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In this article the author analyses specific reservations that are being done to the international documents for the protection of human rights and whether Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties applies to those human rights treaties or not. Also, the author analyses if reservations, which are incompatible with object and purpose of the treaty, can be done or not and what consequences they might bring. For this reason the author describes the practice of the state members under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These treaties were chosen not only because they laid down the most significant principles of the protection of human rights, but also due to the great number of reservations made to the fundamental provisions of these treaties. The importance of the topic is that in the human rights treaties the implementation of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provisions on reservations brings several issues, even though on theoretical level the regulation of reservations seems unproblematic. Firstly, there is a major group of states (especially Islamic countries, which base their explanation on the incompatibility with Islamic law), which want to become parties to the treaties that protect human rights and make reservations to fundamental provisions of them at the same time. Secondly, the state parties that make objections to the reservations have to decide if the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or not. The regulation that is laid down in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties creates difficulties for the state parties and withdrawal of reservations seems to be more problematic in reality than it is in theory. In order to find the solutions for the above mentioned issues, the author analyses whether the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties regime works properly within the mechanism of making reservations to the human rights treaties or not, what reservations should be kept invalid under the human rights treaties and what could be the solutions for the most effective protection from the invalid reservations that address fundamental rights of human beings in the human rights law. ; https://repository.mruni.eu/handle/007/10704

More than four years after the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed, the conventional arms control process in Europe remains deadlocked. The main sticking point continues to be Russia's non-compliance with the commitments it made at the 1999 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Istanbul Summit, particularly those regarding the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Georgia and Moldova. The second wave of NATO enlargement caused Russia to intensify its diplomatic and political rhetoric in 2003 and early 2004, alleging that enlargement would deal a 'fatal blow' to the European conventional arms control regime. The resulting confrontation has made both NATO and Russia aware of the need to find a means to deal with the problem. In 2003 the OSCE participating states remained focused on improving certain norm- and standard-setting measures (NSSMs) and developing new ones in order to better respond to the various threats and challenges facing Europe and its perimeter. In 2003 a Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) was published to assist participating states in implementing the 2000 OSCE SALW Document. A great deal of work was also done to promote the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (COC) in the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus and in other former Soviet states. The OSCE's efforts to combat terrorism led the participating states to propose new arms control-related initiatives. Most significantly, at the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial Council, the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition was adopted, setting out a process whereby requesting states would receive assistance with the destruction of their surplus ammunition. The Treaty on Open Skies had a smooth second year of implementation. Three states ratified the treaty in 2003, and several others are in the process of doing so. In the Balkans, regional arms control continues to work well, evidently unaffected by political, economic and other factors in the region. Although the European conventional arms control regime is by far the most advanced of its type in the world, significant progress is being made in other regions. Within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS), headway was made in 2003 in elaborating the confidence -- and security -- building measures (CSBMs) process in the western hemisphere. A Meeting of Experts on CSBMs took place in Miami, Florida, which built on earlier meetings organized during the 1990s. Recommendations were made on voluntary CSBMs dealing with both traditional and new security threats. At the November Meeting of States Parties to the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention), Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) was adopted. Among other things, the protocol commits signatories to clear or assist in the clearance of ERW following armed conflicts. The protocol was opened for signature and ratification. The attention given to restricting the use of anti-vehicle mines demonstrates the willingness of states to mitigate the consequences of the use of weapons that predominantly affect civilians. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
In recent years, there has been mounting interest in the possibility of the Paris Agreement 2015 featuring in investor-State arbitration.2 This applies particularly to investments connected to greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, insured emissions and other financial investments to be made under the internationally supervised emission-offsetting mechanism to be activated in accordance with the Glasgow Climate Pact 2021.3 While modernisation reforms to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) are anticipated to include direct reference to the Paris Agreement, their effect has been thrown into doubt by recent withdrawals of EU Member States. Although the past two years have seen increasingly successful efforts to enforce the Paris Agreement before national courts, a disputing party has yet to invoke it in an investor-State arbitration. Whereas environmental exception clauses, direct references to the Paris Agreement and substantive obligations on environmental protection remain rare in international investment agreements, this situation is likely to change as 'green investment' expands and high-emission investors react to intensification of host State efforts to mitigate emissions. In analysing recent arbitral jurisprudence on the right of regulation, it is suggested that the most significant effect of the Paris Agreement on international investment law may be in defining the investment relationship of the disputing parties with respect to the liability of the host State for alleged breaches of the substantive protections for the investment under investment treaties, contracts and laws.

