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There is a growing need for regional governance in Western European countries. Unitary states and nations like the Netherlands, France and England do not (yet) have fully fledged, general purpose intermediate governments that can fulfil this need. This article reviews the institutional arrangements for regional governance in the countries mentioned. The existing arrangements turn out to have a great deal in common and show comparable flaws. Drawing on experience from France and the Netherlands, and against the background of the debate on elected Regional Assemblies in England, the article reflects on the need for an autonomous regional government and the requirements it has to meet. © 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd.

The article of record may be found at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-18/iran-unitary-state ; The drone strikes on two major Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia in September left many observers puzzled. Though officials in Washington and Riyadh blamed Iran for the attacks, aggression of this kind seemed at odds with the more conciliatory positions of the government of Hassan Rouhani, Iran's president. Was it really in Iran's interest to so drastically escalate a simmering conflict with the United States and its regional partners? The Houthis, Iran's allies in Yemen's bloody civil war, immediately claimed [1] responsibility for hitting the oil fields, but the sophistication of the attack pointed to a state actor and, eventually, to Iran as the culprit. Though Iranian officials denied any involvement, some commentators suggested that elements of Iran's security apparatus participated in the attacks, even if the strikes weren't orchestrated at the level of the state.

Explores why French territorial institutions were able to bring about peaceful integration in Brittany but Corsica became the scene of a violent confrontation. The nature of center-periphery relations in postrevolutionary France is described, along with differences in the degree of governmental attention given to the regions of Brittany & Corsica. It is contended that differences in regional society & politics account for why the state's limited economic intervention was successful in Brittany but the greater economic investment in Corsica aggravated social tensions. United local elites in Brittany worked through unitary institutions to achieve economic development but local elites in Corsica were not only divided but included those who based their power on patron-clientism which increased the costs of accommodation & provided incentives for nationalist counter-elites to use violence to challenge both corruption in Corsica & the legitimacy of French rule. It is concluded that the institutions of territorial control available to the French state are not equipped to deal with a hostile & internally divided society. 29 References. J. Lindroth

Employing a political-economics approach, this paper compares small states and unions when the former fail to internalize cross-border externalities of publicly provided goods. It discusses two types of unions: federations with more than one level of government and unitary states. While unitary states are unable to differentiate public spending ac-cording to differing preferences, rents of governments in a federation are higher due to a common-pool problem. The comparison leads to the following results. (1) Citizens prefer small states to large states if spillover effects are weak. (2) They benefit from a multi-level government only if their preferences heavily differ from the median-voter's preferences and if spillovers are strong. Based on this comparison the paper also dis-cusses the creation of unions. Making specific assumption on the distribution of prefer-ences, it analyzes strong Nash equilibria and coalition-proof equilibria at the union formation stage.

Employing a political-economics approach, this paper compares small states & unions when the former fail to internalize cross-border externalities of publicly provided goods. It discusses two types of unions: federations with more than one level of government & unitary states. While unitary states are unable to differentiate public spending according to differing preferences, rents of governments in a federation are higher due to a common-pool problem. The comparison leads to the following results. (1) Citizens prefer small states to large states if spillover effects are weak. (2) They benefit from a multi-level government only if their preferences heavily differ from the median-voter's preferences & if spillovers are strong. Based on this comparison the paper also discusses the creation of unions. Making specific assumption on the distribution of preferences, it analyzes strong Nash equilibria at the union-formation stage. 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 12 References. Adapted from the source document.

Employing a political-economics approach, this paper compares small states and unions when the former fail to internalize cross-border externalities of publicly provided goods. It discusses two types of unions: federations with more than one level of government and unitary states. While unitary states are unable to differentiate public spending ac-cording to differing preferences, rents of governments in a federation are higher due to a common-pool problem. The comparison leads to the following results. (1) Citizens prefer small states to large states if spillover effects are weak. (2) They benefit from a multi-level government only if their preferences heavily differ from the median-voter's preferences and if spillovers are strong. Based on this comparison the paper also dis-cusses the creation of unions. Making specific assumption on the distribution of prefer-ences, it analyzes strong Nash equilibria and coalition-proof equilibria at the union formation stage.