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This article recovers "evangelical toleration" as a neglected tradition in early modern political thought with important consequences for contemporary political theory and practice. Many political theorists dismiss the prudential arguments made by "proto-liberal" thinkers like Roger Williams or John Locke in favor of toleration as a necessary precondition for evangelism and conversion as intolerant, unacceptably instrumental, and inessential to their deeper theories. By contrast, critics of liberalism treat them as smoking gun evidence for an imperial and civilizing mission underlying liberal toleration. I argue that both sides underestimate evangelical toleration's genealogical and theoretical importance. Not only were evangelical considerations essential in shaping the particular institutions associated with toleration in England and America, the varieties of evangelical toleration represented by Williams and Locke shed significant light on the very different institutions—and intuitions—governing the expression of religious difference in liberal democracies today.

The underlying concept of multiculturalism in many European discussions is different from that made prominent by the classic cases, e.g. in Canada, that have functioned as paradigm cases which the most prominent theories of multiculturalism have been tailored to fit and justify. "Euro-multiculturalism" denotes a) a different object of debates, i.e. the kind of diversity that multiculturalism is about, b) a different definition of what counts as multiculturalism policy responses to this diversity, and c) a different normative background explaining what is at stake in European multiculturalism controversies. Euro-multiculturalism is a) about mainly immigrant religious minorities rather than indigenous or national minorities defined in mainly cultural or linguistic terms; b) does not for the most part consist in special group-differentiated rights or forms of recognition going beyond established liberal rights, but rather is concerned with the interpretation and application of standard liberal rights and rules to cases involving this new diversity; and c) should be understood as premised on an underlying discussion about the meaning of liberalism rather than as a debate about normative commitments fundamentally different from liberalism. The paper considers two objections to the proposed understanding of Euro-multiculturalism, namely a) that it over-inclusive in the sense that it includes religion as a central category and thereby neglects important differences between religion and culture, and b) that it is under-inclusive in the sense that it collapses multiculturalism into standard liberal political theory and fails to explain what is distinctive about multiculturalism. Finally the paper shows that multiculturalism in this sense can involve issues of toleration. ; The underlying concept of multiculturalism in many European discussions is different from that made prominent by the classic cases, e.g. in Canada, that have functioned as paradigm cases which the most prominent theories of multiculturalism have been tailored to fit and justify. "Euro-multiculturalism" denotes a) a different object of debates, i.e. the kind of diversity that multiculturalism is about, b) a different definition of what counts as multiculturalism policy responses to this diversity, and c) a different normative background explaining what is at stake in European multiculturalism controversies. Euro-multiculturalism is a) about mainly immigrant religious minorities rather than indigenous or national minorities defined in mainly cultural or linguistic terms; b) does not for the most part consist in special group-differentiated rights or forms of recognition going beyond established liberal rights, but rather is concerned with the interpretation and application of standard liberal rights and rules to cases involving this new diversity; and c) should be understood as premised on an underlying discussion about the meaning of liberalism rather than as a debate about normative commitments fundamentally different from liberalism. The paper considers two objections to the proposed understanding of Euro-multiculturalism, namely a) that it over-inclusive in the sense that it includes religion as a central category and thereby neglects important differences between religion and culture, and b) that it is under-inclusive in the sense that it collapses multiculturalism into standard liberal political theory and fails to explain what is distinctive about multiculturalism. Finally the paper shows that multiculturalism in this sense can involve issues of toleration.

Rawls's account of international toleration in The Law of Peoples has been the subject of vigorous critiques by critics who believe that he unacceptably dilutes the principles of his Law of Peoples in order to accommodate non-liberal societies. One important component in these critiques takes issue specifically with Rawls's inclusion of certain non-liberal societies ('decent peoples') in the constituency of justification for the Law of Peoples. In Rawls's defence, I argue that the explanation for the inclusion of decent peoples in the constituency of justification is not, as is standardly assumed, that they are the kind of societies that ought to be tolerated in that way on some prior conception of which kinds of societies ought to be tolerated in that way. The real explanation appeals to a methodological principle underlying Rawls's approach to political justification, according to which liberals owe justification, as a matter of liberal principle, to those who comply with liberal principles for political institutions that apply to them. If such liberal principles can be complied with by agents who nevertheless cannot accept fully liberal justifications for those principles, then liberalism itself requires liberals to seek justifications which they can accept. This approach gives us a new way to view decent peoples: as just such agents, who are therefore owed a justification for the Law of Peoples that they can accept. Decency is thus a concept that is internal to liberal political justification at the international level. Reading Rawls in this way permits a coherent and attractive defence of his strategy of toleration and of his international theory as a whole. © The Author(s) 2012.

