Civil-military relations are vital to the coherence and effectiveness of post-conflict peacebuilding, but have often been problematic. This article argues that civil-military issues vary systematically in relation to the particular civil and military actors in peacebuilding, and that the coercive content of the external military's mission creates special challenges in each of these sets of relationships. Given the significance of the military footprint, the article presents trade-offs for policymakers intending to use military forces to make peace.
In some strange and paradoxical way the rapid 'success' of peacebuilding that the UN has been proclaiming in Kathmandu seems to be another blow to the Western model of peacebuilding: The transition from war to peace is proceeding quite smoothly and the political institutions in the capital city are undergoing significant transformation yet this transition has yet to make a difference in the lives of most citizens and for the overall'development' of Nepal. In some ways, the current changes remind of the post-1990situation where a newly democratized Nepal produced a 'good governance bubble' in Kathmandu, but was unable to address many problems and grievances that finally led to the violent conflict. Prescribing more of the 'status quo ante' medicine as many donors and international aid organizations continue to do is another sign of the lack of historical and institutional memory that development not only in Nepal suffers from. In other words, isn'tt he very success of the political transformation a sign that peacebuilding may create stability on the surface, but at the same time fail to achieve its ultimate goal even under favourable conditions: To contribute to long-term, sustainable development and broad'poverty reduction' in the post-conflict environment?
The study provides an overview of the concept of civil society, its history and understanding in different contexts. It elaborates an analytical framework of civil society functions derived from democracy theory, development discourse and case study knowledge, which in turn is applied to the context of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding theory and practice is analyzed in terms of its civil society functions and their validity, scope and content. The results show that the mere existence of and support for civil society does not automatically lead to peacebuilding. A good understanding of civil society?s roles and potential for peacebuilding is required. It is also important to recognize that certain roles and functions of civil society vary depending on the phases of conflict and may not all be equally relevant and effective in all conflict phases.
This paper explores the topic of collaboration between diasporas and governmental and non-governmental actors in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. Its purpose is to identify key policy recommendations for external parties wishing to establish working relationships with diasporas specifically in these fields. The paper therefore mainly targets an audience of policy makers, however the considerations in the pages that follow will be of interest also to other practitioners in the development field as well as to diaspora groups themselves. The paper is based on data collected within the DIASPEACE research project, analysing how external actors and diaspora groups interact in peacebuilding initiatives. The results discussed in this paper derive from data collected in five European countries (Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Finland) and focus on the specific case-study of diasporas originating from the Horn of Africa.
This paper examines the causes of conflict in Burundi and discusses strategies for building peace. The analysis of the complex relationships between distribution and group dynamics reveals that these relationships are reciprocal, implying that distribution and group dynamics are endogenous. The nature of endogenously generated group dynamics determines the type of preferences (altruistic or exclusionist), which in turn determines the type of allocative institutions and policies that prevail in the political and economic system. While unequal distribution of resources may be socially inefficient, it nonetheless can be rational from the perspective of the ruling elite, especially because inequality perpetuates dominance. However, as the unequal distribution of resources generates conflict, maintaining a system based on inequality is difficult because it requires ever increasing investments in repression. It is therefore clear that if the new Burundian leadership is serious about building peace, it must engineer institutions that uproot the legacy of discrimination and promote equal opportunity for social mobility for all members of ethnic groups and regions. – Burundi ; conflict ; inequality ; education
This volume of the Peacebuilding Compared Project examines the sources of the armed conflict and coup in the Solomon Islands before and after the turn of the millennium. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has been an intensive peacekeeping operation, concentrating on building 'core pillars' of the modern state. It did not take adequate notice of a variety of shadow sources of power in the Solomon Islands, for example logging and business interests, that continue to undermine the state's democratic foundations. At first RAMSI's statebuilding was neither very responsive to local voices nor to root causes of the conflict, but it slowly changed tack to a more responsive form of peacebuilding. The craft of peace as learned in the Solomon Islands is about enabling spaces for dialogue that define where the mission should pull back to allow local actors to expand the horizons of their peacebuilding ambition.
"The UN Peacebuilding Commission – Lessons from Sierra Leone" by political scientist Andrea Iro is an assessment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) by analysing their performance over the last two years in Sierra Leone, one of the first PBC focus countries. The paper explores the key question of how the PBC/PBF's mandate has been translated into operational practice in the field. It concludes that though the overall impact has been mainly positive and welcomed by the country, translating the general mandate into concrete activities remains a real challenge at the country level.
