Critics of the liberal peace paradigm call for the consideration of local realities in order to come to a more sustainable, comprehensive form of peace – which is not imposed by external actors. The "local" is generally seen as the place where bottom-up or grassroots peace is developed in contrast to the liberal peace proposed by external international agents. Whereas critical peacebuilding literature stresses the difference between the "liberal" and the "local" and acknowledges the incoherence of liberal actors, much less attention has been paid to differences and variations within the "local" sphere. Drawing on empirical research in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) we argue that the "local" is much more complex than presumed by many critics of the liberal peace. We argue that a) the local is fragmented and actors and issues are highly contested; b) neither actors nor discourses are purely local; and c) the very idea of a coherent collective local agency is contested locally.
Any peace process is an exercise in the negotiation of big data. From centuries old communal hagiography to the reams of official texts, media coverage and social media updates, peace negotiations generate data. Peacebuilding and peacekeeping today are informed by, often respond and contribute to big data. This is no easy task. As recently as a few years ago, before the term big data embraced the virtual on the web, what informed peace process design and implementation was in the physical domain – from contested borders and resources to background information in the form of text. The move from analogue, face-to-face negotiations to online, asynchronous, web-mediated negotiations – which can still include real world meetings – has profound implications for how peace is strengthened in fragile democracies.
In 2001, the Rwandan government began the phased introduction of a decentralisation programme throughout the country. The new programme aimed at countering citizens' social, economic and political marginalisation which was widely viewed as constituting one of the principal drivers of the horrific genocide in 1994 in which almost one million Rwandans were brutally massacred. This research aims at analysing the extent to which Rwanda's decentralisation process is meeting these aims. Employing a framework which differentiates between procedural participation (electoral participation); substantive participation (ongoing active participation in local decision making); and participation as cost-sharing (ongoing participation through financial contributions and voluntary labour), four main findings are discussed. First, although there is much talk among officials and commentators about bottom-up planning processes emanating from local village meetings (formerly ubudehe and now umuganda), and while such an ethos underpins the original Decentralisation Policy formulated in 2001, the accompanying legislation is somewhat scant in its references to such a form of participation as well as to mechanisms whereby this might take place. Instead, a focus on community mobilisation in participation as cost-sharing is more apparent. Second, a shift in emphasis within the decentralisation programme over time is evident. The current national strategy of fast-track economic development as a route out of poverty has been superimposed on the original goal of reconciliation and community building with an attendant emphasis on results over process. This is evident in the 2013 revisions to the Decentralisation Policy as well as in the shift, during the second phase, from political decentralisation toward administrative decentralisation evidenced in the introduction of public management frameworks such as the imihigo and the emphasis on the administrative capacity of local leaders. It is also evident in the demise of the local planning ...
On a recent visit to Mogadishu I was again confronted with the tension between local ownership and international self-interest. On the one hand was the Somali President, who wanted to assert his sovereign authority and lead the peace process according to his vision for Somalia. On the other hand, there was a powerful but diverse international community that has the resources necessary to enhance peace, though such resources were accompanied by a set of ideas concerning what the Somali President should be doing. Officially everyone claimed to support the Federal Government of Somalia, but in reality each outside nation and organisation is engaged in Somalia for its own strategic political, security and economic needs and interests.
Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa is a critical reflection on peacebuilding efforts in Africa. The authors expose the tensions and contradictions in different clusters of peacebuilding activities, including peace negotiations; statebuilding; security sector governance; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Essays also address the institutional framework for peacebuilding in Africa and the ideological underpinnings of key institutions, including the African Union, NEPAD, the African Development Bank, the Pan-African Ministers Conference for Public and Civil Service, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the World Bank, and the International Criminal Court. The volume includes on-the-ground case study chapters on Sudan, the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Niger Delta, Southern Africa, and Somalia, analyzing how peacebuilding operates in particular African contexts. The authors adopt a variety of approaches, but they share a conviction that peacebuilding in Africa is not a script that is authored solely in Western capitals and in the corridors of the United Nations. Rather, the writers in this volume focus on the interaction between local and global ideas and practices in the reconstitution of authority and livelihoods after conflict. The book systematically showcases the tensions that occur within and between the many actors involved in the peacebuilding industry, as well as their intended beneficiaries. It looks at the multiple ways in which peacebuilding ideas and initiatives are reinforced, questioned, reappropriated, and redesigned by different African actors. A joint project between the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa, and the Centre of African Studies at the University of Cambridge.
