Suchergebnisse

The aim of the paper is to analyze the shared basins between Lebanon and riparians, considering cooperation and conflict, geopolitical aspects in the Arab region, as well as governance. This is complemented with the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approach. Traditionally, the issue of shared water resources in the Arab region has been highly politicized as well as a critical feature of high-level negotiations between governments. At the same time, it causes concerns about justice and security among the general public around the world in relation to the human right to water. Attention has largely been focused on long-standing disputes arising from Arab dependence on surface water resources originating from (or controlled by) non-Arab countries. Water is one of the most precious resources in Lebanon and all around the world, especially considering current and future climate change scenarios. The effects of the humanitarian crisis with 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, putting pressure on water services and resources cannot be diminished either. However, the water crisis affecting Lebanon predates the arrival of the Syrian refugees and it's signed by its geopolitical situation. Available water includes rivers and springs, storage dams and groundwater. Lebanon's water resources are under stress due to several factors: unsustainable water management practices, increasing water demand from all sectors, water pollution, and ineffective water governance. Lebanon shares the following basins with riparian countries: the Jordan River, the Orontes River basin, also known as the Al Asi River and the Nahr Al Kabir basin. Concerning to groundwater, the Anti-Lebanon Mountain range is located at the Lebanese-Syrian border. Originating from the Anti-Lebanon and Mount Hermon mountain ranges, the Jordan River covers a distance of 223 km from north to south and discharges into the Dead Sea. The river has five riparians: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.The Jordan River headwaters (Hasbani, Banias and Dan) are fed by groundwater and seasonal surface runoff. Water use in the Jordan River basin is unevenly developed. Palestine and Syria have no access to the Jordan River; hence their use of water resources from the river itself is nil. However, Syria has built several dams in the Yarmouk River sub-basin. Overall, the Jordan River basin has an estimated total irrigated area of 100,000- 150,000 ha of which around 30% is located in Israel, Jordan and Syria, 5% in Palestine and 2% in Lebanon. Regarding to the main agreements, on 1953 and 1987 Jordan and Syria agreed on the use of the Yarmouk River, including the construction of the Wahdah Dam and 25 dams in Syria. The agreement also establishes a joint commission for the implementation of the provisions on the Wahdah Dam. On 1994, Israel and Jordan agreed on Annex II of the Treaty of Peace concerns water allocation and storage of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, and calls for efforts to prevent water pollution as well as the establishment of a Joint Water Committee. Israel and Palestine (PLO) accepted on 1995 the Article 40 of the Oslo II political agreement states that Israel recognizes Palestinian water rights in the West Bank only and establishes the Joint Water Committee to manage West Bank waters and develop new supplies. Palestinians are denied access to the Jordan River under this agreement. Geopolitically, the question of water sharing in the Jordan River basin is inextricably linked to the ongoing conflicts between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Palestine, and while a wide range of issues are at stake, control over water in the basin has added to existing regional tensions. The Orontes River basin, also known as the Al Asi River, is the only perennial river in Western Asia that flows north from Lebanon to Syria and Turkey, and drains west into the Mediterranean Sea. The river is mainly used for irrigation purposes with several agricultural projects planned in the three riparian countries. There is no basin-wide agreement between the three riparians, but there are several bilateral agreements in place on issues such as water allocation (Agreement between Lebanon and Syria on the distribution of water of Al Asi River, 1994) and the joint construction of infrastructure (Syria and Turkey). Orontes basin politics are heavily influenced by the status of Turkish-Syrian relations in general, and discussions over the sharing of the Euphrates River in particular. Syria and Turkey have not resolved the question of the disputed coastal province of Hatay (Iskenderun) through which the Orontes exits to the Mediterranean Sea. On 1994, Lebanon and Syria reached an agreement on the distribution of Orontes River Water originating in Lebanese territory, which specifies water allocation between the two countries. On 2009, Syria and Turkey agreed on the Memorandum of Understanding concerning the construction of the joint Orontes River Friendship Dam. The NahrAl Kabir basin rises from numerous springs in Syria and in the Lebanon Mountain range. It runs a westerly course forming a natural border between northern Lebanon and Syria. The river is severely polluted by widespread discharge of untreated sewage and uncontrolled solid waste disposal. The two countries cooperate on the basis of a 2002 