Suchergebnisse

Healthcare service is a highly trusted field but necessitates a trust relationship with service users. In this field, medical social workers are crucial service providers. In this study, exploratory research was conducted to investigate the meaning of trust from the perspective of medical social workers in Taiwan. The findings are presented as follows: (a) relationship-based trust, (b) trust in the medical system and (c) the potential role for trust and anti-oppressive practices. According to the research results a conclusion was deduced and practical recommendations are proposed.

The article explores some of the assumptions behind the current valence of the notion of trust and in particular its entanglement in discourses of social robustness, the management and reporting of (corporate) knowledge, and its underlying culture and systems of responsibility. It unfolds by contrasting classic and contemporary anthropological work on cultures of suspicion, culpability and spiritual ambiguity with the new vocabulary of capitalist corporate ethics. Finally, the argument examines the work that relationships do when moving in and out of the occult, and contrasts it with the kind of temporal work that capitalism demands from relationships to remain diaphanous. If public trust functions as the political epistemology of neoliberal society, an anthropological theory of trust ought perhaps to reaffirm instead our trust in anthropological theory and comparison. ; Peer reviewed

The Social Security Trust fund is set to run out in a few years. Who cares? Is the total US Federal debt $31,456,554,630,496.28, including Treasury debt held by the Social Security trust fund and other agencies?  or is it "only" $24,629,050,125,670.81 held by the public? (Source.)I've been mulling these questions over, prodded by conversations with some colleagues. The "trust fund" exists because for a while, Social Security taxes were larger than Social Security payments. Social Security used the extras to buy Treasury debt. Now there are fewer workers, more retirees and more generous benefits, so Social Security taxes are smaller than payments. Social Security sells off its "trust fund." And it seems we're in trouble when the "trust fund" runs out.  But that's not how it works at all. Treasury debt is not an asset like a stock or bond, or Uncle Scrooge's pool of gold coins. Treasury debt is a claim against future income taxes. Cashing in Treasury debt just  means paying for benefits with income taxes. The ups and downs of the trust fund just reflect a change in how we finance spending. While payroll taxes > social security spending, which was the case until 2007, then payroll taxes are financing other spending. When payroll taxes < social security spending, then income taxes or increases in debt are financing social security spending, which (graph below) was the case after 2008.* The trust fund just adds up this change over time. But exhausting the trust fund is, in this view, really irrelevant. source: CBOThat doesn't mean we can all go to sleep, for two reasons. First, when payroll taxes < Social Security outlays, and the trust fund is winding down, then income taxes or additional public debt must finance the shortfall. The government has to spend less on other things, raise income tax receipts, or borrow which means raising future taxes. And, per the graph, the numbers are not small. 1% of GDP is $230 billion. The extra strain on income taxes, other spending, or debt, happens right now, when the trust fund is positive but decreasing. Zero matters only because by law,  when the trust fund goes to zero, Social Security payments must be automatically cut to match Social Security taxes. That's the sudden drop in the graph. The program was set up as if  the trust fund were buying stocks and bonds, real assets, and would not lay claim on income tax revenues. But it was not; social security taxes were used to cover other spending, and now income taxes must start to pay social security benefits. What happens when the trust fund runs out, then?  Congress has a choice: automatically cut benefits, as shown, or change the law so that the government can pay Social Security benefits from income taxes, or, more realistically, by issuing ever more debt, until the bond vigilantes come. (Or raise payroll taxes, or reform the whole mess.) I bet on change the law. So what's the right measure of debt? It's conventional to look only at debt in public hands. But there is a case to look at the total debt, i.e. including the trust funds. Those are the total claims against the income  tax. Looking at it this way, however, one could also go on and count unfunded future social security benefits as a debt -- the present value of the difference between the two lines above, which leads to immense numbers, per Larry Kotlikoff. I have usually not considered the present value of unfunded promises as "debt," because Congress can change the payments at any time. Changing debt repayment to the public is a default, with financial and legal consequences; changing social security benefits is legislation. You can't sell your future social security benefits as you can sell your treasury debt. The trust fund is half way on this scale. What would be the consequence of a haircut or rescheduling of trust fund debt? Would that trigger something like cross-default clauses in corporate debt? I don't know. The event is unlikely anyway. The left pocket defaulting on the right pocket doesn't help pay the bills. The trust fund is certainly unlikely to run, and its debt is not used as collateral in financial transactions. As a somewhat meaningless accounting identity, it's a lot less "debt" than the debt in public hands. I think this all goes to remind us that paying off the existing debt is not the US central fiscal problem. The central problem is vast unfunded future promises. Defaulting or inflating away current debt does nothing to fund those promises. I look forward to comments on this one, especialy if there are standard views on these apparently simple questions that I'm not aware of. *In the end,  payroll taxes + income & other taxes + increase in public debt = Social Security spending + other spending. The trust fund nets out. 