The newly inaugurated administration of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. took immediate steps to reengage with a variety of international institutions and agreements from which the Trump administration had withdrawn. On January 20, 2021, the administration deposited with the United Nations a new instrument of acceptance of the Paris Agreement on climate change, and it halted U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO). On January 21, the United States announced that it would participate in the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, an international vaccine distribution scheme. The Biden administration also announced that it would reengage with and seek election to the UN Human Rights Council, and it quickly reached agreement with Russia for a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining arms control agreement between the two countries. These early moves are consistent with the foreign policy strategy President Biden previewed during the campaign when he promised to "renew American leadership" and "[e]levate [d]iplomacy." In his first speech on foreign policy as president, delivered at the U.S. State Department on February 4, Biden asserted that "America is back" and that "[d]iplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy." To implement these objectives, Biden has appointed a slate of experienced foreign affairs officials, many of whom worked in the Obama administration.

The national security strategy adopted in 2007 provided a detailed definition of security and identified its threats. The key threat to the Armenian state was considered to be the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The document indicated the Collective Security Treaty Organisation main guarantor of security, with Russia being Armenia's main partner in bilateral relations. The second position in the strategy was assigned to cooperation with the NATO and the OSCE. One of the priorities identified was to intensify the economic and trade connections with the European Union and participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy as a step towards integration with European structures. As to bilateral relations, the most significant were Armenia's contacts with Georgia and Iran. If we compare the assumptions of the strategy with the policy pursued by Armenia after 2007, it is clear that the measures taken are in line with the provisions of the document. By the end of 2016, the most serious threat to Armenia – the Nagorno-Karabakh issue – remained unresolved. Russia reinforced its position as Armenia's strategic ally. The talks conducted between Armenia and the NATO are of little significance in view of the obligations assumed by Armenia. The same goes for the talks with the European Union after Armenia's withdrawal from signing the association agreement, accession to the Eurasian Economic Union on 01 January 2015 and signing bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation.

В статье разбирается вопрос, чем руководствовались ведущие политики и военные Германской империи в оценке большевистского этапа Российской революции, и делается вывод о том, что на первом месте стояло стремление обеспечить выход России из первой мировой войны и более широком плане – ее исключение из числа великих держав. Страх германских правящих кругов перед «мировым большевизмом» был «продуктом для внутреннего потребления» и не оказывал заметного влияния на принятие стратегических решений во внешней политике. В свою очередь для советского правительства на первом месте стояли вопросы сохранения собственной власти внутри страны, сколько-нибудь заметной поддержки левых сил в Германии вплоть до осени 1918 г. оно не оказывало. ; The article deals with the question of what guided the leading politicians and military men of the German Empire in estimation of the Bolshevik stage of the Russian Revolution and concludes that the main desire was to ensure Russia's withdrawal from the First World War and more broadly its exclusion from among the great powers . The fear of the German ruling circles over "world Bolshevism" was a "product for domestic consumption" and did not have a noticeable influence on the adoption of strategic decisions in foreign policy. However for the Soviet government in the first place were the questions of preserving their own power within the country and that's why it didn't provide any noticeable support for the leftist forces in Germany until the autumn of 1918.