water-sharing agreement, with several joint technical sub-committees tackling various issues related to the watershed. On 2002, Lebanon and Syria reached the Agreement to share the water of the NahrAl Kabir and build a joint dam on the main stem. Concerning to groundwater, the Anti-Lebanon Mountain range is located at the Lebanese-Syrian border between the Bekaa Plain in the west and the Damascus Plain in the east. The Anti-Lebanon is an important source of water, both locally and in the wider regional context, as it forms the source of a number of rivers in the Mashrek. Several large springs emanate from these aquifers and contribute to the Awaj, Barada, Litani, Orontes and (Upper) Jordan Rivers. There are no water agreements in place for any part of the Anti-Lebanon Mountain range, nor for the three shared spring catchments. The two riparians coordinate shared water resources management issues through the Syrian-Lebanese Joint Committee for Shared Water, which also implements the agreements in place over the Nahr Al Kabir and the Orontes River. In this regard, enhancing cooperation between Lebanon and riparians countries is crucial to manage shared water resources in this water-scarce region. More cooperative action and constructive dialogue is needed to sustain these shared resources, considering water governance, hydrodiplomacy principles and the IWRM approach. The questions that guide this study are to know which watersheds Lebanon shares with its neighboring countries, what their characteristics are, and if there are international agreements that regulate their use and joint development. In reference to the techniques of data collection, the research process will collect information from primary and secondary sources (academic research, specialized press, statistical series and international surveys, among others). As regards the techniques of data analysis, the research will use the documentary analysis, qualitative data analysis. This article is presented with an introduction to water management in Arab countries. Next, theoretical bases for the study of transboundary basins are proposed. As a contribution to the theoretical framework, the principles on shared watercourses in International Law are developed. Then, the transboundary basins of the country of Phoenician origin, Lebanon, are presented. Finally, the conclusions of the study are given. ; El objetivo del presente artículo es analizar las cuencas transfronterizas entre la República del Líbano y los países ribereños, considerando aspectos de cooperación y conflicto, geopolíticos de la región árabe, así como gobernanza. Esto se complementa con la propuesta del paradigma de la Gestión Integrada de Recursos Hídricos (GIRH). Tradicionalmente, la cuestión de recursos hídricos compartidos en la región árabe ha estado altamente politizada, así como las negociaciones de alto nivel entre gobiernos han sido críticas. Al mismo tiempo, esto genera preocupación sobre la justicia y la seguridad hídrica. La atención ha estado centrada en disputas de largo recorrido surgidas de la dependencia árabe en recursos hídricos superficiales originados (o controlados por) países no árabes. El agua es uno de los recursos más preciados en Líbano, como en todo el mundo, en especial si se consideran los actuales y futuros escenarios de cambio climático. La crisis humanitaria de 1,5 millones de refugiados sirios en territorio libanés presiona en mayor medidasobre los servicios de agua y sobre los recursos; si bien dicha crisis hídrica antecede a la llegada de dichos refugiados y está marcada por la propia situación geopolítica. El agua disponible discurre por ríos, lagos, embalses y aguas subterráneas. Los recursos hídricos de este país se encuentran bajo estrés debido a distintos factores: prácticas de manejo no sostenibles, aumento de la demanda desde todos los sectores, contaminación y gobernanza inefectiva (casi ausente) del agua. El Líbano comparte las siguientes cuencas con países ribereños: el río Jordán, el río Orontes y el río Nahr Al Kabir. En lo que respecta a agua subterránea, la cadena montañosa de Anti-Líbano está ubicada en la frontera con Siria. La promoción de la cooperación es crucial para el manejo de los recursos hídricos compartidos en esta región. En este sentido, una acción más cooperativa y un diálogo constructivo son necesarios para gestionar estos recursos compartidos, considerando la gobernanza del agua, los principios de la hidrodiplomacia y la GIRH. Las preguntas que guían este estudio son conocer qué cuencas hídricas comparte el Líbano, cuáles son las características de las mismas, y si existen acuerdos internacionales que regulen su uso y aprovechamiento conjunto. En cuanto a la metodología utilizada, la siguiente investigación se basa en información de fuentes primarias y secundarias (investigaciones académicas, prensa especializada, estadísticas, entre otras). El análisis de datos es cualitativo y documental. Este artículo comienza con una introducción a la administración del agua en los países árabes. A continuación, se proponen bases teóricas para el estudio de cuencas transfronterizas. Como aporte al marco teórico, se desarrollan los principios sobre cursos de agua compartidos en el Derecho Internacional. A continuación, se presentan las cuencas transfronterizas del país de origen fenicio. Finalmente, se proponen las conclusiones del estudio.