Abstract
Trust in the media has become an increasingly important issue in communication research. Traditional credibility research and modern media skepticism studies have bred a multiplicity of empirical findings illustrating the attitudes of the recipients toward the mass media, possible reasons for trust or skepticism, and possible consequences of media trust for the individual and society. However, the psychological causes of trust in the media have not attracted much attention in communication research. This is especially true for personality traits such as individual level of interpersonal trust, which, as a global attitude, might be considered as one possible reason for the development of further trust relationships. In this paper it is assumed that the individual level of generalized social trust is one possible reason for the development of trust in the media. It is assumed that people tending to generally trust their fellow humans also express high levels of trust in the media and in other institutions. Based on a representative telephonic survey of the German population, it was found that there are positive correlations between interpersonal trust, trust in the media, and trust in other institutions.

Trust in banks is considered essential for an effective financial system, yet little is known about what determines trust in banks. Only a handful of single-country studies discuss the topic, so this paper aims to fill the gap by providing a cross-country analysis on the level and determinants of trust in banks. Using World Values Survey data covering 52 countries during the period 2010–2014, we observe large cross-country differences in trust in banks and confirm the influence of several sociodemographic indicators. Our main findings include: women tend to trust banks more than men; trust in banks tends to increase with income, but decrease with age and education; access to television enhances trust, while internet access erodes trust; and religious, political, and economic values may affect trust in banks. Notably, religious individuals tend to put greater trust in banks, but differences are observed across denominations. The holding of pro-market economic views is also associated with greater trust in banks.

International audience ; Trust in banks is considered essential for an effective financial system, yet little is known about what determines trust in banks. Only a handful of single-country studies discuss the topic, so this paper aims to fill the gap by providing a cross-country analysis on the level and determinants of trust in banks. Using World Values Survey data covering 52 countries during the period 2010–2014, we observe large cross-country differences in trust in banks and confirm the influence of several sociodemographic indicators. Our main findings include: women tend to trust banks more than men; trust in banks tends to increase with income, but decrease with age and education; and access to television enhances trust, while internet access erodes trust. Additionally, religious, political, and economic values affect trust in banks. Notably, religious individuals tend to put greater trust in banks, but differences are observed across denominations. The holding of pro-market economic views is also associated with greater trust in banks.

SummaryIn this article we examine the link between relational trust and general trust in the context of large‐scale social and economic transformations such as those that have occurred in Poland and Russia. We argue that trust plays an important role in interpersonal relationships, but in more impersonal dealings, as in economic life, reliable and impartial institutions that create binding rules and ensure their enforcement are more important. These provide a stable framework for exchange and make it safe for people to take risks involving others they do not know directly. Relational trust, however, may be critical in situations in which institutions are weak or corrupt. And, even if economic relationships are constrained by carefully devised contracts, there remains residual uncertainty that can be resolved only by relying on trust.. If networks involving trust relationships are the dominant means for engaging in exchange, however, exchange is limited to those whom one knows personally or is linked to through close ties, and opportunities for broader exchange are constrained, which may retard the transition to a more open economy.

Small and removed from the Spanish mainland, the Enclave of Ceuta has always depended on flows of goods and labour out of the Moroccan hinterland, with individuals from different ethnic and religious groups forming informal, flexible and personal economic bonds based on mutual 'confianza' (trust). Since its entry into the European Union in 1986, the Spanish government has erected a border-wall around the enclave, and introduced new migration policies branding many informal workers within its borders as a threat to Spanish society. Based on my preliminary months of research, this paper compares the Ceutan context with other research recently conducted on the topics of migration and borders in the Mediterranean region. It brings into focus key theoretical issues and assumptions that constantly emerge in such literature, particularly regarding the role of 'a-cultural' personal ties between migrants and locals in undermining State categories and ideology. This paper observes how the Ceutan case encourages us to expand our focuses and consequently problematise our understanding of crucial concepts such as 'trust' and 'integration'.

Although trust is a lively area of research, it is rarely investigated in countries outside of commonly available cross-national public-opinion datasets. In an effort to fill this empirical void and to draw conclusions concerning the general determinants of trust, the current article employs detailed survey data from a frequently overlooked Central Asian country, Uzbekistan, to test the relationship between particularized trust and demographic traits previously identified as influential. While a number of Uzbek demographic characteristics coincide with previously identified determinants of trust, age and education yield negative effects not previously found. Interestingly, individual-level demographic variables become insignificant when controlling for regional, religious, and linguistic variation. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical implications.