Namen tega magistrskega dela je raziskati, kaj se dogaja z moderno nacionalno državo in konceptom suverenosti in samoodločbe. V svetu in v Evropi je danes vse več narodov, ki si želijo samostojnosti oziroma odcepitve bodisi od držav, v katerih živijo, bodisi od naddržav, katerim pripadajo. Najbolj aktualen primer je izstop Združenega kraljestva Velike Britanije in Severne Irske iz Evropske unije (EU) (brexit ). To bo prvi izstop iz EU, saj do uvedbe Lizbonske pogodbe leta 2009 možnost izstopa države članice iz EU ni bila nikjer jasno urejena. Po uvedbi izstopne klavzule pa ni več nobenega dvoma, ali je izstop iz EU mogoč ali ne. Zato magistrsko delo podrobno analizira, kaj bo prinesla sprožitev člena 50 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji (PEU) in razčleni postopek izstopa Združenega kraljestva iz EU. Osredotoči se na bodoče odnose med Združenim kraljestvom in EU ter predstavi različne možne oblike sodelovanja med Združenim kraljestvom in EU po izstopu ; razišče vpliv referenduma o neodvisnosti na odnose in razmerja med različnimi skupnostmi in narodi znotraj Združenega kraljestva ; prihodnost Združenega kraljestva kot zvezne države in ponovna prizadevanja Škotov za državnost in neodvisnost ter morebitno združitev Severne Irske z južno sosedo Irsko. Vleče vzporednice med "osamosvajanjem" Britanije, odcepitvijo Slovenije od bivše Socialistične federativne republike Jugoslavije , odhodom danske avtonomne pokrajine Grenlandije iz EU ter primerja njihove izkušnje in uporabo pravice do samoodločbe. Delo torej obravnava eno izmed trenutno najbolj aktualnih tem na svetovni ravni, ki bo nedvomno vplivala na usodo in razvoj številnih narodov. ; The purpose of my master's thesis is to examine what is happening with the modern national state and the concept of sovereignty and self-determination. In Europe, and globally, there is an historic trend of nations seeking independence or secession, either from the states in which they live, or from the "super-states" of which they are part of. The most recent example is the exit of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union (brexit ). This will be the first exit from the EU, since the launch of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and will set out clear direction on how a member state can leave the EU. After the introduction of the exit clause, a route to exit EU was made available to member states who wanted to reconsider their membership. This master's thesis will take a closer look at the consequences of triggering Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the process through which the UK will pursue its withdrawal from the EU. It will focus on future relations between the UK and the EU and present various possible forms of cooperation between the UK and the EU after the exit. Master's thesis will also present an argumentation-based approach to assess the Brexit's impact on the nations leaving in the UK ; the future of the UK as a federal state, and the Scottish re-efforts for statehood and independence and the possible unification of Northern Ireland with its southern neighbour Ireland. Last but not least, will identify parallels between Britain's "independence" and the secession of Slovenia from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the departure of the Danish autonomous province of Greenland from the EU. By comparing their use of the right to self-determination, we will see whether Britain can learn anything from Greenland and Slovenia. The master's thesis therefore focuses on dealing with one of the most important issues of our time which will impact development of many nations.

Cover -- Outline Contents -- Detailed Contents -- List of Boxes, Figures, Images and Tables -- List of Abbreviations -- Preface: The Fascination and Frustration of Studying a Key Institution -- Part I: The European Council: Overview and History -- 1 Introduction: The Many Faces of the European Council -- In the spotlight -- A look at the legal texts: some basic institutional features -- The real world: activities, agreements and acts -- Shifting the institutional balance: trends in the EU's architecture -- Inside the European Council: the puzzle of consensus formation -- Conclusion: puzzles for a hybrid institution -- 2 Multiple Approaches for Understanding a Contested Institution Three Models -- The presidency model: at the top of the institutional hierarchy -- The council model: towards communitarisation -- The fusion model: the European Council as the dominant multilevel player -- Conclusion: a lively debate -- 3 Pre-History: The Birth of Institutionalised Summitry -- Historical perspectives: from a long-term perspective towards a close-up view -- Emergence: reasons for institutionalised summitry -- Establishment: the making of a new institution -- Conclusion: an enabling compromise -- 4 History: Generations of Leaders and the Institutional Trajectory -- Five generations of leaders -- The institutional trajectory of the European Council: incremental evolution to full treaty status -- Conclusion: patterns of continuity -- Part II: The Role of the European Council within the EU Architecture -- 5 Political and Procedural Leadership: General Functions and Specific Powers -- Functions in the EU's policy cycle -- Elective functions: the power as an electoral body -- Institutional and procedural arrangements: the power of incremental engineering -- Procedures for suspension and withdrawal: the power of exclusion.