La llamada globalización tiene su origen en el predominio del capitalismo financiero, que provoca, en apariencia, el escape al Estado de los flujos económicos, y a la consecuente predisposición normativa. Las causas del escape son la revolución tecnológica y el predominio de concepciones políticas y económicas de cuño ultra liberal-conservador: ideología neocon y escuela económica monetarista que abonan la idea de la inevitabilidad de las decisiones de los mercados. Sin embargo no hay: mercado sin reglas jurídicas salvo por el rehúse del Estado. Así nace el Derecho de la globalización como fruto exclusivo de las instancias del poder privado Los resultados: crisis institucional por vacío del poder político jurídico del Estado; aparición de modos de producción del Derecho sin legitimación política; de ello son vehículos la nueva lex mercatoria, el contrato y el arbitraje. Se debe notar que el Derecho global no es Derecho solo transfronterizo, sino que sus soluciones se trasladan al ámbito estatal. Vienen así a la existencia de dos dimensiones jurídicas, una desregulada, otra subalterna de la desregulación, alumbrando un mundo de grandes incertidumbres. ; The so-called globalization stems from the predominance of financial capitalism, which causes an apparent escape for the state of economic flows and your consequent regulation. The causes of the escape are the technological revolution and the prevalence of political and economic conceptions of ultra-liberal-conservative stamp: neocon ideology and monetarist school of economics. This analysis supports the idea of the inevitability of the decisions of the markets. However, there is not market without legal rules; there is the refusal of the state power. Thus, borns the globalization law as the exclusive product of instances of private power. It is results an institutional vacuum of legal political power of the state; and the emergence of modes of production of law without political legitimacy; vehicles of this are the new lex mercatoria, the contract and arbitration. It should be noted that the so called law of globalization is not only transboundary but their solutions are transferred to the state leve!. So, comes to the existence of two legal dimensions, one unregulated, another subordinate to deregulation, arising a world of great uncertainty.

Asia's ten main river systems originate in the Himalayas, most of them in the enormous Tibetan plateau, the Roof of the World, which holds a unique geostrategic importance in the world and controlled by China. This country is one of the countries with most transboundary rivers in the world, second only to Russia and Argentina. The Asian water tower holds a position that gives it enormous power and influence, and the possible decisions Pekin can make regarding its hydraulic relations with the rest of the countries transcend the Himalayas and have a regional, continental and possibly global scope. The management of its 16 transboundary rivers can affect the availability of water in many downstream countries, directly affecting access to water resources in 14 countries on the Asian continent and almost three billion people, that is, almost half of the world population This article aims at analysing the Chinese hydraulic behavior in the Himalayan complex, based on two case studies: Nepal, and India. The present piece of work contributes to the debate, on the one hand, on the explanatory factors of the Chinese water behavior, both domestically and internationally. On the other, to the academic debate on the Chinese strategy in relation to one of the most valued resources on the planet, water. China has embarked upon 90,000 projects on hydraulic infrastructure, including dams, dikes, water diversion projects, river basin and river water transfers. These megaprojects affect both internal rivers —which suffer from scarcity and drought more seriously, such as the Yellow river or the Yangtze—, as well as international transboundary rivers, which immediately poses a threat to the countries with which it shares these rivers —such as the Brahmaputra. The Himalayas represent a strategic enclave of extraordinary significance in the international system, but it remains unknown and under studied in Spain, especially the case of Tibet, the Himalayas, and Sino-Indian relations. The theoretical framework guiding this research comes from hydropolitics, coined from the first time in 1979 by Waterbury and that holds significant explanatory power for the present work. The analysis uses hydropolitics as the systematic investigation of the interaction between riparian states, non-state actors and other participants in relation to the authorized allocation and / or use of national and international water resources. Hydro-politics is also related to the capacity of geopolitical institutions to manage shared water resources in a politically sustainable way. Two main concepts related to hydropolitics frame the research. On the one hand, hydrohegemony, understood as the preponderance position of a country within a given water complex. On the other, that of hydrodomination, highlighting the behavior of a country trying to impose its dominion. Both concepts are notably intertwined but do not mean, or imply, the same, and both will illuminate the findings of the study of China' water policy in the Himalayas. The text is structured as follows. First, it sets the rationale of the paper, laying out the main objectives of the paper, the relevance of the topic under scrutiny and the appropriateness of the selected case studies. The second chapter bears the theoretical part of the piece of work and contains two main aspects. First, it depicts water as a geopolitical problem and outlines why water is a geopolitical asset. Second, it explores hydropolitics as the main explanatory approach and the two main concepts therein, hydrohegemony and hydrodomination. The main empirical part of the paper is found in the third