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Contrary to stylized accounts of policy making in democracies, it is routine for presidents, governors, and other chief executives to issue directives such as decrees and executive orders to make law on their own. This article evaluates what political scientists have learned about presidential unilateral power. In our view, while a quarter century of scholarship on the topic has yielded a variety of theoretical predictions, the empirical record offers conflicting and perhaps unreliable evidence to substantiate and adjudicate between them. We review the dominant theoretical perspectives, which focus largely on constraints related to the separation of powers and political accountability. We then evaluate the evidence supporting these arguments and conclude with recommendations for conceptual, theoretical, and empirical advancement.

This report looks at major trends shown by Israel's March 2006 elections, despite the lowest voter turnout in the country's history (fueled by disgust at corruption). Most important, the resounding defeat of the Likud and the Right in favor of the ""center"" confirmed a shift in political culture away from the Greater Israel ideology and permanent preemptive war against terrorism (i.e., the Palestinians) and the emergence of a broad consensus on unilateral separation (not peace), seen as the guarantor of security and normalcy. Also discussed are the early hopes raised by Amir Peretz's election as Labor party head (and his subsequent domestication), the return of a certain discourse of social justice after years of uncontested neo-liberalism, and the durability of the ""community"" or ethnic vote. The letter ends with a look at coalition politics in Israel and the formation of the new government.

AbstractUnilateral power is an important source of policy change for contemporary presidents. In contrast with scholarship that examines the institutional constraints on presidents' exercise of unilateral authority, I consider presidents' unilateral behavior in a framework of political accountability. I argue that presidents have incentives to incorporate the public's policy priorities in their unilateral agendas. I examine this account using panel data on executive orders and public opinion across issue areas from 1954 to 2018. Across a variety of model specifications and estimation strategies, I find evidence that patterns of executive action reflect the public's policy priorities. Presidents issue greater numbers of unilateral directives on issues that gain public salience, particularly on issues that are more familiar to the public and when issuing more policy‐significant directives. These findings suggest that accountability mechanisms structure how presidents exercise unilateral power and have normative implications for considering presidential unilateralism in a separation‐of‐powers system.

Graham G. Dodds explores the constitutional and historical development of unilateral presidential directives--the ability of presidents to bypass the legislative process and set public policy via their own executive orders--and how such a practice fits Americans' conception of democracy.

AbstractDoes increasing executive power necessarily decrease accountability? To answer this question, I develop a two-period signaling model comparing voter welfare in two separation-of-powers settings. In one, the executive works with a median legislator to change policy; in the other, the executive chooses between legislation or unilateral action. Both politicians may have preferences that diverge from the voter's, yet I find that increasing executive power may increase accountability and welfare, even in some cases when the legislator is more likely to share the voter's preferences than the executive. Unilateral power allows a congruent executive to overcome gridlock, implement the voter's preferred policy, and reveal information about the politicians' types—which can outweigh the risks of a divergent executive wielding power for partisan ends.

Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateralism less often under divided government. While executives see greater potential policy gains through unilateral action during divided government, we argue that their likelihood of acting unilaterally depends on an opposed legislature's ability to retaliate. When polarization is high and majorities are marginal, executives are freer to act unilaterally given the difficulties legislatures have in statutorily responding. Unilateralism is also more likely when facing opposition if legislatures lack nonstatutory means of punishment, such as regulatory review. In the largest analysis of gubernatorial executive unilateralism to date, we use a new data set of 24,232 executive orders in the 50 American states between 1993 and 2013 to evaluate this argument and find strong support for its predictions. These results provide insights into how legislative policymaking capacity can influence the functioning of separation of powers systems.

Interview with Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz on the unilateral separation plan, the security barrier (the "wall") to protect Israel against terrorist incursions and foster the emergence of a new Palestinian partner. Summaries in English and Spanish p. 492 and 506.

With gridlock, presidents increasingly rely on unilateral actions - means not requiring legislative statutes - which many view as tantamount to power. Using a variety of approaches, Chiou and Rothenberg show that this need not be the case as, under many conditions, the chief executive's employment of such tools is constrained. Rather, presidents contemplating issuing executive orders are often constrained by worries about challenging the legislature and the courts. Most notably, the ability of Congress to employ extra-statutory means, involving efforts by legislators and their parties that don't require passing a law, limit how presidents utilize their discretion. Additionally, political parties can influence presidential choices and actions both by restricting the ideological direction in which presidents can push policy via discretionary authority and by agenda-setting and disciplining members in the legislative process. Nor are all presidential actions equal, as the policy area involved and the importance of an action condition presidential power

Intro -- Contents -- 1 Introduction: Comparing Colonial Conditions -- 2 The Geography of Unilateral Separation: on Israeli Apartheids -- 3 The Troubles of Decolonization: France/ Algeria, Israel/ Palestine -- 4 Founding Violence and Settler Societies: Rewriting History in Israel and Australia -- 5 Conclusion: Imperial Engage-ments and the Negotiation of Israel and Palestine -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Argues that only an international solution can resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; discusses political strategies of Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon, the unilateral separation plan of the Labor Party, and the "iron curtain" proposal of the Likud Party to ensure security of the Jewish state. Summaries in English and Spanish p. 388 and 400.