Toleration is a key concept of liberalism, both from the historical and conceptual points of view. On the other hand, as people's freedom to live according to their moral and religious ideas has long become a basic value for liberal societies and their political constitutions, it is reasonable to understand that there is nothing to be tolerated nor by citizens neither by the State. However, a part of the scope and meaning of the fundamental rights and freedoms is subject to what John Rawls calls reasonable disagreements and this is a field where toleration understood in the classic way is compatible with equality: not to intervene against that which is being disapproved understood has a raison d'être. Since the 1980s, toleration has been present in the debates on how to deal with pluralism in a constitutional democracy. This has to be connected to the rise of identity politics: political and intellectual movements such as multiculturalism or comunitarism that questioned whether social order based on neutral criteria was either possible or desirable or both things at the same time. Outstanding liberal philosophers were among those demanding political priority for comunitarian values and those who showed interest for toleration as a key concept to articulate pluralism. Key distinctions between them can be explained as the result of the different approaches they take when facing classical theories on toleration: whereas John Locke's is a major influence on Rawls, John Stuart Mill's is on the others, while Gray, Walzer and Rorty follow Isaiah Berlin's reading of Mill. ; Universidad de Málaga, Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech.

Title: The Rohingya Muslims' Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar: 'Recognition as Toleration' and 'Religious Toleration' Abstract: The inhuman annihilation of the Rohingya people from the Rakhine state by the Myanmar military and the Buddhist majority, which is supported by the Myanmar government as they watched the massacre silently, could be considered as genocide. Ashley Kinseth claims: "in terms of rate of escalation, this is the greatest mass exodus - and has the makings to become the most significant humanitarian catastrophe - since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when over 800,000 Hutus and moderate Tutsis were slaughtered." The main reason of this massacre, as claimed by the Myanmar state officials, was an "armed attack by a Rohingya group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, against more than 20 Myanmar police stations and an army base on Aug 25, 2017" (Beyrer and Kamarulzaman 1570), "killing 12 members of Myanmar's security forces" (Gibbens). But there are other issues, such as political, religious, economic, ethnic, etc., which actually motivate the Myanmar military and the Buddhists (the majority religious group in Myanmar) to kill and dislocate the Rohingya from their Rakhine state. The paper examines the current Rohingya Muslims' crisis in Myanmar while investigating the Buddhist Burmese's underlying religious discourses in displacing the Rohingya from the Rakhine state. In doing so, this paper analyzes the current massacre in relation to Anna E. Galeotti's theory on 'toleration as recognition' and Locke's 'theory on toleration,' particularly in regards what Locke has forwarded as 'religious toleration' in his canonical Letters to figure out the suitability of either of them for a possible solution to the crisis.

This article determines which education enables the perpetuation of diverse ways of life and the liberal democracy that accommodates this diversity. Liberals like John Rawls, Stephen Macedo, and William Galston have disagreed about the scope of civic education. Based on an analysis of toleration—the primary means for maintaining a pluralist liberal democracy—I argue that schools should teach democratic participatory skills and a minimal exposure to diversity to enable citizens to participate in the democratic process of defining which cultural and religious practices the state should tolerate or prohibit through its laws. To make this argument, I contend, in contrast to several scholars, that toleration is practiced primarily between the democratic state and citizens rather than among citizens. Although many theorists do not show the educational implications of their theories, I conclude that schools must teach: (a) mutual respect among citizens, (b) citizens' constitutional rights, (c) democratic participatory skills, (d) a basic understanding of other worldviews, and (e) critical media skills. Students should master these components through instruction on government, cultures and religions, and the media, but more important through discussions and democratic simulations both inside and outside the classroom.

