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AbstractPreferential trade agreements have boomed in recent years and extended their reach well beyond tariff reduction, to cover policy areas such as investment, services, competition and intellectual property rights. This paper uses new information on the content of preferential trade agreements to examine the trade effects of deep agreements and revisit the classic Vinerian question of trade creation and trade diversion. Our results indicate that deep agreements lead to more trade creation and less trade diversion than shallow agreements. Furthermore, some provisions of deep agreements have a public good aspect and increase trade also with non‐members.

SUMMARYIt has been shown that when voluntary export restraints are applied against a non‐Member of a trade club, such as the EC and EFTA in Europe, the partner's exports will increase in absolute terms although overall imports are reduced; the trade barrier 'leaks' and leads to a misallocation of resources from a global point of view. The partner prefers such a leaking trade barrier to free trade. Compared to traditional customs union theory, where the analysis concentrates on a move from global discrimination to preferential treatment of one foreign country, in this paper the move is in the opposite direction: from free trade with all foreign countries to discrimination against one foreign country (typically a developing one) and retained free trade with the remaining one. Reference was made to international trade in textile, clothing and footwear (TCF). The trade diversion effect of VERs were found to be particularly strong for France and Sweden, less so for Italy and Germany, and non‐existent for the UK. A comparison was made with changes in non‐European countries' integration with LDC exports of TCF (Australia, Canada, Japan and the USA). Finally, the trade diversion effect was illustrated with an analysis of changes in the supply composition of Sweden's home demand for clothing between 1974–82.

SummaryThis paper is intended as a guide for policymakers considering new regional trade agreements. The data provided here show that only about a quarter of imports are potentially subject to trade diversion from new agreements (i.e. they come from countries outside of regional trading blocs and in industries with positive most‐favored nation tariffs). Since this percentage is steadily declining with the increasing number of regional trade agreements and the falling level of tariffs, trade diversion is becoming increasingly irrelevant as a concern for new trade deals. The paper also estimates how each potential new bilateral free trade agreement would affect a country's imports and exports, as well as whether the increased imports would replace domestic production, imports from other RTA partners, or imports from non‐RTA partners. In this way, the estimates are able to shed light on which countries make the best partners for new regional trade agreements. Finally, the paper provides estimates of the trade effects for two large potential new regional agreements: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans‐Pacific Partnership.

Abstract Trade barriers can cause output to be diverted to other countries and into other products. We study the effect of a voluntary price restraint (VPR) on Mexican tomatoes entering the United States. The diversion caused by the VPR is statistically and economically significant – representing over four‐fifths of the direct effects of the trade barrier. When the VPR was binding, Mexico exported more tomatoes to Canada, the United States cut back on exports while Canada increased their exports to the United States. The VPR also diverted fresh tomatoes in Mexico into paste production, which was then exported to the United States.

"Freiwillige" Exportbeschränkungen genießen derzeit größte Aufmerksamkeit, weil sie die sich am schnellsten ausbreitende Form des Protektionismus darstellen, in der Regel den Entwicklungsländern abgefordert seitens der Industrieländer zum "Schutze" eigener Produktionen. Zur Analyse der Auswirkungen auf den Handel werden ein einfaches Modell entwickelt, vier Beispiele bilateraler Handelsrestriktionen dargestellt und schließlich das Modell anhand der Welthandelsentwicklung bei Textilien, Kleidung und Schuhwaren überprüft. (AuD-Lut)