chapter. This chapter unfolds by presenting the Himalayas and underlines its strategic standpoint, namely as a key hydrological complex. It then analyses two meaningful case studies, that help address to the two main questions posed by the paper. Sketching out China' hydropower in Tibet as the main domestic factor, as the Tibetan plateau is the main source of hydrological power to China, the paper focuses on China's projects in Nepal as the first case under the prism of the study, as China is bouncing back to this country and is increasingly stepping in this territory through several water-related projects. Then, the paper draws its attention to Sino-Indian relations and, concretely, to the relations over the Sikkim region and regarding the Chinese projects in the Brahmaputra. The paper outlines some findings of the analysis of the case studies. The paper states that China takes advantage of its hydrohegemony and of the current international context to impose its preferences over water relations and to pursue a unilateral, assertive, aggressive hydropolicy. China' water context cannot be neglected, but the crisis of multilateralism and lingering geopolitical disputes in the wider Himalayan region are external factors that shape Chinese behaviour. A second finding is related to geography, as geographical considerations always matter. China's control over the Tibetan plateau and its transboundary water character provide this country with a position which allows this country to exert some hegemony and domination vis-à-vis its riparian neighbours. This is not merely a geographical reality, but a geopolitical imperative that China always uses as a trump card. Third, China's hydropolicy in Nepal and India seems to indicate a huge degree of continuity in Mao's the bigger, the better policy. Pekin keeps its political strategy to become the world's leading superpower, and this needs naturally enormous infrastructure projects, massive investments, and a global quest for natural resources. Some of the concrete projects presented, such as the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, are remarkable in that sense. The final conclusions and considerations close this article. The paper zooms out and refers to the relevance of the Himalayas, with the special case of the Tibetan plateau, to Chinese behaviour and to hydropolitics. It also proposes some topics and theoretical approaches for future research. The main argument of the article is that Chinese water policy in the Himalayas should be conceived as one more step in China's attempt to consolidate its political and strategic presence in different parts of the world. Chinese relations must be analyzed in the context of its foreign policy over the last decade, marked by its expansionism, its crystallization as a great world power and the fostering of mega projects and initiatives on a global scale. In short, maybe the most hydropolitical imperative of China is Why should I cooperate if I can dominate? ; Los diez sistemas de ríos principales del continente asiático nacen en el Himalaya, la gran mayoría, en la enorme meseta tibetana. China es uno de los países con más ríos transfronterizos en el mundo, solo superado por Rusia y Argentina. La torre de agua de Asia se encuentra en una posición que le confiere un enorme poder e influencia, y las decisiones que adopte en el campo de sus relaciones hidráulicas con el resto de países tiene un alcance regional, continental y, posiblemente, global. La gestión de sus 16 ríos transfronterizos puede afectar la disponibilidad de agua de muchos países río abajo, con afectación directa al acceso a los recursos hídricos de 14 países en el continente asiático y de casi tres billones de personas, es decir casi la mitad de la población mundial El objetivo del presente artículo es analizar el comportamiento hidráulico chino en el complejo del Himalaya, a partir de dos casos de estudio: las relaciones de China con Nepal e India. Se pretende así contribuir al debate sobre, por una parte, los factores explicativos del comportamiento hídrico de la potencia asiática, prestando especial atención a la importancia de la meseta tibetana y, por el otro, al debate académico sobre la estrategia china en relación con uno de los recursos más apreciados del planeta, el agua. China cuenta hoy en día con unas 90.000 infraestructuras hidráulicas, contando presas, diques y proyectos de desvío de agua, y sus intereses hídricos abarcan tanto ríos internos —que acusan la escasez y la sequía con más gravedad, como el Amarillo o el Yangtzé— como los ríos transfronterizos internacionales, lo que conlleva de inmediato una amenaza para los países con los que comparte estos ríos —como el Brahmaputra. El principal argumento es que la política china en el Himalaya es un eslabón más en el intento chino de consolidar su presencia política y estratégica en diferentes partes del mundo. Las relaciones hídricas chinas se deben analizar en el contexto de la política exterior del gigante asiático en la última década, marcada por su expansionismo, su cristalización como gran potencia mundial, y su estilo de política exterior a escala global El artículo se estructura de la siguiente forma. El primer apartado contiene el marco teórico y analítico del articulado, empezando por el paraguas conceptual que nos ofrece la hidropolítica para entender el comportamiento en términos hídricos de China en el espacio del Himalaya, en base a dos conceptos principales: hidrohegemonía e hidrodominación. El segundo apartado contiene una disección analítica del Himalaya como complejo hídrico y el estudio de los casos relevantes para entender el comportamiento de China en el sistema himalayo; Nepal e India. El análisis de los factores explicativos de la política hídrica china, a nivel endógeno y exógeno, así como la estrategia seguida por Pekín, sustentan el tercer apartado del documento. Las conclusiones y consideraciones finales cierran el presente artículo.