Litwa, Łotwa i Estonia są jedynymi państwami wchodzącymi w skład byłego ZSRR, które współcześnie przynależą zarówno do Unii Europejskiej, jak i do Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego, przez co zajmują specjalne miejsce na mapie interesów swoich wschodnich sąsiadów. Praca ma na celu wykazać, że wojna informacyjnawymierzona w państwa bałtyckie jest elementem i przejawem szerszej strategii Federacji Rosyjskiej, wykraczającej daleko poza wspomniany region. Na podstawie analizy kilkuset przekazów medialnych z lat 2016–2020, wyciągnięto wnioski na temat ostatnich trendów i metod prowadzenia kampanii dezinformacyjnych, jak i przedstawiono główne narracje na płaszczyźnie wspólnotowej, politycznej, społecznej, historycznej i gospodarczej. ; Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are the only countries that were part of the USSR, which today belong to both the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, therefore they occupy a special place on the map of interests of their eastern neigbours. The intention of this article is to demonstrate that the information warfare activity against the Baltic States is an element and expression of Russia's broad strategy, which extend far beyond this region. Based on the analysis of several hundred 2016–2020 media covereges, the conclusions were drawn about the latest trends and techniques for conducting disinformation campaigns, as well as the main narratives at the community, political, social, historical and economical level.
The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.
The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.
The aim of the article is to demonstrate how science and researchcooperation may help to reintegrate the Baltic region in the 21st century withthe participation of Russia. This is done through the analysis of documentsand strategies of Baltic Sea regionalism in the context of the regional knowledgeregime. Attention is paid to different positionalities of the regional actorsand their narratives. The theoretical framework is secured by an analysis ofcritical junctures drawing on case studies from the years 1989-91 and 2014 andthe subsequent reconfiguration of the power / knowledge nexus. The analysisshows that this reconfiguration actively contributes to creating and changingthe content and context of the Baltic Sea regionalism as based on new symbolic,economic, and political capitals. The conclusion points to the potentialof Russia's involvement in the co-creation of the regional knowledge regimeand defines the conditions and methods of possible cooperation.
The aim of the paper was to compare the situation of the Polish minority in the three bordering countries: Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus. Despite similar historical circumstances contemporary groups of Polish minority in the lands of former Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Polish Livonia living in the different socio-economic and political conditioning. This situation affecting their relations with other ethnic groups and state authorities. All of the researched areas – Vilnius region in Lithuania, Latgale region in Latvia, Hrodna region in Belarus – are multicultural. In all, owing to special circumstances of Eastern Slavic-Baltic ethnic borderland, a compact Polish ethnic area was formed. Despite the deportation and postwar emigration of Poles and despite that areas inhabited by them belong to three different states, the Polish population still represents a significant proportion of the population, affecting the local socio-cultural and political life. The analysis of census data and maps indicates the progressive decrease of the Polish population and retreat of Polish ethnic area. However, recent censuses show the vary – depending on the region – processes. In Lithuania the stabilization of the ethnical structure of the population is observed. Despite the hostile attitude of Lithuanian nationalists and state authorities that often remain under their influence, Polish population takes advantage of the civil rule of law to consolidate its assets. In Belarus further melting of Polish ethnic area is observed, associated with a decrease in the number of Poles, both in absolute and relative terms. This can be combined with both the difficult situation of the Polish population in the Soviet period (no schools and other Polish institutions), and the current socio-political situation in Belarus. Under Lukashenka's dictatorial rule the Polish minority action is merely tolerated. Government support the policy of the tsarist and Soviet authorities, under which local Poles were considered as regional (Catholic) branch of the Belarusian people. Paradoxically, the relatively best situation concern the Polish population in Latvia, where Polish community is the least numerous, both in absolute and relative terms. The clear revival of Polish socio-cultural, and even increasing participation of Poles in some areas, can be observed. The Latvian authorities are positively oriented to the Polish socio-cultural initiatives, seeing the Polish movement as a counterweight to the demographic dominance of East Slavic population (Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians) in the south-eastern part of the country. ; Pomimo podobnych uwarunkowań historycznych mniejszość polska, zamieszkująca tereny dawnego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego i Inflant Polskich, w zależności od miejsca zamieszkania (Litwa, Łotwa, Białoruś) znajduje się w odmiennej sytuacji społeczno-gospodarczej i polityczno- -ustrojowej. Odciska się to na relacjach mniejszości polskiej z innymi grupami etnicznymi oraz władzami państwowymi. Analiza sytuacji sugeruje, iż pod wieloma względami najlepsze warunki dla pielęgnowania swojej odrębności (pomimo niewielkiej liczebności) ma mniejszość polska na Łotwie. Na przeciwległym krańcu, choć najliczniejsza, znajduje się mniejszość polska na Białorusi.
