The end of the Cold War gave rise to American unipolarity in the international system. With the rise of new powers such as the Erics, the present distribution of power is gradually being challenged in favor of multipolarity in the international system, while at the same time the US strategy is changing. Bearing in mind the US foreign policy in the Ukrainian crisis, this article argues that the current crisis in Ukraine could represent a milestone in the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity based on revisionist actions by the Russian Federation. Adapted from the source document.
This article will try to address three inter-connected issues. Is the US a unipolar power? The answer in an unambiguous yes: the United States is the sole international pole in the post- Cold War era & unipolarity will last for the next few decades. But will that situation guarantee a more peaceful world? We can't be so sure about it. Contrary to received wisdom, there is no reason to suppose that American unipolarity will be peaceful. Whatever the strategy chosen by the United States -- global primacy, defense of the status quo or disengagement -- conflict will be the rule in an unbalanced international system. Adapted from the source document.
The Bush Era was marked by two analytical mistakes. In 2003, America was seen as the "Empire." In 2008, conventional wisdom established that we live in a multipolar world. These two mistakes share a common cause: a misunderstanding of the concepts of "unipolarity" & "constitutional order." We aim to demonstrate the following points: (1) the interstate system remains unipolar; (2) a key change has happened not at the level of structural unipolarity, but at the level of the constitutional order (namely in the American system of alliances). We can assert that the unipolar moment has not ended. What has come to an end is the eurocentric moment at the constitutional order. Adapted from the source document.
Kenneth Waltz resisted describing the post-Cold War world as unipolar. This reluctance results from two characteristics of his structural realism: its naturalistic view of systemic balances of power and its focus on relations among great powers. Yet, Waltz's thinking on the nuclear revolution allows us to correct these limitations of his structural theory and highlight two central aspects of American unipolarity: its potential durability in a nuclear world and its potential for preventive counter-proliferation wars. In sum, Waltz's structural realism, when combined with his thinking about a nuclear world, produces a powerful analytic apparatus to further our understanding of our post-Cold War unipolar world. Adapted from the source document.
The strategic debate behind the us presidential elections is ruled by two distinct schools of thought about what should be the Grand Strategy of the United States for today. The first one, academically represented by Christopher Layne and championed by Barack Obama, believes that a transition is in course, in the international system, from unipolarity to multipolarity, as a result of the United States' relative downfall and the "rise of the rest", and that the country should adopt a Grand Strategy of Offshore Balancing. The second one, headed by authors such as Robert Kagan and seconded by Mitt Romney, rejects the assumption of a shift in power and advocates the furtherance of the Grand Strategy of Global Dominance or Global Hegemony. Adapted from the source document.
Bilateralt diplomati er ikke en skandinavisk spidskompetence, men det har fået stigende betydning i dagens verden. Et antal cases analyseres her, i hvilke de skandinaviske lande er blevet bilateralt 'disciplineret' af stormagter som Rusland, Kina, Indien eller USA. Sammenlignet med de første ca. 15 år efter Den Kolde Krig med amerikansk hegemoni og EU's normative magt har de nordiske lande måttet erfare en indsnævring af deres handlefrihed. Det er ikke længere muligt, uden betydelige omkostninger, at kritisere stormagter baseret på universelle værdier. Generelt er det selvsagt vigtigt for beslutningstagere at respektere statens eksterne handlefrihed. Men på den anden side må de ikke være overforsigtige og undlade at prøve grænser af, bl.a. af hensyn til den hjemlige arena. 'Bastioner' må etableres og forsvares med troværdighed. Handlefrihedens grænser er svære at identificere, men prøveballoner, paralleladfærd med beslægtede lande eller måske brug af 'historiens lære' kan være gangbare metoder.
Abstract in English:Limits to Action Space: Scandinavians in Bbilateral DiplomacyBilateral diplomacy is not a Scandinavian favourite sport, but it has become increasingly important in today's world. A number of cases are analysed, in which Scandinavian countries have been "disciplined" bilaterally by great powers (Russia, China, India and the US). Compared to the first 15 years, roughly, after the Cold War, with American unipolarity and EU normative power, the Scandinavians have seen a narrowing of their freedom of manoeuvre (action space). It is no longer possible, without significant costs, to criticise great powers based on universal values. In general, it is crucial for decision-makers not to overstep their state's freedom of manoeuvre. But on the other hand, they should not be docile and desist from occasionally challenging its limits, also considering their domestic arena. "Bastions" should be credibly construed and defended. The limits of action space are difficult to discern, but trial balloons, parallel action with related countries, or "lessons of the past" could be helpful.