Since 1945, violent conflict has occurred primarily within sovereign states rather than among them. These internal conflicts have far surpassed international conflicts in lethality, economic destruction, and social upheaval. This phenomenon is diverse: no region has avoided civil wars, while the stated aims of rebel groups have ranged widely. Prominent examples include anti-colonial nationalists in Algeria, Mozambique, and Kenya; ethnic separatists in Eritrea and Bosnia; leftists in Latin America and Southeastern Asia; Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; and income seeking warlords in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Internal conflicts have emerged in rich European countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain, and in the context of state collapse and extreme poverty in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. Some civil wars have lasted only weeks, while the longest-- in Sudan-- lasted over 40 years.Intense violent conflicts often leave core state institutions debilitated, fragmented, or, in some cases, totally destroyed. For these societies, the central tasks for ending conflict and beginning post-war recovery involve reinvigorating or reestablishing legitimate state authority. These post-war states must both win the acquiescence of the governed and develop the infrastructural power to implement state policy. The risks of conflict relapse are significant: since 1970, 44 of 111 post-war cases (40 percent) relapse into a full-fledged civil war, while 68 of 111 (61 percent) experience at least a low-level conflict. The time for policymakers to mitigate this risk is short: of post-war countries that fall back into civil war, the median time to relapse is just 35.5 months. The immediate post-war environment is therefore particularly critical for determining the political, economic, and social trajectories of conflict-affected countries. The right combination of policies can help determine whether a country recovers quickly and secures any available peace dividend, or whether it relapses and slides into a conflict trap. This dissertation explains how societies that have managed to end their civil wars are able or unable to rebuild political order in the their post-war period.This dissertation focuses on one key policy arena-- perhaps the most critical policy arena-- for post-war societies to address: the security sector. It may sound simplistic or even tautological to claim that the organization, disposition, control, and reform of armed groups are the most important task for a post-war society to undertake. It may seem obvious to stress the importance of the size, competencies, oversight, social embeddedness, and other qualities of the military, the police, the intelligence services, and any remaining armed non-state actors. But such qualities resist easy quantification, and most scholars and practitioners over the past decade have focused on economic performance, political democratization, communal reconciliation, post-conflict justice, and other "soft-power" variables to explain patterns of post-war successes and failures. The following chapters attempt to shift the conversation back to the formation and reformation of security sector actors in war-affected countries.
How are our efforts to reduce the impact of climate change affecting post-conflict societies? Thinking and research about the possible impacts of climate change adaptation and mitigation on post-conflict societies is almost nonexistent. Most attention remains on climate change and variability and their link to war.1 In this article I discuss the link between climate change mitigation and building peace. Drawing on new empirical data of micro hydropower development in post-conflict Nepal I inquire further if climate change mitigation contributes to peacebuilding. The findings show that micro-hydropower development in Nepal has not contributed to peacebuilding on a state level. This is because these measures do not strengthen the political legitimacy of the post-conflict authorities, a crucial measure for successful peacebuilding. Actually, in the short run this measure of climate change mitigation has led to new informal spaces of peace beyond the reach of the Nepali state. This puts policy decision makers into a dilemma: Should they consider abandoning climate change mitigation policies if they might in fact risk the peacebuilding process? Or is it worth the bigger cause of reducing CO2 emissions globally? As this article shows, the answer might be more nuanced.
The Canadian intervention in Kandahar from 2005 to 2011 has mainly been based on the concept of stabilization. This is particularly true from 2009 to 2011. Stabilization had some successes in Kandahar. It also had important challenges. Contradictions remain to ensure best implementation on the ground. This article is based on firsthand experience in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) and the Dand District Forward Operating Base (FOB). Using Kandahar as a case example, the author aims to provide policy recommendations to the Canadian Government to increase the effectiveness of future stabilization operations.
