Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article examines how treaty withdrawal affects international cooperation. By terminating its treaty commitments, the exiting state could earn a reputation for unreliability, making other states less willing to cooperate with it. However, states' reactions to withdrawal vary markedly, even though it is public behavior. I develop an experiential theory of international cooperation that explains this variation. I argue that withdrawal damages the exiting state's relations with other treaty members, causing them to ratify fewer agreements with it in the future. I test this theory using an original data set of all treaties registered with the United Nations and a case study of France's exit from NATO's Status of Forces Agreement. I find that withdrawal reduces treaty members' ratification of agreements with the exiting state by 7.9% in the 7 years after exit. This effect increases with the salience and material cost of withdrawal and can spill across issue areas.

ON MARCH 12, 1993, NORTH KOREA ANNOUNCED THAT IT INTENDS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. PYONGYANG'S DECISION IS WIDELY VIEWED AS HAVING POTENTIALLY SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND FOR THE GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.