Ziel dieser Studie war es, die Einstellung gegenüber Datenaustausch- und Datenerhebungsorganisationen vor und nach der Einführung der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO) der EU von Personen in Deutschland zu messen. Die Daten stammen aus einer dreistufigen Split-Panel-Webbefragung unter Personen ab 18 Jahren in Deutschland, die aus einem deutschen, Nicht-Wahrscheinlichkeits-Online-Panel rekrutiert wurden. Im April 2018 (vor dem Inkrafttreten der DSGVO) füllten 2.095 Teilnehmer den Welle 1-Fragebogen über Gerätebesitz, Social Media-Nutzung, Vertrauen in verschiedene Datenerfassungsorganisationen, Bereitschaft zum Datenaustausch, allgemeines Vertrauen, Bewusstsein und Wissen über die DSGVO sowie Datenschutzbelange aus. Im Juli und Oktober 2018 (nach Inkrafttreten der DSGVO) wurden die Befragten aus den früheren Wellen zu einer zweiten und dritten Webumfrage eingeladen, die die meisten Fragen der ersten Welle wiederholte. Zusätzlich zu den Teilnehmern aus den früheren Wellen wurden auch neue Teilnehmer zu den Wellen 2 und 3 eingeladen. Insgesamt 2.046 (Welle 2) und 2.117 (Welle 3) Teilnehmer füllten den Fragebogen der folgenden Wellen aus. 1.269 Teilnehmer nahmen an allen drei Wellen teil.

Themen:

Welle 1

Besitz von Smartphone, Handy, PC, Tablet und/oder E-Book-Reader; Social-Media-Nutzung: Account mit Benutzernahme und Passwort bei ausgewählten Anbietern (Google, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Xing); Vertrauen in Institutionen (Google, Facebook, Bundesamt für Statistik, Universitätsforscher) im Hinblick auf den Schutz persönlicher Daten und Begründung diese Einschätzung; Wahrscheinlichkeitsskala im Hinblick auf den Schutz persönlicher Daten bei den zuvor genannten Institutionen und Gründe für diese Einschätzung; Einverständnis mit dem Zuspielen persönlicher Daten der Sozialversicherungsträger zu den Umfragedaten; allgemeines Personenvertrauen; Bekanntheit der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO) der EU; Wissenstest: Ziele der DSGVO (offen); Gefühl verletzter Privatsphäre durch folgende Institutionen: Google, Facebook, Staatliche Behörden, Universitätsforscher; allgemeine Datenschutzbedenken.

Welle 2:

Besitz von Smartphone, Handy, PC, Tablet und/oder E-Book-Reader; Social-Media-Nutzung: Account mit Benutzernahme und Passwort bei ausgewählten Anbietern (Google, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Xing); Vertrauen in Institutionen (Google, Facebook, Bundesamt für Statistik, Universitätsforscher) im Hinblick auf den Schutz persönlicher Daten; allgemeines Personenvertrauen; Bekanntheit der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO) der EU; Wissenstest: Ziele der DSGVO (offen); Einverständnis mit dem Speichern verschiedener persönlicher Daten durch Facebook bzw. Google (Name, E-Mail Adresse, Wohnadresse, Geburtsdatum, Telefonnummer, Einkommen, Familienstand, Anzahl der Kinder, aktueller Standort, Internetbrowserverlauf, Accountnamen von anderen sozialen Medien und von Dritten erhaltene Daten); Gefühl der Verletzung der Privatsphäre durch folgende Institutionen: Google, Facebook, Staatliche Behörden, Universitätsforscher; allgemeine Datenschutzbedenken.

Welle 3:

Besitz von Smartphone, Handy, PC, Tablet und/oder E-Book-Reader; Social-Media-Nutzung: Account mit Benutzernahme und Passwort bei ausgewählten Anbietern (Google, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Xing); Vertrauen in Institutionen (Google, Facebook, Bundesamt für Statistik, Universitätsforscher) im Hinblick auf den Schutz persönlicher Daten; allgemeines Personenvertrauen; Bekanntheit der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO) der EU; Wissenstest: Ziele der DSGVO (offen); Besorgnis über Privatsphäre im Allgemeinen; Verständlichkeit von auszugweise wiedergegebenen Inhalten der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO) der EU (bzw. zu Fluggastrechten bei Nichtbeförderung und Flugverspätungen); geschätzte Popularität von Smartphones (Anteil der Smartphonebesitzer je 100 erwachsene Deutsche); Wiederholung der Frage nach dem Vertrauen in Datenerfassungsunternehmen (Google, Facebook) im Hinblick auf den Schutz personenbezogener Daten sowie zum allgemeinen Personenvertrauen; Bereitschaft zum Datenaustausch durch Google (bzw. Facebook oder das Statistische Bundesamt) für Forschungszwecke (bzw. für kommerzielle Zwecke).

Demographie: Geschlecht; Alter (Geburtsjahr); Bundesland; Schulbildung; berufliche Qualifikation.

Zusätzlich verkodet wurde: laufende Nummer; Befragten ID; Experimentalgruppen DSGVO Info; Dauer (Reaktionszeit in Sekunden); Gerätetyp, mit dem der Fragebogen ausgefüllt wurde.

Der Fragebogen beinhaltete auch zwei Experimente, eines über die Auswirkungen von DSGVO-bezogenen Informationen auf das Vertrauen in Datenerfassungsunternehmen und eines über den Komfort des Datenaustauschs mit verschiedenen Unternehmen aus verschiedenen Gründen.