[Abstract] This research presents a proposal for a study of governance from the perspective presented in the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) of the European Union, which seeks to provide coherence to the problems in the maritime sector through the coordination of all stakeholders in the maritime sector. The objective of this research is to identify the barriers and the problems that occur when a Member State tries to implement the Integrated Maritime Policy in the governmental organization of marine spaces. The challenge is to achieve 'blue governance' i.e.the activation of a network of cooperation between the different stakeholders of the port sectors so as to be able to integrate the different regional, national, European and international levels with the purpose of establishing a structured, systematic collaboration framework. ; [Resumo] Esta investigación ofrece unha proposta para o estudo da gobernanza desde a perspectiva presentada na Política Marítima Integrada (PMI) da Unión Europea, que busca proporcionarlles coherencia aos problemas do sector marítimo desde a coordinación de todos os interesados. O obxectivo desta investigación é identificar as barreiras e os problemas que ocorren cando un Estado membro intenta implementar a Política Marítima Integrada na organización gobernamental de espazos mariños. O desafío que se tenta conseguir é lograr a gobernanza azul, é dicir, a activación dunha rede de cooperación entre as diferentes partes interesadas do sector portuario para poder integrar os diferentes niveis rexionais, nacionais, europeos e internacionais de cara a unha estrutura colaborativa.
International Conference "Ocean Governance in Archipelagic Regions", 7-10 October 2019, Faial, Azores, Portugal. ; A gestão das pescas na Região Autónoma dos Açores (RAA) é feita com base na Política Comum de pescas (PCP, Regulamento UE nº 1380/2013, de 11 de dezembro), que deverá ir ao encontro dos requisitos presentes na Diretiva Quadro Estratégia Marinha (DQEM, Diretiva nº 2008/56/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 17 de junho) e estar alinhada com os objetivos de desenvolvimento sustentável das Nações Unidas, nomeadamente o #14. A União Europeia (UE), através destes diplomas, exige aos estados membros que implementem medidas de gestão eficientes que assegurem a sustentabilidade social, económica e ambiental das atividades extrativas, incluindo a monitorização regular dos recursos explorados e seus habitats. Neste sentido a UE instituiu um quadro para a recolha e gestão de dados da pesca (Regulamento (UE) 2017/1004, de 17 maio) cujo principal objetivo é assegurar a recolha de dados, por todos os estados membros, que serão posteriormente disponibilizados e utilizados para efeitos de gestão das pescarias comunitárias. A monitorização da atividade pesqueira vem também expressa no art. 15º da PCP ao proibir as rejeições. Isto representa uma mudança fundamental no sistema de gestão das pescarias europeias face ao anterior regulamento base, que permite monitorizar todas as frações da captura e não apenas os desembarques. Um regime de gestão específico de acesso à pesca de espécies em profundidade foi também implementado pela EU (Regulamento (UE) 2016/2336, de 14 dezembro) e prevê, entre outros constrangimentos, uma cobertura mínima das operações de pesca em profundidade. A sustentabilidade das pescarias regionais e a garantia do bom estado ambiental é uma imposição clara da UE e passa pela tomada de medidas eficientes de gestão pesqueira que tenham por base informação obtida ao abrigo de programas sistemáticos de monitorização de recursos, da pesca e dos habitats marinhos. De facto, as decisões estratégicas a adotar na gestão dos recursos marinhos devem basear-se no conhecimento científico sólido e bem fundamentado sobre o nível de exploração que as unidades populacionais podem suportar, tendo em consideração também os potenciais efeitos que sobre eles podem exercer outras pressões. Consciente das obrigações impostas e das necessidades ao nível da recolha de dados da pesca, a administração regional garante a execução do Programa Nacional de Recolha de Dados da Pesca (PNRD) e financia uma série de outros programas de monitorização em estreita colaboração com o Departamento de Oceanografia e Pescas da Universidade dos Açores. Alguns destes programas com uma série temporal de dados considerável, como são a campanha anual de demersais (ARQDAÇO) para estimação de abundâncias de recursos demersais e o Programa de Observação das Pescas dos Açores (POPA) para a recolha de dados das pescarias da região, com especial atenção à pescaria de atum de salto e vara. Acresce a estes programas de monitorização, o COSTA (COnsolidating Sea Turtle conservation in the Azores) que numa parceria com instituições estrangeiras prevê a recolha de dados na pescaria de palangre derivante de superfície, a de maior impacto na conservação de tartarugas marinhas que ocorrem na RAA. No que respeita aos recursos marinhos costeiros de interesse comercial a informação existente resume-se a estudos pontuais, o que levanta alguma incerteza relativamente à eficácia das medidas de gestão implementadas para algumas pescarias. Esta lacuna no conhecimento levou a administração regional, em 2019, a iniciar o financiamento um novo programa de monitorização de recursos costeiros e avaliação do seu estado de conservação (MoniCo), para assim, de forma consciente, impor medidas que permitam a sustentabilidade destas pescarias. A estes programas de monitorização acrescem-se os trabalhos que têm sido desenvolvidos ao nível da caracterização socioeconómica do ativo da pesca bem como do bem-estar financeiro dos mesmos. ; ABSTRACT: Fisheries management in the Autonomous Region of the Azores (RAA) is based on the Common Fisheries Policy (PCP, Regulation (EU) 1380/2013, 11 December), which should meet the requirements of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (DQEM, Directive No. 2008/56 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 17 June) and be aligned with the United Nations' sustainable development objectives, namely # 14. The European Union (EU), through these diplomas, requires