In contrast to the democratic system of government established at independence, the chiefly system in Vanuatu has claimed and now possesses widespread support for its work at the community level. Chiefs are regarded as the key to community harmony and, although Vanuatu is currently experiencing a period of relative stability, underlying social tensions contribute to the high level of importance placed on strong community leadership. Chiefs in Vanuatu have demonstrated their willingness and ability to adapt to changing environments - since colonisation, chiefship has evolved and new chiefly structures have been developed. In the capital of Port Vila especially, chiefs have shown themselves to be resilient to the forces of urbanisation and globalisation. However as the holders of custom, they face a number of unique challenges for which their own systems of governance may not provide ready solutions. Through a discussion on the response of chiefs to the riots that occurred in Port Vila in 1998 and 2007, this paper explores some of the issues currently facing chiefs in Vanuatu's capita city, Port Vila. Extending the notion that chiefs are responsible for community harmony and well-being, the paper discusses the role of chiefs within the broader framework of development. ; AusAID
In contrast to the democratic system of government established at independence, the chiefly system in Vanuatu has claimed and now possesses widespread support for its work at the community level. Chiefs are regarded as the key to community harmony and, although Vanuatu is currently experiencing a period of relative stability, underlying social tensions contribute to the high level of importance placed on strong community leadership. Chiefs in Vanuatu have demonstrated their willingness and ability to adapt to changing environments - since colonisation, chiefship has evolved and new chiefly structures have been developed. In the capital of Port Vila especially, chiefs have shown themselves to be resilient to the forces of urbanisation and globalisation. However as the holders of custom, they face a number of unique challenges for which their own systems of governance may not provide ready solutions. Through a discussion on the response of chiefs to the riots that occurred in Port Vila in 1998 and 2007, this paper explores some of the issues currently facing chiefs in Vanuatu's capita city, Port Vila. Extending the notion that chiefs are responsible for community harmony and well-being, the paper discusses the role of chiefs within the broader framework of development. ; AusAID
Table of Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Research on Peacebuilding 4 1.2 Agency and Process: Peacebuilding as Negotiation 7 1.3 Findings: Negotiated Peacebuilding in Bosnia 9 1.4 Outline of the Thesis 11 Part I: Researching Peacebuilding as Negotiation 15 2 Conceptual framework 17 2.1 Studying Negotiations 19 2.2 The Peacebuilding Field 22 2.3 Actors in the Peacebuilding Field 30 2.4 Interests in the Peacebuilding Field 33 2.5 Resources 36 2.6 Strategies 45 2.7 The Outcome: Appropriating Intervention 52 2.8 Concluding Summary 53 3 Framework of Analysis 55 3.1 Interests 55 3.2 Resources 56 3.3 Strategies 57 3.4 Outcomes 57 3.5 Outline of the Empirical Chapters 58 4 Research Methods 61 4.1 Approach: Interpretive and Reconstructive 61 4.2 Cases 63 4.3 Accessing Data 65 4.4 Data Analysis 67 4.5 Quality Criteria: Trustworthiness 70 4.6 Locating the Researcher and Access to the Field 74 Part II: Peacebuilding Negotiations in Bosnia 77 5 The Peacebuilding Field in Bosnia 79 5.1 The End of Yugoslavia 79 5.2 The Bosnian Political Elites 83 5.3 The Interveners 102 5.4 Concluding Summary 116 6 Defense Reform 119 6.1 Background to Defense Reform 120 6.2 The Field in Defense Reform 127 6.3 The Story of Defense Reform 134 6.4 Strategies in Defense Reform 141 6.5 Outcomes: Success and Failure in Defense Reform 151 6.6 Concluding Summary 153 7 Police Reform 157 7.1 Background to Police Reform 157 7.2 The Peacebuilding Field in Police Reform 162 7.3 The Story of Structural Police Reform 169 7.4 Strategies in Police Reform 177 7.5 Outcome: Success and Failure in Police Reform 189 7.6 Concluding Summary 189 8 State Property 191 8.1 Background 192 8.2 The Peacebuilding Field for State Property 193 8.3 Negotiating the division of state property 199 8.4 Strategies 207 8.5 Outcome 216 8.6 Concluding Summary 217 Part III: Discussion and Conclusions 219 9 Patterns of Negotiation 221 9.1 Interests 222 9.2 Resources 224 9.3 Strategies 230 9.4 Outcomes 238 9.5 Concluding Summary 240 10 Peacebuilding in Practice 241 10.1 The Trouble with Exit ...