lt is very likely that the most difficult task of moral and political philosophy has always been that of assessing comprehensive views which contradict each other, not so much in what concerns the interests expressed by individuals but in what regards what is considered to be of genuine value.' lf individuals do not agree with each other about what constitutes a good and valuable life, then they would probably end up having dramatic conflicts, even if their actions are motivated by an honest altruistic attitude. Our deep beliefs about what is good and valuable for the life of all the individuals in our own community will prompt u5 to use the coercive mechanisms of the state in order to achieve the desiderata and the ideals that we share, not only for our own sake but also for those who happen not to share the same vision on the values and meaningfulness of a good life. Of course, those who disagree with us will try to make use of the institutions of the state in the very same way as we do in order to promote and support their own values and ideals. Unfortunateiy, as we know too well from history, the deep disagreements concerning values can turn into very traumatic conflicts to a much greater extent than the mere conflicts of interests.

One aspect of the issue of toleration of religion is how far the government and others should recognize religious claims of conscience. Such claims will be present in any liberal democracy. The particular controversies on which attention is mainly focused shift, but certain underlying themes remain. In this essay, I outline what I take to be the major issues about government recognition of religious claims of conscience. I then address the special problems created when a claim of conscience ends up competing with an opposing claim of conscience or with basic premises about fairness and justice. We can conceive of these as competing claims of toleration. Just such competition is involved when the question is a possible exemption from compliance with laws that recognize same-sex marriage and from laws that require insurance coverage of contraceptive drugs, two prominent issues in our present political setting

This chapter explains why granting conscientious exemptions is almost always the outcome of toleration – and always the outcome of toleration – in cases where the exemption is granted from a law that reflects or enforces moral values. The chapter explains why the principle of toleration better explains both the practice of granting conscientious exemptions and the attitude of those who grant the exemptions. Much of the discomfort that this argument causes and much of the criticism of it, result from confusing the dominant descriptive aspect of toleration with its non-existent normative aspect; from mistakenly seeing toleration as a reason or justification; and from mistakenly perceiving it as a political or moral virtue. The chapter explains why toleration is a descriptive concept and never a reason or justification to act in a certain way, and why toleration is not a political or moral virtue, but rather either morally good, morally allowed, morally prohibited or a lesser evil – all according to the circumstances. The chapter then continues to explain why the concepts of neutrality and respect fail to accurately describe the practice of granting conscientious exemptions and the attitude of those who grant the exemptions. As to neutrality, it fails to describe the practice of granting conscientious exemptions, both because the state is not and can never be neutral, and because the argument that granting conscientious exemptions results from state's neutrality can never be coherent. As to respect, it either misses the nature of conscientious exemptions – or collapses into the definition of toleration. The chapter concludes with a conceptual note according to which the concepts of neutrality and toleration have some overlooked similarities, generally, and also within the context of granting conscientious exemptions.

This paper analyses the role of the principle of secularism with respect to the consolidation of the democratic 'host' nations which confront themselves with other cultural and religious identities. The aim is pursued by a revisitation of the concept, in the light of the philosophy of ideas. The core of the argumentation is the following: both liberal and liberal-democratic western states are grounded on what contemporary scholars, proving true John Locke, call the subtle art of distinction among spheres and dimensions of individual and collective life. This must be reconsidered nowadays in order to tackle properly the struggle among groups whose specific symbolic internal cohesion is based on forms of religious identity.

In diverse societies like Australia, Britain, Canada and The Netherlands, government policy has increasingly focused on inter-citizen relations. There have been demands for citizens to respect each others' differences, as well as fears about declining social cohesion and acts of intolerance. In political theory, these themes also have currency, although here they often have been obscured by a tendency to think in terms of 'majorities' and minorities', and 'we' and 'they', rather than in terms of the state and the individual citizen. This thesis argues that while respect of difference may seem to be the best way to successfully accommodate individual difference, it is an indefensible demand on the citizen: such a demand is both excessive and unnecessary, and has the potential to unjustifiably limit individual freedom and the accommodation of difference. Further, the requirement for social cohesion is often overstated, while acts of intolerance are best avoided by citizens respecting each others' sameness (citizenship) rather than their difference. As far as the state is concerned, by clearly distinguishing specific instances of tolerance (which always involve forbearance) from the general practice of toleration, the thesis defends toleration as a general and maximally permissive practice – one which is compatible with both liberal neutrality and the maximal accommodation of individual difference, and thus the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit.

