Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article examines how treaty withdrawal affects international cooperation. By terminating its treaty commitments, the exiting state could earn a reputation for unreliability, making other states less willing to cooperate with it. However, states' reactions to withdrawal vary markedly, even though it is public behavior. I develop an experiential theory of international cooperation that explains this variation. I argue that withdrawal damages the exiting state's relations with other treaty members, causing them to ratify fewer agreements with it in the future. I test this theory using an original data set of all treaties registered with the United Nations and a case study of France's exit from NATO's Status of Forces Agreement. I find that withdrawal reduces treaty members' ratification of agreements with the exiting state by 7.9% in the 7 years after exit. This effect increases with the salience and material cost of withdrawal and can spill across issue areas.

Intro -- Cover -- Dedication -- Title Page -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Introduction -- I. Towards a Law of Withdrawal -- A. What is Withdrawal? -- B. What is the Law of Withdrawal? -- II. Why Does It All Work? The Purpose of This Book -- III. The Structure of the Book and Some Preliminary Caveats -- 1. What is the Law of Withdrawal For? A Sketch of the Objectives -- Introduction -- I. State Consent, Sovereignty and Withdrawal -- A. Defining Sovereignty -- B. Critically Appraising State Consent -- C. Withdrawal as the Undoing of State Consent? -- II. Four Justifications for the Existence of the Law of Withdrawal -- A. Withdrawal Safeguards a State in Light of Changing External Circumstances -- B. Withdrawal as Recognition of a Political Decision by a State Party -- C. An Escape Hatch against 'Delegation Creep' -- D. The Law of Withdrawal as a Guarantee of Good Faith -- Conclusion: The Two Concerns -- 2. The Structure of Withdrawal Clauses: Theory and Form -- Introduction -- I. Theoretical Templates for Understanding How Withdrawal Clauses Shape State Behaviour -- II. Initiating a Declaration of Withdrawal -- A. The Process of Withdrawal as a Counterpoint to Accession -- B. Demonstrating the Necessity for Withdrawal -- C. Initiating Withdrawal as a Means of Stopping Proceedings -- III. Notification Provisions -- A. Whom to Notify -- B. Substance of the Notification -- C. Withdrawal of a Notification -- IV. The Temporal Issues of Withdrawal -- A. The Time from Accession to Notification -- B. The Time from Notification to Exit -- Conclusion: Thinking about Withdrawal Clauses -- 3. Obligations after Withdrawal -- Introduction -- I. The Sources of Law for Obligations on Exit -- A. Obligations within Withdrawal Clauses -- B. Breaches of Obligations Prior to Withdrawal -- II. The Right to a Hearing after Exit -- A. Investment Arbitration.

In "the constitutional case of the century", the UK Supreme Court concluded that the Government did not possess the prerogative power to withdraw from the European Union. However, whilst it may be clear that legislation was required to empower the Government to notify the European Union of its intention to leave, it is not necessarily clear when legislation would be required to withdraw from international Treaties. There is also considerable controversy as to whether the Supreme Court reached the right conclusion. It is hard to determine how far Miller would apply to other international Treaties. At its broadest, it would apply to the withdrawal from any Treaty which had created rights for individuals, regardless of whether this Treaty had been implemented into domestic law or not. At its narrowest, it only applies to the European Union Treaties, which created a set of arrangements in international law that are so esoteric, they are unique to the European Union. To demonstrated how one judgment can generate such a plethora of interpretations, we need to revisit the original criticisms and unravel the different strands of argument running through the decision.

The article analyzes the dynamics, causes and implications of the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty in the broader context of gradual dismantlement of the network of arms control and confidence building regimes created at the end of the Cold War. The central focus is on the explanation of the declining U.S. support for the treaty since the 2010s and the eventual withdrawal addressed against the background of the evolution of the U.S. approach to arms control during the first two decades of the 21st century. While policies changed from one president to another, a sequence of U.S. administrations shared growing loss of interest in arms control and unwillingness to invest in generating domestic support for existing and new agreements. The weakening of arms control became preferable to limitations on the U.S.' own programs and forces, in line with the belief that the United States was sufficiently advanced to remain ahead of any possible competitors, including Russia. While arms control issues are more effectively addressed through detailed, difficult negotiations and compromises, the evolving U.S. approach to perceived treaty violations by Russia amounted to an ultimatum to Moscow to admit violations and fix them the way the U.S. wants them to be fixed. Russia's decision to follow suit by withdrawing from the treaty, while not immediate or preordained, is explained as driven both by political motives and, in cost-benefit terms, by concerns that the United States would keep access to data on Russia collected under the treaty through the U.S. NATO allies. The prospects for modest upgrade of the arms control agenda under the Biden administration are also addressed.