In theory, the art of war can meet different approach to the characteristics of the phenomenon of war and peace. Until recently the phenomenon of war and peace could be compared to a magnet, creating a single entity, but having two opposite poles. The new realities of social, economic, political and military relationships between the phenomena of war and peace can be compared to the spectrum of visible light, where peace and war still represent opposite poles, but in between there is the phenomenon (concept) intermediate. Study aims to analyze the situation in the Persian Gulf in the twenty-first century. The article consists of three parts. The first presents the results of research on the origin of the conflict and the assumed political and military objectives. In the second, the conclusions of the Iraqi Freedom operation have been formulated in the context of the goals achieved and their impact on peace-building in the Gulf region. In the last one, an attempt was made to answer the question whether the military intervention of coalition forces in Iraq has led to a solution of the crisis, or rather it has been the beginning of the current problems Europe is facing. ; W teorii operacji wojskowych, sztuce wojennej oraz naukach politycznych można spotkać różne podejścia do pokoju i wojny. Do niedawna jeszcze oba zjawiska porównywano do magnesu, tworzącego jedną całość, posiadającego jednak dwa przeciwstawne bieguny. W nowych realiach społecznych, ekonomicznych, politycznych i militarnych wzajemne relacje pomiędzy wojną i pokojem można porównać do widma światła widzialnego, gdzie oba nadal stanowią przeciwstawne bieguny, ale pomiędzy nimi pojawiły się zjawiska (pojęcia) pośrednie. Celem artykułu jest analiza sytuacji konfliktowej w Zatoce Perskiej w XXI. Artykuł składa się z trzech części. W pierwszej przedstawiono wyniki badań dotyczących genezy konfliktu oraz zakładanych celów politycznych i militarnych. W drugiej, sformułowano wnioski z przeprowadzonej operacji Iracka Wolność, w kontekście sposobów osiągania tychże celów i ich wpływu na kształtowanie pokoju w regionie Zatoki Perskiej. W ostatniej, zaprezentowano próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie: czy interwencja zbrojna sił koalicyjnych w I raku doprowadziła do rozwiązania kryzysu, czy raczej stała się początkiem obecnych problemów z jakimi zmaga się Europa.
This study examines Russia's policies towards and within the Councilof the Baltic Sea States in the aftermath of the Ukrainian and other internationalcrises. More specifically, this paper analyses Russia's interest in andexpectations from the CBSS, as well as Moscow's institutional behaviour in theCouncil. The CBSS is viewed by Russia as both a centrepiece and cornerstoneof the regional governance system. Moscow also sees the CBSS as an importanttool for overcoming the politico-diplomatic isolation where Russia founditself with the start of the Ukrainian crisis. With the help of the CBSS, it retainsits ability to influence socioeconomic, political, environmental, and humanitariandevelopments in the Baltic Sea region. Russia supported the Council'sthree long-term priority areas: a regional identity, a sustainable and prosperousregion, and a safe and secure region. Russia favoured further the Council'sinstitutionalization and strengthening of its role in the regional governancesystem. Despite the fact that Russia's relations with other CBSS member-statesremain tense and that Moscow does not always manage to use the Councilto promote its interests in the region, the CBSS is still seen by Russia as animportant platform for regional cooperation.
In this paper author examines the perception of Central Asia by contemporary Russian thinkers and scientists: "neo-Slavophiles", "Eurasians" and "Westernizers". Author established the existence of significant differences between three groups of experts in the assessment of Russia's foreign policy in relation to Central Asian states. This conclusion applies equally to the attitude of selected Russian scientists concerning China, as well as to Russia's prospects in the region.