The USA considers missile potentials of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea as the main sources of threats to their national security. In the early 2000s following the withdrawal from the Soviet-American ABM Treaty the US began to deploy a global ballistic missile defense system to protect their "homeland, US forces abroad and its allies" from potential and real threats. The set of basic elements of a multi-layer ballistic missile defense is generally the same, its architecture is always adapted to the local conditions of the regions of deployment and specific tasks. Their common designation is the ability to work as subsystems within an integrated, global in scope antiballistic missile defense system controlled by the United States. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is actively engaging its regional allies Australia, South Korea and Japan in a joint effort to build-up ABM capabilities while simultaneously increasing its military-strategic presence in the region. Moscow strongly opposes the program considering it as potential threat to the effectiveness of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and undermining strategic stability and considers emergence the ballistic missile subsystems in Europe and the Asian-Pacific Region as a direct threat to its security. US ABM policy provokes the accelerated development by China and the DPRK of ballistic missile delivery systems, encourages Russia to create new weapon systems that are guaranteed to be able to overcome any existing and future missile defense.

Treaty law and its relationship with the legal system of the European Union are the subjects of this article, which analyses them in the light of Brexit and the agreements - simple withdrawal agreement and mixed agreement on future relations - that will govern the exit of the United Kingdom. In particular, it analyses the binding nature of such agreements for the Union and for its Member States, with special reference to Spain, their hierarchy in the system of sources and the possible direct effect of their obligations. The article also seeks to explore how principles applicable to these problems would be relevant to other agreements concluded by the Union and its Member States: international administrative agreements and non-normative agreements. ; El Derecho de los tratados y sus relaciones con el ordenamiento jurídico de la Unión Europea son los temas de este artículo, que los analiza a la luz del Brexit y de los acuerdos -acuerdo simple de retirada y mixto de relaciones futuras- que regirán la salida del Reino Unido. Se analiza en particular la obligatoriedad de tales acuerdos para la Unión y para los Estados que la componen, con especial referencia a España, su jerarquía en el sistema de fuentes y el posible efecto directo de sus obligaciones. El artículo pretende también estudiar cómo principios aplicables a esos problemas resultarían relevantes para otros acuerdos que celebra la Unión y sus Estados miembros: los acuerdos internacionales administrativos y los acuerdos no normativos.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was reduced from the role of a global hegemon to that of a regional hegemon. As the regional hegemon, Russia was responsible for creating a regional order that was nested within the global order. However, since the Soviet Union had collapsed, it could not be assumed that Russia would create a regional order that was compatible with the global order. Would Russia create a regional order that was incompatible with the global order, and further, would Russia be a dissatisfied state that would challenge US hegemony? Using network analysis, I discover that Russia created a regional order that was compatible with the global order. In other words, Russia did not directly challenge the global order. More specifically, Russia accepted the global order that existed at the end of the Cold War. Providing that the global order remained static, Russia would not challenge that order. However, US actions following the collapse of the Soviet Union such as the expansion ofnatoand the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are interpreted by Russia as a dynamic change in the global order. The Ukrainian crisis further exacerbated the wedge that had developed between the United States and Russia. It has further isolated Russia, destroyed the regional order nested within the global order, and ensured that Russia fully became a dissatisfied state looking to challenge US hegemony. Russia will now turn to China to try to challenge US hegemony.

The article argues that consequence of Brexit bring specifi c costs for both of the partners: EU as well as the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the procedure of Brexit brings about also some positive aspects. The procedure itself points at the fact how European integration is important for the economy and development of each member state. The procedure helps to restructure the future Multiannual Financial Framework after 2020, it also shows that it is easier to negotiate conditions of trade being represented by the Commission than doing it individually in relations between two states. Separate problem is ascribed to deterrence of applying similar ideas in states, which had followed some of the Brexit visions and mobilized by them politically some of the citizens (Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland). All such conclusions can be drawn while discussing the process, which prolongs and it is impossible to guess how fi nally it will end for the UK as well for the EU as far as their mutual economic relations are concerned. It is still possible to withdraw from the article 50 of the treaty, it is possible to accept the negotiated conditions of the withdrawal treaty or to leave the EU without an agreement. Still all mentioned solutions are possible and can be applied. The choice of one of them is a big unknown. Lack of the Brexit agreement will cause big costs for both of the partners: the EU and the UK. ; Artykuł ma na celu dowieść, że skutki brexitu niosą określone koszty zarówno dla UE, jak i Wielkiej Brytanii. Sama procedura brexitu wskazuje znaczenie integracji europejskiej dla rozwoju każdego z państw UE, która wspomaga proces restrukturyzacji przyszłych Wieloletnich Ram Finansowych, wskazuje, że łatwiej jest negocjować warunki handlu, mając za reprezentanta Komisję, niż na zasadzie indywidualnej – państwo z państwem. Osobny problem wiąże się z działaniem na rzecz odstraszania od podobnych koncepcji państw, w których naśladownictwo "brexitu" stało się tematem mobilizującym politycznie (Dania, Finlandia, Francja, Grecja, Niemcy, Polska, Węgry, Włochy). Brexit się przeciąga, jednak trudno przewidzieć, jak się zakończy dla UE i Wielkiej Brytanii, jeśli chodzi o przyszłe wzajemne relacje. Nadal możliwe jest cofnięcie decyzji o uruchomieniu artykułu 50 traktatu, czy zaakceptowanie wynegocjowanej umowy lub wyjście bez umowy, co oznaczałoby bardzo duże koszty dla obu stron.

