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Governance for Architects is the text of a guest lecture given January 18th 2002 at the Fontys Academy of Architecture and Urbanism in Tilburg. The lecture was programmed in a wider discussion on network society and spatial design. Referring to government building commissions in three phases of history, the lecture shows the development of politics and administration, and their influence upon architecture and urbanism.

International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.

International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.

International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.

International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.

International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.

Corporate governance trekt in Nederland en daarbuiten al enige tijd veel belangstelling. Diverse nationale en internationale commissies stellen regels op in aanvulling op bestaande wet- en regelgeving. In dit verband wordt gesproken van procedurele rationaliteit. Wat opvalt is dat er weinig rekening wordt gehouden met issues als machtsposities, eigen belang, onderhandelingen en (in)formele netwerken. Een verband wordt daartoe gelegd met het begrip politieke rationaliteit. Aandacht voor beide vormen van rationaliteit biedt perspectief om geconstateerde problemen met betrekking tot de implementatie van aanbevelingen op het gebied van corporate governance tegen te gaan c.q. te voorkomen.

This paper attempts to analyze governance systems in Southeast Asia and proposes some policy suggestions that can improve governance practices in the region. It also discusses the links between governance and official development assistance and the role of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. To put the discussion on governance systems in a proper context, the paper discusses the governance and growth nexus in Southeast Asia; describes the operating governance systems in Southeast Asia; analyzes economic governance, more specifically in the areas of economic management and growth, revenue generation, social spending, access to services, cost of doing business, and corporate governance; and examines political governance, focusing on the rule of law and judicial independence, conflict management, and voice participation. Regardless of level of development, Southeast Asian countries need to establish and strengthen their transparency and accountability structures, both in the public and private sectors, in order to continue the momentum for broad-based growth. It is also necessary to strengthen the fiscal autonomy of their sub-national units, and provide more room for participation by civil society groups. More responsive and simplified regulatory structures are needed, and so are strong law enforcement mechanisms. The rise of ethnic tensions argues for better peace-building institutions to narrow the gap between groups. In all these, the ultimate challenge lies in seeking allies and building constituencies for reform. To make ODA better managed and more effective, donors must work in partnership (that is, have a common basket) rather than in competition. Donors can also enhance the value of aid by increasingly providing ideas and not just goods, untying aid and allowing recipient countries to take "ownership" and greater flexibility in the use of aid. For Japanese development assistance, in particular, Japanese aid agencies must adopt a strategic approach to assisting poverty reduction in the poorer countries of Southeast Asia, while extending their concessional window to middle-income countries. Japan can do well in providing "ideas aid" based on the Japanese experience. Japanese ODA can have higher leverage if an increasing part of the aid is used for institution building and reforms in governance.

Empezando con Chile a comienzos de 1980, los países de América Latina han profundizado la reforma a las telecomunicaciones para crear un entorno regulatorio que incentive la inversión privada, en particular la inversión extranjera. En este artículo, trabajo las tendencias regulatorias en el sector telecomunicaciones de 24 países latinoamericanos y del caribe durante el período 1980-1997 y construyo un índice basado en : autonomía, rendición de cuentas, claridad de las funciones y objetivos, transparencia y participación, y el tipo de mandato legal que crea el ente regulador. El índice muestra que, en promedio, la mayoría de los países llevaron a cabo fuertes reformas regulatorias en la dirección sugerida por expertos e investigadores. El índice también se correlación bien con varias variables políticas, de riesgo, económicas y de telecomunicaciones. ; Starting with Chile in the early 1980s, Latin American countries have pushed telecommunications reform to create regulatory environments that encourage private investment, especially foreign investment. I look at regulatory trends in telecommunications in 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries during 1980-97 and construct an index based on the following aspects: autonomy, accountability, clarity of roles and objectives, transparency and participation, and the type of legal mandate that creates a regulatory body. The index shows clearly that, in general, most countries embraced strong regulatory reforms along the lines recommended by experts and practitioners. The index also correlates well with main political, risk, economic and telecommunications variables.

Peaceful acts of protest are relatively common in popular Australian sports and entertainment. Traditionally, protest has been regulated through criminal and adjunct summary offences or policing legislation. Trends in corporate governance and state-sponsored event management have significant implications for individual and collective rights of protest at popular domestic and international events. In reviewing prominent incidents of protest and the evolution of public order laws in Victoria and New South Wales, this article highlights the complexity and contradictions underpinning the regulation of protest at major entertainment venues, and examines the impact of recent legislative reforms facilitating professional corporate event management.