member states to implement efficient management measures that ensure the social, economic and environmental sustainability of extractive activities, including the regular monitoring of exploited resources and their habitats. Accordingly, the EU has introduced a framework for fisheries data collection and management (Regulation (EU) 2017/1004, 17 May) whose main objective is to ensure the data collection, by all member states, which will later be made available and used for fisheries management purposes. Monitoring of fishing activity also expressed in art. 15 of the PCP, which ban the discards. This represents a fundamental shift in the European fisheries management system when compared with the previous regulation, which allows monitoring of all catch components and not only the landings. A specific management regime for access to deep-sea fishing also been implemented by the EU (Regulation (EU) 2016/2336, 14 December) and provides, among other constraints, minimum coverage for deep-sea fishing operations. The sustainability of regional fisheries and the guarantee of a good environmental status is a clear requirement of the EU, which involves efficient fisheries management measures based on information obtained under systematic fisheries resource and marine habitats monitoring programs. In fact, the strategic decisions to be taken in the management of marine resources must be based on solid and well-founded scientific knowledge concerning the level of exploitation that stocks can support, and also taking into account the potential effects that other pressures may have on them. Aware of the obligations imposed and the needs for fisheries data collection, the regional administration guarantees the execution of the Azores Data Collection Framework (DCF) and support several monitoring programs in close collaboration with the Department of Oceanography and Fisheries at the University of the Azores. Some of these programs have a considerable time series of data, such as the annual demersal campaign (ARQDAÇO) for estimating abundance of demersal resources and the Azores Fisheries Observer Program (POPA) for data collection from the regional fisheries, with special attention to pole-and-line tuna fishery. In addition to these monitoring programs, COSTA (COnsolidating Sea Turtle conservation in the Azores) in partnership with international institutions, foresees the data collection in the surface longline fishery, which has the greatest impact on the conservation of sea turtles that occur in the RAA. With regard to coastal marine resources of commercial interest, the existing information is limited to specific studies, which raises some uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of the management measures implemented for some fisheries. This knowledge gap led the regional administration, in 2019, to support a new monitoring program for coastal resources (MoniCo) that will help to assess their conservation status and thus impose more consciously measures that allow the sustainability of these fisheries. In addition to these monitoring programs, work has been carried out on the socioeconomic characterization of the fishing asset as well as their financial well-being. ; Azores Regional Government - Regional Directorate for Fisheries. Regional Directorate for Fisheries supports for better management, among other programs and projects: POPA, COSTA, CONDOR, ARQDAÇO, PNRD and the, recently created, MONICO - Monitoring Program for Coastal Resources. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Public sector innovation labs are becoming an increasingly visible instrument in public sector innovation and experimentation. Proponents of these labs claim they can play an important role in addressing pressing social challenges, changing government structures and thereby shaping ideas and practices of future governance. Whilst some research has been carried out on public innovation labs, the focus of inquiry has been primarily on the emergence, models and activities of labs in Europe and North America. This paper attempts to contribute to this growing body of research by bringing forth some of the particularities of this phenomenon as it emerges in Latin America. Using as starting point three experimental interests identified in the available literature, namely increasing flexibilization of public procedures, developing methods for citizen engagement and experimental development of public policies, the paper presents insights and observations from a study of ten public sector innovation labs in Latin America. In particular, our focus is on how these interests are confronted with different realities and therefore what kind of challenges the labs face. Experimentation in Latin America seems to concern not only flexibilization, engagement and public policies; it also includes juggling with the tensions arising from budgetary constraints, the need to weave networks of regional labs to collaborate and finally the need to align their agendas to those of other institutions, while being accountable to different levels of society. This places Latin American labs in a different light than their European and North American counterparts. ; Peer reviewed
Algorithmic governance as a key concept in controversies around the emerging digital society highlights the idea that digital technologies produce social ordering in a specific way. Starting with the origins of the concept, this paper portrays different perspectives and objects of inquiry where algorithmic governance has gained prominence ranging from the public sector to labour management and ordering digital communication. Recurrent controversies across all sectors such as datafication and surveillance, bias, agency and transparency indicate that the concept of algorithmic governance allows to bring objects of inquiry and research fields that had not been related before into a joint conversation. Short case studies on predictive policy and automated content moderation show that algorithmic governance is multiple, contingent and contested. It takes different forms in different contexts and jurisdictions, and it is shaped by interests, power, and resistance.