Статья посвящена анализу взглядов известного американского дипломата и историка Джорджа Ф. Кеннана относительно Брест-Литовского мирного договора и его влияния на завершение Первой мировой войны. Выдвинутые Кеннаном положения о сущностном содержании Брестского мира, доминантах внешней политики большевиков, месте договора в истории международных отношений до сих пор являются классическими в американской историографии, посвященной проблемам Первой мировой войны и советской дипломатии. В работах «Россия выходит из войны», «Россия и Запад при Ленине и Сталине», «Советская внешняя политика, 1917-1941 гг.» Кеннан рассматривал Брест-Литовский договор в контексте внутриполитической ситуации в России и событий на фронтах Первой мировой войны. Считая, что выдвинутая большевиками в Декрете о мире идея «мира без аннексий и контрибуций» была нереалистична и не могла стать основой для многосторонних переговоров, он все же сожалел об упущенной возможности завершить Первую мировую войну в конце 1917 г. В своих размышлениях исследователь обращал особое внимание на реакцию западных союзников на подписание Брестского договора и выход России из войны. По мнению Кеннана, после подписания договора сотрудничество между странами Антанты значительно усилилось, особенно взаимодействие США с европейскими державами. Вместе с тем в попытках удержать Россию в войне союзные государства использовали все возможные средства, включая поддержку антибольшевистских сил и идею военной интервенции. В этом Кеннан усматривал источник беспрецедентной враждебности между Россией и Западом, растянувшейся на несколько десятилетий. ; The paper is devoted to the study of the views by famous American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan about the Brest-Litovsk Treaty's significance and its influence for the completion of the First World War. Kennan's assertions about Brest Peace's essential content, the dominants in foreign policy of the Bolshevik government, Treaty's role in history of international relations are still a classical in American historiography on the problems of the First World War and Soviet diplomacy. In his books "Russia Leaves the War", "Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin", "Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941" Kennan considered the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in the context of the Russian political situation and developments in the First World War. Kennan believed that the Bolsheviks idea about peace without annexations and indemnities, which they have put forward in the Decree on Peace, was unrealistic and unsuitable for multilateral negotiations, but he regretted about the loss opportunity to end the War in late 1917. In his reflections Kennan paid special attention on the Allied reaction to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and Russian withdrawal from the War. In his opinion, the cooperation between the Allies increased, especially cooperation between USA and European countries after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. However trying to keep Russia in the War the Allies used all means, including support for the anti-Bolsheviks and the idea of military intervention in Russia. In this Kennan saw the source of hostility between Russian and the West, which existed for few decades.