This volume of the Peacebuilding Compared Project examines the sources of the armed conflict and coup in the Solomon Islands before and after the turn of the millennium. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has been an intensive peacekeeping operation, concentrating on building 'core pillars' of the modern state. It did not take adequate notice of a variety of shadow sources of power in the Solomon Islands, for example logging and business interests, that continue to undermine the state's democratic foundations. At first RAMSI's statebuilding was neither very responsive to local voices nor to root causes of the conflict, but it slowly changed tack to a more responsive form of peacebuilding. The craft of peace as learned in the Solomon Islands is about enabling spaces for dialogue that define where the mission should pull back to allow local actors to expand the horizons of their peacebuilding ambition.
The article focuses on the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) activity as the UN intergovernmental advisory body that provides peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict, becoming one of the first evident achievements in the UN reforming process. One of the key points of the article is concentrated on the Peacebuilding Fund’s efforts in stabilization, economic recovery and development of the countries after periods of crisis. Analysis of the PBC activity indicates several specific points. The first one is that we can admit attempts to underline a dominant role of the General Assembly in the prejudice of the Security Council authority. The second − striving to use the platform of the Commission for political debates on situation in post-conflict countries. Russia has been supported the idea of the Peacebuilding Commission foundation from the beginning, taking an active part in development of guidelines that define the PBC terms of reference, structure and relations with other UN bodies.
The article focuses on the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) activity as the UN intergovernmental advisory body that provides peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict, becoming one of the first evident achievements in the UN reforming process. One of the key points of the article is concentrated on the Peacebuilding Fund's efforts in stabilization, economic recovery and development of the countries after periods of crisis. Analysis of the PBC activity indicates several specific points. The first one is that we can admit attempts to underline a dominant role of the General Assembly in the prejudice of the Security Council authority. The second − striving to use the platform of the Commission for political debates on situation in post-conflict countries. Russia has been supported the idea of the Peacebuilding Commission foundation from the beginning, taking an active part in development of guidelines that define the PBC terms of reference, structure and relations with other UN bodies.
Indonesia suffered an explosion of religious violence, ethnic violence, separatist violence, terrorism, and violence by criminal gangs, the security forces and militias in the late 1990s and early 2000s. By 2002 Indonesia had the worst terrorism problem of any nation. All these forms of violence have now fallen dramatically. How was this accomplished? What drove the rise and the fall of violence? Anomie theory is deployed to explain these developments. Sudden institutional change at the time of the Asian financial crisis and the fall of President Suharto meant the rules of the game were up for grabs. Valerie Braithwaite's motivational postures theory is used to explain the gaming of the rules and the disengagement from authority that occurred in that era. Ultimately resistance to Suharto laid a foundation for commitment to a revised, more democratic, institutional order. The peacebuilding that occurred was not based on the high-integrity truth-seeking and reconciliation that was the normative preference of these authors. Rather it was based on non-truth, sometimes lies, and yet substantial reconciliation. This poses a challenge to restorative justice theories of peacebuilding. ; Indonesia suffered an explosion of religious violence, ethnic violence, separatist violence, terrorism, and violence by criminal gangs, the security forces and militias in the late 1990s and early 2000s. By 2002 Indonesia had the worst terrorism problem of any nation. All these forms of violence have now fallen dramatically. How was this accomplished? What drove the rise and the fall of violence? Anomie theory is deployed to explain these developments. Sudden institutional change at the time of the Asian financial crisis and the fall of President Suharto meant the rules of the game were up for grabs. Valerie Braithwaite's motivational postures theory is used to explain the gaming of the rules and the disengagement from authority that occurred in that era. Ultimately resistance to Suharto laid a foundation for commitment to a revised, more democratic, institutional order. The peacebuilding that occurred was not based on the high-integrity truth-seeking and reconciliation that was the normative preference of these authors. Rather it was based on non-truth, sometimes lies, and yet substantial reconciliation. This poses a challenge to restorative justice theories of peacebuilding.