Corporate governance is a recent concept that encompasses the costs caused by managerial misbehavior. Corporate governance is concerned with how organizations in general, and corporations in particular, produce value and how that value is distributed among the members of the corporation, its stakeholders. The interrelation of value production and value distribution links the ubiquitous technological aspect (the production of value) with the moral and ethical dimension (the distribution of value). Corporate governance is concerned with this link in general, but more specifically with the moral and ethical dimensions of distributing the generated value among the stakeholders. Value in firms is created by firm-specific investments, and the motivation and coordination of value enhancing activities and investment is protected by the power concentrated at the pyramidal top of the organization. In modern companies, it is the CEO and the top management deciding how to create value and how to distribute it among the relevant stakeholders. Due to asymmetric information and the imperfect nature of markets and contracts, adverse selection and moral hazard problems occur, where delegated (selected) managers could act in their own interest at the costs of other relevant stakeholders. Corporate governance is a two-tailed concept. The first aspect is about identifying the (most) relevant stakeholder(s), separating theory and practice into two different and conflicting streams: the stakeholder value approach and the shareholder value approach. The second aspect of the concept is about providing and analyzing different mechanisms, reducing the costs induced by moral hazard and adverse selection effects, and to balance out the motivation and coordination problems of the relevant stakeholders. Corporate governance is an interdisciplinary concept encompassing academic fields like finance, economics, accounting, law, taxation and psychology, among others. Like countries differ according to their institutions (i.e. legal and political systems, norms, and rules), firms differ according to their size, age, dominant shareholders or industries. Thus concepts in corporate governance differ along these dimensions as well. And while the underlying characteristics vary in time, continuously or as an exogenous shock, concepts in corporate governance are dynamic and static, offering a challenging field of interest for academics, policy makers and firm managers.
This book seeks to pose and explore a question that sheds light on the contested but largely cooperative nature of Arctic governance in the post-Cold War period: how does power matter – and how has it mattered – in shaping cross-border cooperation and diplomacy in the Arctic? Each chapter functions as a window through which power relations in the Arctic are explored. Issues include how representing the Arctic region matters for securing preferred outcomes, how circumpolar cooperation is marked by regional hierarchies and how Arctic governance has become a global social site in its own right, replete with disciplining norms for steering diplomatic behaviour. This book draws upon Russia's role in the Arctic Council as an extended case study and examines how Arctic cross-border governance can be understood as a site of competition over the exercise of authority.
The following chapter identifies the meaning and main features of corporate governance, underlines the importance of an entity, which regulates and balances the interests of shareholders, stakeholders, and managers in order to realize a corporation's long-run goals. Currently, all models of corporate governance can be divided by their characteristics into three types: Anglo-American, German, and Japanese; each of these models has some unique elements that are required by a particular country. The process of forming and development of corporate governance in transitional economies are described as well. As the accuracy of corporate government influences the wiliness of investors to sink their capital, it is crucial to understand the methods of corporate governance efficiency evaluation by international rating agencies. Moreover, the example of Enron Corporation's failure shows the exceptional role of corporate governance in protecting and ensuring the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, solving the conflict between managers seeking higher bonuses and investors' goals on stable future return and potential growth.