The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding aims at assisting war-torn states and societies to avoid a relapse into armed conflict. To be successful in establishing the conditions for a sustainable peace, the international community may have to interfere with the domestic affairs of the affected country. Taking into account the transformative nature of peacebuilding, it is important that such action always be guided by clear normative standards. Legal certainty and predictability are fundamental cornerstones of any stable post-conflict order. Moreover, adherence to international law is a vital precondition for generating political and moral legitimacy. Therefore, international and local support for a specific peacebuilding process largely depends on whether the responsible actors are able to credibly demonstrate their respect for the rule of international law. The relevant question, however, remains as to what is the substance of the law applicable to such cases. Whilst international treaty law contains clear provisions governing the use of force in international relations and the conduct of the parties during an armed conflict no such specific rules exist for the post-conflict phase. In particular there is no international instrument offering a systematic and comprehensive catalogue of definite criteria for how to deal with war-torn states and societies in the aftermath of an armed conflict. Nevertheless, international law is by no means indifferent in this regard. It contains many general principles that may be applied to post-conflict situations. The purpose of this study is to identify some basic normative parameters for post-conflict peacebuilding and to sketch the contours of a modern "jus post bellum
Am 14. September 2005 wird die 60. VN-Generalversammlung mit einem dreitägigen Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs eröffnet. Anlaß dieses Treffens ist die Fünf-Jahres-Überprüfung der im Jahr 2000 verabschiedeten Millenniumserklärung. Im Mittelpunkt stehen zudem institutionelle Reformen der Vereinten Nationen. Als ein wesentliches Ergebnis wird die Einrichtung einer Peacebuilding-Kommission erwartet. Für Deutschland dürfte dieses Gremium vor allem dann bedeutsam werden, wenn ein Beschluß zur Erweiterung des Sicherheitsrates in absehbarer Zeit nicht zustande kommt.(SWP-aktuell/ SWP)
In recent years, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has emerged as a key component of international post-conflict reconstruction efforts. At the same time, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that the holistic approach to SSR that is outlined in policy papers is very difficult to translate into effective interventions in fragile states. This paper identifies two competing approaches for a 'contextualized' SSR-agenda: A monopoly model that focuses on restoring the state's monopoly on the means of violence and a hybrid model that seeks to strengthen local community-based security and justice solutions. The paper argues that as a strategy for intervention, the choice is not simply between a top-down 'imposition' of a universal state model and a bottom-up approach of 'working with what is there'. It is also a choice between direct and indirect forms of rule. This makes the dilemma real for liberal-minded practitioners and observers who for good reasons remain reluctant towards the colonial practice of ruling through middle-men. The paper does not offer a solution to the dilemma. When two imperatives pull in opposite directions, 'answers' are bound to be ad hoc: Specific and contextual, rather than principled and generic. The paper does, however, suggest that part of the way forward may be to move towards a more 'entry-oriented' mode of operation that recognizes that the role of external actors is to help establish a space for security and development solutions, rather than to fill that space.
Indonesia suffered an explosion of religious violence, ethnic violence, separatist violence, terrorism, and violence by criminal gangs, the security forces and militias in the late 1990s and early 2000s. By 2002 Indonesia had the worst terrorism problem of any nation. All these forms of violence have now fallen dramatically. How was this accomplished? What drove the rise and the fall of violence? Anomie theory is deployed to explain these developments. Sudden institutional change at the time of the Asian financial crisis and the fall of President Suharto meant the rules of the game were up for grabs. Valerie Braithwaite's motivational postures theory is used to explain the gaming of the rules and the disengagement from authority that occurred in that era. Ultimately resistance to Suharto laid a foundation for commitment to a revised, more democratic, institutional order. The peacebuilding that occurred was not based on the high-integrity truth-seeking and reconciliation that was the normative preference of these authors. Rather it was based on non-truth, sometimes lies, and yet substantial reconciliation. This poses a challenge to restorative justice theories of peacebuilding.
