An interview with musician Shabaka Hutchings, leader of the bands Sons of Kemet, The Comet is Coming and Shabaka and the Ancestors. The conversation starts with a discussion of multiplicity and unity, and the imperial habit of reducing multiplicity down to a single dominant unity, whether through imposing one religion, one view of empire, or one recognised form of art music. It looks at the different ways of viewing culture in the West and in African countries. And it discusses the relationship between jazz and classical music; improvisation; musical dialogue; South African music; transcendence through music; and musical healing.
Cover -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. God in Philosophical Thinking -- 2. Philosophical Proofs of the Existence of God -- 2.1 A Priori Proofs -- 2.2 A Posteriori Proofs -- 3. The Problem of Evil and Theodicy -- 3.1 God and Evil -- 3.2 Suffering, Freedom, and Love -- Conclusion -- Bibliography
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In: Analele Universității din Craiova: Annales de l'Université de Craiova = Annals of the University of Craiova. Seria Filosofie = Serie de philosophie = Philosophy series, Heft 49
In our analysis we deal with some interpretations of the concept of the idea in the history of philosophy. We concentrate our investigations on the following authors: Plato, Descartes, Locke and Berkeley. In particular,- Throughout our analysis of Plato, we interpret ideas as the entities which pave the way to the discovery of transcendence. Ideas show, by virtue of their existence, that not only the sphere of the average life and not only the sphere of perception exist. Correspondingly, individuals cannot be reduced to the dimension of their sphere perception. Through the recollection of the ideas, the subject can acknowledge that there is a reality dimension which transcends the dimension of the senses.- Descartes enables us to observe the search for the conditions of certainty regarding the activity of the minds. Descartes' strategy, through his inquiry into the innate idea of God and into the contents of this idea, is directed to the demonstration of the existence of God: the demonstration of the existence of God is functional to the foundation of the possibility of certainty of the mental and cognitive activities of the subject.- Locke considers the dimension of the internal and external experience as the very root of the ideas: this position corresponds to Locke's refusal of any form of innatism whatsoever. Locke does not admit any innate idea, and sees the origins of the ideas only in the external and internal experience. Innatism of whichever ideas cannot be accepted; the subject is completely dependent on his experience.- A regards Berkeley, we concentrate our investigation on Berkeley's strategy of refusal of materialism. In Berkeley's view, there is nothing else than ideas in the mind of the subject. All objects are equivalent to ideas. From the existence of the ideas the subject cannot legitimately infer the existence of a reality which is independent of his own mind. The investigation on the characteristics and sources of the ideas demonstrates that there is no independent existence of entities outside God's mind.
For any sizable group of theologians to agree on any statement is a sign of hope that we may be moving beyond the extreme fragmentation of the recent past. Further, the tone and intent of this agreement is clearly Christian and affirmative. Hence my initial reaction to "An Appeal for Theological Affirmation" was positive. Unfortunately, this initial reaction has been superseded by a more negative judgment, and my comments will reflect this phase of my reaction.The chief weakness of "An Appeal for Theological Affirmation" is that it consists in a series of negations. The assumption is that if only positions that are opposed can be swept aside, powerful new affirmations will rise to take their place; but surely this is a dubious reading of our current situation.
In the jargon of our day, transcendence is a "heavy" subject, dense not only with meaning, but with complexity and confusion. In short, the term's older meanings, largely associated with a metaphysical reality or religious experience, are being revived by persons from unexpected corners of the modern secular world. As one eminent sociologist has surmised, there is scattered evidence that secularization may not be as all embracing as some thought, that the supernatural, banished from cognitive respectability by the intellectual culture, may survive hidden in nooks and crannies… For whatever reasons, sizable numbers of specimen "modern man" have not lost a propensity for awe, for the uncanny, for all those possibilities that are legislated against by the canon of secularized rationality. Some of the interested see the traditional religious import behind the term in thoroughly naturalistic terms: either as a figment necessary for man's survival at one time or as an advantageous fact of this life, not of any other. Others are concerned to attribute a metaphysical dimension to what they have discovered. Still a third group, probably the most interesting, seems to be in the middle or, to use a phrase from Paul Tillich, "on the boundary," on the fence, not knowing what to do with the past that has come to haunt them; they are at once plagued by both enthusiasm and hesitancy. For the purposes of this paper, after first looking at prominent Christian or theistic variations on transcendence from the not-too-far-distant past, some recent and diverse impulses—both secular and religious, with an increasingly uncertain line between—will be discussed with the point of holding their relation to the classic attempts firmly in mind. And finally, in the last section of the paper, the central issue of the current wave of interest as regarded from the perspective of Christian thought will be dealt with : are these contemporary happenings, as one theologian is inclined to regard them, "a demonstration of, and incentive toward, God ?"
Abstract This article argues that a pragmatist ambition to transcendence undergirds Richard Rorty's metaphilosophy. That transcendence might play a positive role in Rorty's work might seem implausible given his well-known rejection of the idea that human practices are accountable to some external, Archimedean standpoint, and his endorsement of the historicist view that standards of rationality are products of time and chance. It is true that Rorty's contributions to epistemology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics have this anti-transcendentalist character. But in his metaphilosophy, Rorty shows great respect for pre-philosophical impulses aimed at transcendence of some kind, in particular the romantic (and indeed religious) experience of awe at something greater than oneself, and the utopian striving for a radically better world. These impulses do not disappear in Rorty's metaphilosophy but are reshaped in a pragmatist iteration of transcendence which, we argue, can be characterised as horizontal (rather than vertical) and weak (rather strong). We use this characterization to distinguish Rorty's metaphilosophy from other accounts that share a postmetaphysical ambition to transcendence.