Governance is a highly contested concept that concerns the exercise of collective control towards common goals. In higher education institutes' (HEIs) context, the concept of governance refers to their internal structure, organisation and management. Simply explained, academic governance is the way in which universities are operated; it concerns both the internal (institutional) and external (system) governance of the institution. Internal governance refers to the institutional arrangements within universities (e.g., lines of authority, decision making processes, financing and staffing) whereas external governance refers to the institutional arrangements on the macro- or system-level (e.g., laws and decrees, funding arrangements, evaluations). The principal academic governance model for both public and private universities, until the 1980s, was based on a collegial shared form of governance. The tradition of shared governance rests on the assumption that faculty should hold a substantive role in decision making alongside the institution's key stakeholders; these stakeholders include the university Rector/President/CEO, and representatives from the management, administrative staff, and the students. The most visible vehicle for faculty involvement is typically a faculty senate or a similar body with a different name; such senates currently exist in more than 90 percent of colleges and universities in the U.S.A. and with small variations in Europe and the rest of the world. During the 1980s the idea of the so called corporate or entrepreneurial university emerged; it was based on the notion that, even non-profit public universities should be run as a business in order to address both the society and market needs and be able to control their own budgets. In practical terms this meant that universities should develop relationships with the industry, secure external (other than government) funding, and be able to at least break even in terms of managing their finance. Today, both models co-exist in a delicate balance: the traditional model advocates for free public higher education (HE) for anyone at any cost, whereas the new model argues for a market-driven performance-led university for those who can afford it. This entry is about the existing models of academic governance, their structure, key issues, and the current and future perspectives.
− Agency is one of five core analytical problems in the Earth System Governance (ESG) Project's research framework, which offers a unique approach to the study of environmental governance. − Agency in Earth System Governance draws lessons from ESG–Agency research through a systematic review of 322 peer-reviewed journal articles published between 2008 and 2016 and contained in the ESG–Agency Harvesting Database.− ESG–Agency research draws on diverse disciplinary perspectives with distinct clusters of scholars rooted in the fields of global environmental politics, policy studies, and socio-ecological systems. − Collectively, the chapters in Agency in Earth System Governance provide an accessible synthesis of some of the field's major questions and debates and a state-of-the-art understanding of how diverse actors engage with and exercise authority in environmental governance.
Both at the central and state levels administration of India has actualized various ICT (Information and Communication Technology) activities under the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP). The objective of NeGP to most extreme utilization of government services accessible to residents of India by means of electronic media in simplest and most ideal way. To build the quantity of e-exchanges in the nation, proficient administration conveyance to the natives, re-utilization of uses, making ideal utilization of existing foundation, reception of cloud based e-Governance is the main arrangement, accordingly accomplishing a definitive objective of NeGP. Distributed computing is the most recent propelled development in figuring, distributed computing assets are accessible at whatever point required and charges depends on the amount you utilize them. Broad distributed computing is just conceivable by the Internet, and this is the most widely recognized method for getting to cloud assets. The primary plan to think about on this is the means by which to keep up information in advanced arrangement with secure spot and usage in future for investigation and improvement at whatever time anyplace with least assets. It expects to convey more intuitive i.e. administrations to subjects and organizations through E-Governance. For this, distributed computing might prompt huge cost reserve funds and dependable method for information exchange. It involves use over the Internet of processing equipment and programming base and applications that are remotely facilitated.
We identify an important feature of current digital governance systems: "third-party funded digital barter": consumers of digital services get many digital services for free (or under- priced) and in return have personal information about themselves collected for free. In addition, the digital consumers receive advertising and other forms of influence from the third parties that fund the digital services. The interests of the third-party funders are not well-aligned with the interests of the digital consumers. This fundamental flaw of current digital governance systems is responsible for an array of serious problems, including inequities, inefficiencies, manipulation of digital consumers, as well as dangers to social cohesion and democracy. We present four policy guidelines that aim to correct this flaw by shifting control of personal data from the data aggregators and their third-party funders to the digital consumers. The proposals cover "official data" that require official authentication, "privy data" that is either generated by the data subjects about themselves or by a second parties, and "collective data." The proposals put each of these data types under the individual or collective control of the data subjects. There are also proposals to mitigate asymmetries of information and market power.
Scholars and practitioners are increasingly questioning formal disaster governance (FDG) approaches as being too rigid, slow, and command-and-control driven. Too often, local realities and non-formal influences are sidelined or ignored to the extent that disaster governance can be harmed through the efforts to impose formal and/or political structures. A contrasting narrative emphasises so-called bottom-up, local, and/or participatory approaches which this article proposes to encapsulate as Informal Disaster Governance (IDG). This article theorises IDG and situates it within the long-standing albeit limited literature on the topic, paying particular attention to the literature's failure to properly define informal disaster risk reduction and response efforts, to conceptualise their far-reaching extent and consequences, and to consider their 'dark sides.' By presenting IDG as a framework, this article restores the conceptual importance and balance of IDG vis-à-vis FDG, paving the way for a better understanding of the 'complete' picture of disaster governance. This framework is then considered in a location where IDG might be expected to be more powerful or obvious, namely in a smaller, more isolated, and tightly knit community, characteristics which are stereotypically used to describe island locations. Thus, Svalbard in the Arctic has been chosen as a case study, including its handling of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, to explore the merits and challenges with shifting the politics of disaster governance towards IDG.