Much of the time, transitional justice measures are developed alongside the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts, and are expected by their framers and advocates to contribute to peace. The claim is that accountability measures can help to deter future violence and prevent revenge attacks, demonstrate and help to reinstall the rule of law and democracy, and contribute in so doing to longer-term stability. And indeed, transitional justice measures are expected to work alongside specific measures of peacebuilding, such as rule of law promotion, security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of excombatants, and increasingly those developing such measures of peacebuilding are expected to take transitional justice measures into account. What happens, however, when a transitional justice measure is developed decades after the end of the conflict, where such standard measures of peacebuilding were not pursued, or are incomplete? Can a transitional justice mechanism have the desired effects? And what if that mechanism is not designed to address the wide range of past crimes, but a more recent subset? This chapter considers the prospects for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to have any serious impact on the country itself, against the backdrop of long-term, but unconsolidated, peacebuilding or reconstruction efforts. It argues that while Lebanon has undergone extensive reconstruction since the end of its brutal civil war, no serious peacebuilding efforts were undertaken, meaning that many of the changes a post-conflict society is expected to undergo, arising from demobilization of large numbers of fighters, reform of the justice and security sector, did not take place. In this context, accountability for the abuses of the war and in the 15 years after it in which the country was under Syrian occupation has yet to take place and seems unlikely. The STL is nonetheless often expected to operate as a mechanism analogous to ordinary transitional justice mechanisms, yet it does not have the remit to address the legacy of conflict and occupation, but rather only the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and related assassinations. It seems unlikely that it can have the effect expected of transitional justice mechanisms and ascribed by its advocates to it as well, of promoting human rights and accountability, and even peacebuilding, in the affected country. Rather, after two decades of reconstruction, the tribunal is unlikely to contribute to peace, and may run the risk of promoting conflict should it try defendants, whether in person or in absentia.
Obgleich die Zustimmung der von einem Konflikt betroffenen Staaten und die Kooperationsbereitschaft ihrer Bevölkerungen wesentliche Voraussetzungen für eine erfolgreiche Friedenskonsolidierung sind, kann es im Rahmen des Peacebuilding durchaus erforderlich sein, unter Anwendung von Zwang in völkerrechtlich geschützte Rechtsgüter einzugreifen. Davon ist insbesondere auszugehen, wenn im Zuge des Konflikts politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Strukturen bereits erheblich zersetzt oder im Wege einer militärischen Intervention gezielt beseitigt wurden. In solchen Eingriffssituationen muss Klarheit über die juristische Grundlage des Einschreitens, den Status der beteiligten Akteure und die Rechtsfolgen des Eingriffs herrschen. Die politische Relevanz dieser Fragen besteht vor allem in der Tatsache, dass nur ein völkerrechtsgemäßes Vorgehen konkreten Peacebuilding-Projekten die erforderliche Legitimität und Akzeptanz verleihen kann.Die völkerrechtlichen Voraussetzungen für den Umgang mit Staaten und Gesellschaften, die von einem Konflikt betroffen waren, erschließen sich jedoch nicht systematisch aus internationalen Verträgen. Die Studie beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, inwieweit dieses Defizit unter Rückgriff auf allgemeine völkerrechtliche Grundsätze kompensiert werden kann. Sie versucht insbesondere aus der Charta der Vereinten Nationen und dem Völkergewohnheitsrecht Elemente eines 'ius post bellum' abzuleiten, die den Handlungsspielraum im Rahmen der Friedenskonsolidierung zumindest in groben Umrissen vorgeben und den Beteiligten in der Nachkonfliktphase einen Mindeststandard an rechtlicher Sicherheit und Vorhersehbarkeit garantieren sollen.(SWP-Studie / SWP)
This discussion paper focuses on the engagement of diasporas in peacebuilding processes in their countries of origin. The main argument put forward in this paper is that, given certain conditions, diasporas carry a potential to fruitfully engage in the field of peacebuilding. After substantiating this claim with a critical discussion of literature and research insight, the issue is further addressed by identifying and collating a set of key criteria of "good practice" for constructive diaspora engagement. This is to help third parties identify diaspora organisations and groups that have the potential to engage transparently and in long-term processes, while also presenting the capacity to foster the resolution, transformation and management of conflicts in their respective countries of origin. In an endeavour to strengthen cooperation between diaspora organisations and other actors, the aim of this discussion paper is therefore to offer to International Agencies, the European Union and its member states, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders an indicative tool that will assist them in the identification of potential cooperation partners within the diaspora community to work together in conflict settings. Given the particularly sensitive nature of interventions in this field, the suggested criteria take into account factors that are generally related to collaboration with diaspora organisations, as well as factors that take into account a specific concern for their engagement in peacebuilding. In addition, it is hoped that the criteria may also facilitate purposeful self-reflection among diaspora groups on how they operate and on new potential areas for engagement in their countries of origin.
