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The rate of introduction of transgenic crops in Spanish agriculture has been limited by a number of adverse factors, some of which are linked to specific local circumstances, while others are common to most European Union (EU) member countries. Because of its dry climate, Spain is the main European importer of feed grains, mainly soybeans and corn. The public was introduced to transgenic crops through the appearance of press headlines reporting demonstrations by nongovernmental organizations protesting transgenic grains at ports of entry. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the present status and future prospects of some key transgenic crops, such as corn and cotton. However, in order to understand the current impact and future potential of such crops in Spanish agriculture, some background facts and a brief description of the general scenario are pertinent. We will begin by briefly considering some relevant characteristics of Spanish agriculture, the R&D potential of the country, and the legal backdrop.

Gene flow is the transfer of genes between individuals, populations and species. In Brazil the Brazilian legislation for the production of certified seeds, does not guarantee a secure isolation of the areas of seed production of transgenic and nontransgenic soybean. The objective of this work was to evaluate and to quantify the gene flow in soybean (glycine max (L.) Merrill). Soybean seeds of the cultivar CD 201 (non transgenic) and cultivar CD 212 RR (transgenic, with the gene RR) were used, they came from the breeding program of COODETEC (Cooperativa Central de Pesquisa Agricola), located in Cascavel (Paraná State-Brazil). They were sown in an experimental design of concentric rings, with a total area of 7850 m2. The sampling points were delimited in eight halfway rays, in the directions S, SW, SE, N, NW, NE, E and W, on which 480 collection points were defined. A total of 96,000 seeds were collected from all these points and analyzed by the standard germination test, using paper towel. The papers were soaked in 0.03% of glyphosate herbicide solution. The rate of crosspollination was calculated by the percentage of seedlings that showed to be resistant to the herbicide, in relation to the total analyzed plants. The cross pollination was 0.027 %. It is was evidence that the gen flow is very low in soybean plants and they do not care much attention if the geographical isolation is attempted review redaction. ; The objective of this study was to assess and quantify the gene flow in soybean. It were used two batches of soybean seeds, the cultivar CD 201 (non transgenic) and the CD 212 RR (transgenic, with the RR gene), both from the breeding program of COODETEC (Cooperativa Central de Pesquisa Agricola), located in Cascavel (Paraná State-Brazil). They were sown in an experimental design of concentric rings, totalizing an area of 100 m of diameter and 2.500 m2. The sampling points were delimited in eight halfway rays, in the directions S, SW, SE, N, NW, NE, E and W, on which 480 collection points were defined. The 96 seeds collected from all these points were analyzed by the standard germination test, using paper towel soaked in 0.03% of glyphosate herbicide solution. The rate of cross pollination was calculated by the percentage of seedlings which showed to be resistant to the herbicide, in relation to the total of analyzed plants. The results showed a cross pollination of 0.027%. It is evidence that the gene flow is very low in soybean plants.

This article investigates how to regulate transgenic soybean production in Argentina. Taking into account the broad range of negative externalities associated with transgenic soybean production, we explore the effects of two different policy instruments, namely a subsidy for non-transgenic soybean and production quotas for transgenic soybean. Taking into account the political and economic context in Argentina, we demonstrate that auctioned production quotas are the best way to achieve the regulation of transgenic soybean production. However, the organization of the agricultural sector in Argentina is such that "raising rivals' costs" behavior could occur on the quota market although the output price is set exogenously. We show that auctioned quotas limit this anti-competitive behavior. Finally, we demonstrate that introducing a shadow cost of public funds leads to an increase in the optimal production level of transgenic soybean.

This article investigates how to regulate transgenic soybean production in Argentina. Taking into account the broad range of negative externalities associated with transgenic soybean production, we explore the effects of two different policy instruments, namely a subsidy for non-transgenic soybean and production quotas for transgenic soybean. Taking into account the political and economic context in Argentina, we demonstrate that auctioned production quotas are the best way to achieve the regulation of transgenic soybean production. However, the organization of the agricultural sector in Argentina is such that "raising rivals' costs" behavior could occur on the quota market although the output price is set exogenously. We show that auctioned quotas limit this anti-competitive behavior. Finally, we demonstrate that introducing a shadow cost of public funds leads to an increase in the optimal production level of transgenic soybean.

This article investigates how to regulate transgenic soybean production in Argentina. Taking into account the broad range of negative externalities associated with transgenic soybean production, we explore the effects of two different policy instruments, namely a subsidy for non-transgenic soybean and production quotas for transgenic soybean. Taking into account the political and economic context in Argentina, we demonstrate that auctioned production quotas are the best way to achieve the regulation of transgenic soybean production. However, the organization of the agricultural sector in Argentina is such that "raising rivals' costs" behavior could occur on the quota market although the output price is set exogenously. We show that auctioned quotas limit this anti-competitive behavior. Finally, we demonstrate that introducing a shadow cost of public funds leads to an increase in the optimal production level of transgenic soybean.

This article investigates how to regulate transgenic soybean production in Argentina. Taking into account the broad range of negative externalities associated with transgenic soybean production, we explore the effects of two different policy instruments, namely a subsidy for non-transgenic soybean and production quotas for transgenic soybean. Taking into account the political and economic context in Argentina, we demonstrate that auctioned production quotas are the best way to achieve the regulation of transgenic soybean production. However, the organization of the agricultural sector in Argentina is such that "raising rivals' costs" behavior could occur on the quota market although the output price is set exogenously. We show that auctioned quotas limit this anti-competitive behavior. Finally, we demonstrate that introducing a shadow cost of public funds leads to an increase in the optimal production level of transgenic soybean.

The transgenic seed industry provides an ideal case study of major competition policy and antitrust enforcement questions associated with systems. These systems consist, at a minimum, of upstream markets for genetic traits (e.g., herbicide-tolerance and insect-resistance) and downstream markets for traited seeds. Corn, soybeans, and cotton are particularly important crops on which transgenic innovations have had an impact. The article begins by discussing the remarkable nature of the transgenic seed revolution, the role of innovation, and the importance of patent protection. It moves on to examine how rapid consolidation has created systems with significant vertical and horizontal integration. These sections help establish the framework for examining two major types of systems—open and closed. Such systems are defined primarily by whether the combinations or "stacks" of genetic traits contained in traited seed involve the technology of a single firm or multiple firms. They give rise to two major modalities of competition—intrasystem and intersystem rivalry. In transgenic seed, the presence of a dominant firm has arguably had a major influence on the evolution of these modalities, particularly through licensing policies for patented technology. The article highlights the difficult questions associated with the nexus between intellectual property law and antitrust law. Some progress is evident, however, as illustrated by landmark antitrust enforcement actions that address system issues.