It has become popular to advocate partnership arrangements. Such partnerships may be seen as new forms of governance, which fit in with the imminent network society. However, the idea of partnership is often introduced without much reflection on the need to reorganize policy-making processes and to adjust existing institutional structures. In this contribution, we discuss the ambiguity of partnerships. An empirical basis is provided by means of an analysis of the policy making on the expansion of the Rotterdam harbor. This case indicates that although new governance schemes are being proposed and explored, they still have to comply with the existing procedures in which they are imbedded. Governments especially are not prepared to adjust to governance arrangements. Policy making continues to be based on selfreferential organizational decisions, rather than on joint interorganizational policy making. This raises questions about the added value of intended cooperative governance processes.

This Article argues that the components of globalization--economic integration, democratization, and global governance networks--are changing the nature of corporate governance and the prospects for peace. Multinational enterprises are the instruments of economic integration. As such, multinationals as a group deserve credit for the positive productivity-related wealth effects of the process. As the implementing institutions, these enterprises are also inextricably related to the inequality--the social void--resulting from globalization that threatens peace. Hyper competition in the global product markets and the demands of the financial markets determine, to a large extent, the activities of the multinational. Alternatively, there is an evolving opportunity for management to participate in a socially positive way with global governance networks that are gradually assuming the regulatory role from national governments. Within these market and governance constraints, individual firms have an opportunity to mitigate the negative pressures on their various constituencies, thus contributing to development and the prospect for peace. The Article includes a model for balancing the productive, social, and environmental role of the enterprise.

Whose responsibility is it to assure food security in an age of globalization? Is improved governance at the international level our greatest need, or are governance deficits most severe at the national level? When national governments lag in assuring food security for their own citizens, can outsiders help make up the resulting governance deficit? What role can bilateral donors and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, play? Is it possible for NGOs to step in to do the job? These and related pressing questions are addressed in this discussion paper by Robert Paarlberg. He argues that the problems of hunger and food insecurity urgently require a national, not global focus. Many national governments in developing countries still do not provide essential public goods, such as civil peace, rule of law, transport infrastructure, clean water, electrical power, and public research to generate new agricultural productivity — essential ingredients in the effort to boost incomes. For tackling hunger, the weak per-formance of nation-states remains most critical—and in most critical need of improvement. According to Paarlberg, the governance challenge as far as food security is concerned is to persuade sovereign governments to provide the necessary public goods that would ensure access to adequate food. This paper was commissioned for IFPRI's 2020 Vision Initiative conference, "Sustainable Food Security for All by 2020," held on September 4–6, 2001, in Bonn, Germany. A summary version was presented at the session on "Whose Responsibility Is It To End Hunger?" The presentation sparked a long overdue discussion on who are the key actors in the effort to eliminate hunger, how their role has changed over time, and what their responsibilities are likely to be in the future. (from Foreward by Per Pinstrup-Andersen Director General, IFPRI) ; PR ; IFPRI1; 2020 ; DGO

Electoral governance is a crucial variable in securing the credibility of elections in emerging democracies, but remains largely ignored in the comparative study of democratization. This article develops some basic analytical tools to advance comparative analysis and understanding of this neglected topic. It conceptualizes electoral governance as a set of related activities that involves rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication. It identifies the provision of procedural certainty to secure the substantive uncertainty of democratic elections as the principal task of electoral governance. It argues that electoral governance, while socially and institutionally embedded, matters most during the indeterminate conditions that typically attend democratization. Finally, it outlines a research agenda that covers the comparative study of the structures as well as the processes of electoral governance.

This article describes and explains patterns of electoral governance in Africa's emerging democracies through a systematic examination of election management bodies (embs), the formal units principally responsible for the organization and conduct of elections. The effectiveness of embs as institutional linchpins of electoral governance depends largely, but not exclusively, on their autonomy from the government. The article measures the degree of autonomy of embs as an indicator of the varying patterns of electoral governance in Africa's emerging democracies and employs an ordered probit model to account for them. The model confirms the expected combined effects of the institutional legacies of colonial governance and postcolonial neopatrimonial regimes, ethnopolitical fragmentation and political negotiations over new democratic institutions on the relative autonomy of embs. Predicted probabilities calculated from the probit coefficients accurately predict the separate impact of each independent variable on the likelihood of African countries choosing non-autonomous, semi-autonomous or autonomous embs.