Dealing with Diversity: Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. Liberalism and Minority Rights: Liberalizating Minorities. Liberal Pluralism and Diversity. Political Liberalism and Diversity: Political Transformation. Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. ; Dealing with Diversity: Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. Liberalism and Minority Rights: Liberalizating Minorities. Liberal Pluralism and Diversity. Political Liberalism and Diversity: Political Transformation. Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. ; LUISS PhD Thesis

Background In the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare, proponents of conscience rights often point to the imperative to protect the health professional's moral integrity. Their opponents hold that the moral integrity argument alone can at most justify accommodation of conscientious objectors as a "moral courtesy", as the argument is insufficient to establish a general moral right to accommodation, let alone a legal right. Main text This text draws on political philosophy in order to argue for a legal right to accommodation. The moral integrity arguments should be supplemented by the requirement to protect minority rights in liberal democracies. Citizens have a right to live in accordance with their fundamental moral convictions, and a right to equal access to employment. However, this right should not be unconditional, as that would unduly infringe on the rights of other citizens. The right must be limited to cases where the moral basis is more fundamental in a sense that all reasonable citizens in a liberal democracy should accept, such as the constitutive role of the inviolability of human life in liberal democracies. Conclusion There should be a legal, yet circumscribed, right to accommodation for conscientious objectors refusing to provide healthcare services that they reasonably consider to involve the intentional killing of a human being. ; publishedVersion ; © The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

Background In the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare, proponents of conscience rights often point to the imperative to protect the health professional's moral integrity. Their opponents hold that the moral integrity argument alone can at most justify accommodation of conscientious objectors as a "moral courtesy", as the argument is insufficient to establish a general moral right to accommodation, let alone a legal right. Main text This text draws on political philosophy in order to argue for a legal right to accommodation. The moral integrity arguments should be supplemented by the requirement to protect minority rights in liberal democracies. Citizens have a right to live in accordance with their fundamental moral convictions, and a right to equal access to employment. However, this right should not be unconditional, as that would unduly infringe on the rights of other citizens. The right must be limited to cases where the moral basis is more fundamental in a sense that all reasonable citizens in a liberal democracy should accept, such as the constitutive role of the inviolability of human life in liberal democracies. Conclusion There should be a legal, yet circumscribed, right to accommodation for conscientious objectors refusing to provide healthcare services that they reasonably consider to involve the intentional killing of a human being.

En este texto se examina el alcance que el principio de intolerancia religiosa tuvo entre los primeros liberales españoles, partiendo de la constatación de que la intolerancia era un ingrediente esencial de la cultura política española a comienzos del siglo xix, marco cronológico de referencia. A diferencia de los realistas o «serviles», los liberales no concibieron la intolerancia como un principio inamovible, intrínseco al catolicismo, sino como una prescripción del poder civil, que podía ser alterada por este poder si lo consideraba conveniente. Desde esta óptica, se examina por qué no se consideró oportuno debatir en este tiempo sobre la tolerancia, se ofrece una interpretación del artículo 12 de la Constitución de 1812 y se muestra cómo en el transcurso de los debates parlamentarios los liberales matizaron la intolerancia de cultos contenida en dicho artículo. This article examines the extent to which the principle of religious intolerance was espoused by the first Spanish liberals, taking into account that intolerance was an essential ingredient of Spanish political culture in the time-frame considered, that is the early 19th century. Unlike the royalists or «serviles», liberals did not see intolerance as an immovable principle intrinsic to Catholicism, but as a precept of civil power which that power could modify whenever it saw fit. From that viewpoint the article asks why it was not considered convenient to debate toleration at that time. It offers an interpretation of Article 12 of the Constitution of 1812 and shows how in the course of the parliamentary debates the liberals moderated the intolerance of creeds implicit in that article.