The main goal of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is political and economic stabilization of the region threatened both by its post-Soviet systemic predicaments such as weakness of state institutions, the gap between the ruling oligarchy and citizens and corruption, and by Russia's attempts to maintain or extend its sphere of influence, which involves fomenting separatist tendencies of minorities and promoting anti-EU narratives. Among the six EaP countries, Georgia is most advanced in implementing reforms; however, there is still immense work to be done, despite the EU's economic and technical support. Another aspect of the EU's involvement in the region is the security dilemma whether to accept Russia's influence in the former Soviet republics together with authoritarian models of governing or to make efforts towards democratization of those countries, risking the increase of Russian hostility, an example of which could be seen in 2014 conflict with Ukraine.
The main goal of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is political and economic stabilization of the region threatened both by its post-Soviet systemic predicaments such as weakness of state institutions, the gap between the ruling oligarchy and citizens and corruption, and by Russia's attempts to maintain or extend its sphere of influence, which involves fomenting separatist tendencies of minorities and promoting anti-EU narratives. Among the six EaP countries, Georgia is most advanced in implementing reforms; however, there is still immense work to be done, despite the EU's economic and technical support. Another aspect of the EU's involvement in the region is the security dilemma whether to accept Russia's influence in the former Soviet republics together with authoritarian models of governing or to make efforts towards democratization of those countries, risking the increase of Russian hostility, an example of which could be seen in 2014 conflict with Ukraine.
The presence of oil is a major distinguishing feature of the Middle East on a global scale. The countries of the region (especially the subregion of the Persian Gulf), which have oil at their disposal, influence the politics of superpowers, not only toward this part of the world. In the 20th century, oil became an effective instrument of politics toward countries which are the greatest consumers of oil, but are not self-sufficient in this respect. The first half of the 20th century was marked by competition for its largest resources and making the oil-producing countries dependent on policies of great oil concerns. It was also the time of the leading role of the oil cartel of "seven sisters". The second half of the 20th century brought a fundamental change in the balance of power in global and regional oil politics. It involved: a growing awareness among governments and societies in oil-exporting countries of how significant oil is as a tool of effective international politics, gradual nationalization of Western associations in control of oil exploration, a change in the formula of distribution of profits from oil exploration and import among oil associations and governments of the oil-producing countries in favor of the latter, and the foundation of OPEC as an effective subject comprising major oil-exporting countries. In the perception of the United States, providing the US with free access to oil resources in the Middle East when the bilateral agreement was binding and after its dissolution, became a primary goal of politics in this part of the world of successive American administrations. A factor permanently shaping the United States' politics in the Middle East was ensuring the US secure energy.
Zarówno Stany Zjednoczone, jak i Unia Europejska prowadzą aktywną politykę wobec państw Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej. Od początku lat 90. XX wieku jednym z istotnych elementów działań politycznych tych dwóch ważnych aktorów sceny międzynarodowej są inicjatywy, mające na celu wspieranie procesów demokratyzacyjnych. Unia Europejska i Stany Zjednoczone są autorami szeregu programów polityczno-gospodarczych, których beneficjentami są państwa regionu. W artykule przeanalizowano i porównano najważniejsze programy autorstwa Stanów Zjednoczonych [United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Human Rights and Democracy Fund, Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), The Greater Middle East Initiative oraz Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI)] i Unii Europejskiej [Europejska Inicjatywa na Rzecz Demokracji i Praw Człowieka (od 2007 roku Europejski Instrument na Rzecz Demokracji i Praw Człowieka), Partnerstwo Eurośródziemnomorskie oraz Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa]. ; MENA is a very important region in US and EU foreign policy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, one of the crucial aspects of political involvement has been promoting democracy in the MENA region. This article presents and compares US and EU programs supporting the efforts to expand democracy in MENA countries. The main US initiatives are the following: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Human Rights and Democracy Fund, Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), The Greater Middle East Initiative as well as Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI). The EU's programmes are: European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighbour Policy. Both actors use similar methods but they have different approaches to achieve the goals of these initiatives.
