized. Against this background, I analyse a recent development that has largely gone unnoticed: Clubs have been integrating previously excluded developing countries. From small and exclusive clubs, they are growing into larger and more inclusive clubs. I call this trajectory of the past seventy years – the establishment of intergovernmental organizations, their increasing displacement in favour of clubs, and the recent reversion towards larger clubs – accordion governance. Like an accordion that expands or contracts as needed, so too have governance models and rule-making adjusted to changing conditions and preferences by becoming more or less inclusive. Focusing on club expansion, I address three questions: (1) How has participation – and the rules governing it – evolved over time? (2) Why are governments voluntarily sharing rule-making authority with new participants? (3) Can these reforms close the participation gap in international rule-making?

Executive SummaryGovernment post-Brexit will face sustained and difficult challenges as the UK adjusts to its new situation. Yet these challenges risk being exacerbated by fundamental changes in UK political debate that are affecting the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the system and structures of government. These include erosion of the clear distinction entrenched for the last 150 years between political choices by elected representatives and impartial administration by the civil service; the disruption of traditional deliberative processes by digital and social media; and increased centralisation of decision-making in No. 10 Downing Street combined with inadequate scrutiny of that decision-making either by the Cabinet or by Parliament.The centralisation of executive power reduces its perceived legitimacy across the UK, with devolved government in Scotland and Wales seen as contingent on the Westminster Parliament and Northern Ireland under control by central government. Fiscally, the UK has become the most centralised democratic country in the world. As government faces up to the challenge of unwinding membership of the legal and regulatory framework developed during 45 years of EU membership, it is vital that the UK's political structures restore their legitimacy and efficiency.Necessary reforms start with greater transparency about how government really works today. A PM's Department should be created, separate from the Cabinet Office; senior appointments including the Chief of Staff and 'Advisors', as well as instructions from No. 10 to departments, should be subject to effective Parliamentary scrutiny. Legally entrenched structures are required to confirm that devolved powers cannot simply be overridden by the Westminster Parliament. Greater fiscal autonomy should be guaranteed to local government.Finally, politicians should choose either to recommit explicitly to the original system whereby the civil service remains separate from politics and take steps to make it effective; or acknowledge the drift towards greater political control of the civil service and introduce safeguards to minimise political abuse, for example by taking steps to increase scrutiny of appointments and expenditure.