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The philosophical tradition of liberal political thought has come to see tolerance as a crucial element of a liberal political order. However, while much has been made of the value of toleration, little work has been done on individual-level motivations for tolerant behavior. In this article, we seek to develop an account of the rational motivations for toleration and of where the limits of toleration lie. We first present a very simple model of rational motivations for toleration. Key to this model is an application of David Ricardo's model of trade to thinking about toleration. This model supports the claim that we always have reasons to be as tolerant as possible. We then explore why we do not always see tolerant attitudes in the actual world, and point to some potential preconditions for toleration that the initial model does not capture. Subsequently, we examine a more detailed model that allows us to investigate more carefully the conditions under which tolerant behavior can be rewarded. We conclude by arguing that a consideration of self-interested motivations for toleration is essential to the success of a robust theory of toleration for a diverse society, but that even this approach has its limitations. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Part of the political leadership running the Netherlands is the far-right Party of Freedom (PVV) whose agenda is immersed in anti-immigrant sentiment. This situation is a side effect of the fact that anti-Muslim discourse has encountered growing acceptance in recent years. This paper examines how the PVV gained inclusion in the Dutch governing coalition by employing not race-based rhetoric but anti-Islam rhetoric. Adapted from the source document.

1 SHALL ARGUE THAT TOLERANCE IS CENTRALLY A MORAL CONCEPT (although it is also used in a variety of non-moral ways). My differences with the two papers, with which I in many ways agree, derive from this observation. I shall argue that the definition they use must be extended to allow for claims to legitimacy characteristic of cases of tolerance, and I shall further argue (against Dr King) that tolerance characterizes social groups in a less formal sense than he allows, and (against Professor Crick) that tolerance is primarily a social rather than a political phenomenon.

For people to live together in pluralistic communities, they must find someway to cope with the practices of others that they abhor. For that reason, tolerance has always seemed an appealing medium of accommodation. But tolerance also has its critics. One wing charges that the tolerant are too easygoing. They are insensitive to evil in their midst. At the same time, another wing attacks the (merely) tolerant for being too weak in their sentimentsof respect. "The Christian does not wish to be tolerated," as T. S. Eliot said; and by this he meant to claim, presumably, that the Christian desires respect and acceptance, and not merely the forbearance suggested by "tolerance."To make the case for tolerance, we must engage in a three-front campaign: first, against intolerance; second, against the moral failing of indifference; and third, against the desirability of respecting and accepting everyone. The central claim in making this case will be that unlike these three competing sentiments, tolerance is a complex attitude toward the behavior and beliefs of others. Its complexity consists in both moral disapproval (or atleast cultural rejection) and the avoidance of interference. If there is a case to be made for tolerance, it must derive from this peculiar complexity. After surveying its alternatives, I will argue that the complex sentimentof tolerance is more readily praised than its alternatives.

A review essay on books by (1) A. J. Conyers, The Long Truce: How Toleration Made the World Safe for Power and Profit (Dallas, TX: Spence Publing, 2001); (2) John C. Laursen & Cary J. Nederman (Eds), Beyond the Persecuting Society (Philadelphia: U Pennsylvania Press, 1998); (3) Andrew Murphy, Conscience and Community (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State U Press, 2001); & (4) G. F. Newey, Virtue, Reason, and Toleration: The Place of Toleration in Ethical and Political Philosophy (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh U Press, 1999).

IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WE ARE CONCERNED WITH tolerance, not as a physical problem, but as a problem of human relations. In this context, 'to tolerate' generally means to endure, suffer or put up with a person, activity, idea or organization of which or whom one does not really approve. One can 'put up with' an item both when one can and cannot do anything about it. For example, one can 'put up with' the excesses of a ruler whose behaviour one has no power to amend. Equally, one can 'put up with' the excesses of a child even where one has no need to do so. In the second case, one has control; in the first, one does not. Both cases could be advanced as instances of 'tolerance'. But cases of the first sort (powerlessness) I shall label as instances of 'acquiescence' or 'sufferance' or 'endurance', since it is obvious that acquiescence typically flows from powerlessness. I shall label cases of the second sort (powerfulness) as instances of tolerance. It is clear in any event that these two types of case are distinct, and, for the purposes of this discussion, at least, differential labelling is essential. In this context, an agent will be said to 'tolerate' an item where the item is disliked or disapproved and is yet voluntarily endured. On this definition it is plain that tolerance requires some form of self-restraint by the tolerator.

Factors influencing the tolerance level of evangelical Christians; 1972-88 survey data; US; based on conference paper. Whether evangelical Christians have less political tolerance; demographic variables, religiosity, and group affect.