Zarówno Stany Zjednoczone, jak i Unia Europejska prowadzą aktywną politykę wobec państw Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej. Od początku lat 90. XX wieku jednym z istotnych elementów działań politycznych tych dwóch ważnych aktorów sceny międzynarodowej są inicjatywy, mające na celu wspieranie procesów demokratyzacyjnych. Unia Europejska i Stany Zjednoczone są autorami szeregu programów polityczno-gospodarczych, których beneficjentami są państwa regionu. W artykule przeanalizowano i porównano najważniejsze programy autorstwa Stanów Zjednoczonych [United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Human Rights and Democracy Fund, Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), The Greater Middle East Initiative oraz Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI)] i Unii Europejskiej [Europejska Inicjatywa na Rzecz Demokracji i Praw Człowieka (od 2007 roku Europejski Instrument na Rzecz Demokracji i Praw Człowieka), Partnerstwo Eurośródziemnomorskie oraz Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa]. ; MENA is a very important region in US and EU foreign policy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, one of the crucial aspects of political involvement has been promoting democracy in the MENA region. This article presents and compares US and EU programs supporting the efforts to expand democracy in MENA countries. The main US initiatives are the following: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Human Rights and Democracy Fund, Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), The Greater Middle East Initiative as well as Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI). The EU's programmes are: European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, Euro- Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighbour Policy. Both actors use similar methods but they have different approaches to achieve the goals of these initiatives.
After the collapse of the USSR, the Kaliningrad Oblast, which currently constitutes a part of the Russian Federation, has become an exclave neighboring Poland and Lithuania. After these two countries joined the European Union in 2004 the Kaliningrad Oblast has become an 'isle in the EU'. One of the outcomes of this situation involves regular statements issued by politicians from Moscow and Kaliningrad reassuring that on account of its geostrategy the region is a permanent part of Russia. A special name has even been coined to address this matter – the Kaliningrad issue. There are two main geopolitical concepts: the region is Russia's westernmost military outpost; and a pilot region for collaboration with the European Union. Although, different concepts have emerged concerning the increased independence and autonomy of this region, its inclusion in Russia is beyond doubt. ; After the collapse of the USSR, the Kaliningrad Oblast, which currently constitutes a part of the Russian Federation, has become an exclave neighboring Poland and Lithuania. After these two countries joined the EU in 2004, the Kaliningrad Oblast has become an "isle in the EU". One of the outcomers of this situation involves regular statements of politicians from Moscow and Kaliningrad reassuring that on account of its geostrategy Kaliningrad is a permanent part of Russia. A special name has even been cointed to address this matter: the Kaliningrad issue. There are two main geopolitical concepts: the region is Russia's westernmost military outpost, and a pilot region for collaboration with the EU. Although different concepts have emerged concerning the increased independence and authonomy of this region, its inclusion in Russia is beyong doubt.
The paper is an attempt to analyze the marketing activities of selected candidates running for office in the local authorities of the Opolskie Region in 2010. A large proportion of these candidates implemented the Machiavellian principle that the end justifies the means, and they tried to win power, almost trampling over corpses, using all available methods to succeed. Niccolò Machiavelli, the author of The Prince, argued five centuries earlier that the good of state justifies ruses, cruelty and violence. The present face of political Machiavellianism is different, as many people value power itself rather than the good of the state or region. As a result, voters observe a political farce under the official name of an election campaign. The local government campaign in the Opolskie Region in 2010 reminded a political circus with a number of pseudo-events keenly reported by the media, instead of real content that could give potential voters an idea of what the candidates had to offer. Some tried to win voters feeding them with sweets, others cleared snow from pavements in the middle of winter, yet others paid those who promised to vote for them. The latter are probably still suffering from post-election hiccups, as they will have to explain this electoral corruption in court. ; The paper is an attempt to analyze the marketing activities of selected candidates running for office in the local authorities of the Opolskie Region in 2010. A large proportion of these candidates implemented the Machiavellian principle that the end justifies the means, and they tried to win power, almost trampling over corpses, using all available methods to succeed. Niccolò Machiavelli, the author of The Prince, argued five centuries earlier that the good of state justifies ruses, cruelty and violence. The present face of political Machiavellianism is different, as many people value power itself rather than the good of the state or region. As a result, voters observe a political farce under the official name of an election campaign. The local government campaign in the Opolskie Region in 2010 reminded a political circus with a number of pseudo-events keenly reported by the media, instead of real content that could give potential voters an idea of what the candidates had to offer. Some tried to win voters feeding them with sweets, others cleared snow from pavements in the middle of winter, yet others paid those who promised to vote for them. The latter are probably still suffering from post-election hiccups, as they will have to explain this electoral corruption in court.