Following the decision of the British referendum on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) plans to exit the European Union (EU). Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty was invoked at the end of March 2017 and the UK will officially leave the single market and customs union in March 2019. Brexit negotiations have proven difficult due to diverging positions of the two partners on many issues, such as freedom of movement, financial contributions and the potential re-emergence of a tough border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Despite the successfully negotiated Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, there is still con¬siderable political uncertainty about the final EU-UK deal. Regardless of the final outcome of the negotiations, Brexit implies fundamental changes in the British trade regime concerning third countries. This starts with a negotiation of national terms of access for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and extends to renegotiation of the numerous EU free trade agreements. Moreover, the UK will no longer be part of the European Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) or the Everything But Arms (EBA) treaty, which allow vulnerable developing countries to pay fewer or no duties on their exports to the EU. The Economic Partnership Agree-ments (EPAs) between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries will not apply to the UK either. While the negative effects of Brexit on the UK and EU are in the limelight, the implications for third countries receive less attention. This paper puts the spotlight on these often-overlooked issues by presenting new findings on Brexit implications for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and discussing policy recommendations. Developing countries with close ties to the UK will suffer from Brexit as import duties are once again imposed. In particular, 49 of the world's poorest countries presently benefit from preferential treatment that covers 99% of all products under the EBA agreement. Although these countries account for only 1.15% of the UK's imports, the share of their exports to the UK exceeds 35% in apparel, 21% in textiles and 9% in sugar (calculations based on the UN Comtrade data for 2013-2015). Our findings show that losing these preferences together with the UK's withdrawal from the EU may cause EBA countries' GDPs to fall by -0.01% to -1.08%. Our simulations also indicate that the highest losses will occur in Cambodia and Malawi, where dependence on the UK market is strong. Moreover, Brexit may cause the number of those living in extreme poverty (PPP $1.90 a day) to rise by nearly 1.7 million in all EBA countries. These are conservative estimates of Brexit's negative impacts; they do not take into account the addi¬tional implications of uncertainty, depreciation of the pound sterling, reduced aid spending, remittances and investments. The UK must act to mitigate the adverse effects on economically vulnerable countries. Such action may include replicating existing EU treaties that grant preferential access to goods from LDCs, creating a more development-friendly UK trade policy with preferential access to services imports and cumulative rules of origin, as well as offering better-targeted aid for trade initiatives. The EU could also support LDCs by implementing liberal cumulative rules of origin and applying its preferential treatment partly to goods with a low value-added content from considered countries. In addition, developing countries should diversify their export destinations and industries as well as engage in economic transformation that makes them less dependent on UK trade, aid and foreign direct investment (FDI).

Following the decision of the British referendum on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) plans to exit the European Union (EU). Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty was invoked at the end of March 2017 and the UK will officially leave the single market and customs union in March 2019. Brexit negotiations have proven difficult due to diverging positions of the two partners on many issues, such as freedom of movement, financial contributions and the potential re-emergence of a tough border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Despite the successfully negotiated Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, there is still con¬siderable political uncertainty about the final EU-UK deal.Regardless of the final outcome of the negotiations, Brexit implies fundamental changes in the British trade regime concerning third countries. This starts with a negotiation of national terms of access for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and extends to renegotiation of the numerous EU free trade agreements. Moreover, the UK will no longer be part of the European Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) or the Everything But Arms (EBA) treaty, which allow vulnerable developing countries to pay fewer or no duties on their exports to the EU. The Economic Partnership Agree-ments (EPAs) between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries will not apply to the UK either.While the negative effects of Brexit on the UK and EU are in the limelight, the implications for third countries receive less attention. This paper puts the spotlight on these often-overlooked issues by presenting new findings on Brexit implications for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and discussing policy recommendations.Developing countries with close ties to the UK will suffer from Brexit as import duties are once again imposed.In particular, 49 of the world's poorest countries presently benefit from preferential treatment that covers 99% of all products under the EBA agreement. Although these countries account for only 1.15% of the UK's imports, the share of their exports to the UK exceeds 35% in apparel, 21% in textiles and 9% in sugar (calculations based on the UN Comtrade data for 2013-2015). Our findings show that losing these preferences together with the UK's withdrawal from the EU may cause EBA countries' GDPs to fall by -0.01% to -1.08%. Our simulations also indicate that the highest losses will occur in Cambodia and Malawi, where dependence on the UK market is strong. Moreover, Brexit may cause the number of those living in extreme poverty (PPP $1.90 a day) to rise by nearly 1.7 million in all EBA countries. These are conservative estimates of Brexit's negative impacts; they do not take into account the addi¬tional implications of uncertainty, depreciation of the pound sterling, reduced aid spending, remittances and investments.The UK must act to mitigate the adverse effects on economically vulnerable countries. Such action may include replicating existing EU treaties that grant preferential access to goods from LDCs, creating a more development-friendly UK trade policy with preferential access to services imports and cumulative rules of origin, as well as offering better-targeted aid for trade initiatives. The EU could also support LDCs by implementing liberal cumulative rules of origin and applying its preferential treatment partly to goods with a low value-added content from considered countries.In addition, developing countries should diversify their export destinations and industries as well as engage in economic transformation that makes them less dependent on UK trade, aid and foreign direct investment (FDI).