We identify an important feature of current digital governance systems: "third-party funded digital barter": consumers of digital services get many digital services for free (or underpriced) and in return have personal information about themselves collected for free. In addition, the digital consumers receive advertising and other forms of influence from the third parties that fund the digital services. The interests of the third-party funders are not well-aligned with the interests of the digital consumers. This fundamental flaw of current digital governance systems is responsible for an array of serious problems, including inequities, inefficiencies, manipulation of digital consumers, as well as dangers to social cohesion and democracy. We present four policy guidelines that aim to correct this flaw by shifting control of personal data from the data aggregators and their third-party funders to the digital consumers. The proposals cover "official data" that require official authentication, "privy data" that is either generated by the data subjects about themselves or by a second parties, and "collective data." The proposals put each of these data types under the individual or collective control of the data subjects. There are also proposals to mitigate asymmetries of information and market power.
We identify an important feature of current digital governance systems: "third-party funded digital barter": consumers of digital services get many digital services for free (or underpriced) and in return have personal information about themselves collected for free. In addition, the digital consumers receive advertising and other forms of influence from the third parties that fund the digital services. The interests of the third-party funders are not well-aligned with the interests of the digital consumers. This fundamental flaw of current digital governance systems is responsible for an array of serious problems, including inequities, inefficiencies, manipulation of digital consumers, as well as dangers to social cohesion and democracy. We present four policy guidelines that aim to correct this flaw by shifting control of personal data from the data aggregators and their third-party funders to the digital consumers. The proposals cover "official data" that require official authentication, "privy data" that is either generated by the data subjects about themselves or by a second parties, and "collective data." The proposals put each of these data types under the individual or collective control of the data subjects. There are also proposals to mitigate asymmetries of information and market power.
This thesis is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of change in product market competition on board composition and evaluate its consequences on firm performance. Using industry-specific exogenous changes in product market competition, I test whether firms respond to changes in the demand for board independence. I find that firms decrease their level of board independence by 5.52 percentage points in response to an increase in product market competition. Moreover, by exploiting the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ rulings in a triple-difference design, I show that constraint on firm's ability to adjust its board structure in response to changes in competition has negative consequences on its performance; firms which are constrained by the regulation to reduce their board independence experience a 10.5 percentage points lower return on assets (ROA) compared to unconstrained firms. This suggests that the decrease in board independence is in the interest of shareholders. By showing that regulation may actually harm some firms, the analysis sheds light on the costs of "one size fits all" governance regulations. In the second chapter, I shed light on the political ideology of the CEO as an important determinant of firm performance. Using individual campaign contribution data, I measure the political ideology of U.S. CEOs over the period 1994 to 2014 and analyze the relation between CEO ideology and firm performance. To identify the causal effect of CEO ideology, I use a combination of time-varying effects and novel instruments based on the ideology of the pool of potential CEO hires. Across all specifications, I find that firms with Republican CEOs, on average, 6 percentage point higher ROA compared to firms with Democrat CEOs. Several alternate explanations such as time varying differences at state-industry level, political connections and firm fixed effects do not explain away the results. In the third chapter, joint work with Antonio Vazquez Lopez (UC3M), we test whether focal firms whose CEOs sit on multiple boards can suffer decreases in performance due to transient attention-grabbing events in firms where CEOs sit as independent directors. We exploit extreme returns (positive and negative), extreme earnings and extreme volatility in firms where CEOs sit as independent directors and find that such distraction leads to an average decrease of approximately 1% of focal firm's ROA, Q, market returns and ROE. This effect is stronger for focal firms that are geographically more distant to firms where CEOs sit as independent directors, which suggests that distraction is costlier in such situations. Additionally, we show that distraction is greater for CEOs that sit on the audit committee or chair a major sub-committee. Finally, we show that these distraction events also lead to lower CEO compensation and higher probability of forced turnover. ; Programa de Doctorado en Empresa y Finanzas / Business and Finance por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ; Presidente: Andrés Almazán; Secretario: Pedro Gete; Vocal: Miguel Antón