Suchergebnisse

The entry into force, on January 1st, 2012, of the European Union Directive 2008/101/EC extending the European Emission Trading System to domestic and international civil aviation has taken the dispute regarding its legitimacy to unprecedented heights. The choice of the EU legislator to include foreign air carriers and their CO2 emissions that occurred beyond EU airspace infuriated third countries, while the fact that the directive applies the same treatment to all airline operators whatever their nationality met vivid criticism from developing countries, in particular China and India.This paper investigates the reasons why the environmental objective pursued by the EU Aviation ETS does not seem sufficient to render its unilateral adoption acceptable to the international community, despite staging multilateral negotiations and despite the flourishing national transplants of the ETS system in other jurisdictions. Thereby it provides a preliminary assessment of what the current row implies for the global governance of climate change. Devoting particular attention to the positions of the EU and China in this dispute, it argues that the opposition to EU endeavour finds its roots in the normative frictions between the climate change regime and the international aviation regime, while the lack of process legitimacy of EU unilateralism provoked third countries' claims to the infringement of their national sovereignty. Thus, it concludes that in the current international system, the harmonization of regimes' normative goals and principles must result from a political choice, the absence of which can effectively frustrate the achievement of multilateral cooperation goals. Moreover, in such context, the unilateral imposition of an alternative path involving the other regime members against their consent, to palliate multilateral norm-making, is likely to meet increasingly strong opposition from an increasing number of powerful countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie współczesnych dylematów w kwestii zarządzania Internetem jako nowym dobrem wspólnym ludzkości i przykładem tzw. nowych dóbr wspólnych. W ślad za Lawrence'em Lessigiem omówione zostały trzy warstwy Internetu: fizyczna, logiczna i treści. W tym kontekście przedstawiono dokonania Grupy Roboczej ds. Zarządzania Internetem (WGIG) powołanej przez Sekretarza Generalnego ONZ oraz rolę Forum Zarządzania Internetem (IGF). Zaprezentowano rozbieżne preferencje państw w wyborze suwerennego, wielostronnego lub międzyrządowego modelu zarządzania Internetem. W szczególności ukazano przeciwstawne działania USA i Unii Europejskiej oraz Chin i Rosji oraz podkreślanie przez te dwa ostatnie państwa zagadnienia cyberbezpieczeństwa i cybersuwerenności, co prowadzi do ograniczenia wolności słowa w Internecie i treściowej fragmentacji sieci. Autor proponuje wydzielenie kwestii możliwych do regulacji w drodze porozumień międzyrządowych. Zarazem dochodzi do wniosku, iż mechanizmy wielostronnego zarządzania siecią mogą uzyskać legitymację, jeżeli będą bardziej rzetelne i reprezentatywne niż system międzyrządowy. ; The purpose of this article is to present contemporary dilemmas in the management of the Internet as a new common good of mankind and an example of so called "new commons". In the wake of the Lawrence Lessig's writings discussed are the three layers of the Internet: physical, logical and content. In this context, presented are the achievements of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) initiated by the UN Secretary General and the role of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Presented are divergent preferences of states in choosing a sovereign, multi-stakeholder or multilateral model of Internet governance. In particular, the article demonstrates conflicting actions of the US, European Union and China, Russia and issues of cybersecurity and cyber sovereignty highlighted by the latter two countries, which lead to restrictions on freedom of speech in the Internet and fragmentation of the network in its content layer. The author proposes to separate issues for feasible regulation by multilateral agreements. At the same time he concludes that the mechanisms of multilateral network management can gain legitimacy if they are more reliable and representative than the intergovernmental system.