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On 11 August 1779 the magistrates of Lille published a minutely detailed ordinance designed to reform funeral and burial practices in that northern French city. Since the Middle Ages it had been the practice in Lille, as in other French cities, to bury the deceased within the parish grounds. Depending upon the status of the deceased, burial would take place under the choir of the church (solennels); under a lateral wing (demi-solennels); or in one of the two exterior cemeteries adjoining the church—the first of which was for ordinary parishioners (bourgeois), the second for unbaptized children. Briefly, the Ordinance of 1779 established a common cemetery outside of the city walls and forbade further burials in the five parish cemeteries of Lille. The four traditional distinctions by rank were maintained in the new cemetery and a system of funeral hearses drawn by horses was introduced by the magistrates to transport the deceased to the new cemetery. The ordinance was the product of several years of negotiation among the magistrates of Lille, the Bishop of Tournai, and royal authorities at Versailles. This reform was partially the result of a new campaign for urban hygiene or l'air pur and an attempt by the magistrates to appropriate valuable urban property since the ordinance stipulated that parishes would sell their cemetery land to the magistrates.

AbstractThe French 2005 riots in the urban outskirts were the most numerous, widespread and violent France has experienced since the beginning of the 1980s. In The Politics of Collective Violence, Charles Tilly refused the term 'riot as a scientific idiom' because it embodies a political judgment rather than an analytical distinction. Authorities and observers label as riots the damage‐going gatherings of which they disapprove, but they use terms like demonstrations, protest, resistance or retaliation for essentially similar events of which they approve (2003, 18).Our aim here is to discuss this assertion. How far is violence an act of protest? How far can the authors of collective violence acting in the French deprived urban areas in November 2005 be described as 'rioters' or rebels? The following contribution mainly focuses on empirical data (quantitative and qualitative) in order to fulfil this aim. We will leave the root causes and contextual aspects by one side (economic deprivation, urban segregation, conflicts with police forces, etc.) and concentrate on immediate data produced in the wake of the riots, in the little research produced afterwards.

This book examines how movements from below pose challenges to the status quo. The 2010s have seen an explosion of protest movements, sometimes characterised as riots by governments and the media. But these are not new phenomena, rather reflecting thousands of years of conflict between different social classes. Beginning with struggles for democracy and control of the state in Athens and ancient Rome, this book traces the common threads of resistance through the Middle Ages in Europe and into the modern age. As classes change so does the composition of the protestors and the goals of their movements; the one common factor being how groups can mobilise to resist unbearable oppression, thereby developing a crowd consciousness that widens their political horizons and demonstrates the possibility of overthrowing the existing order. To appreciate the roots and motivations of these so-called deviants the author argues that we need to listen to the sound of the crowd. This book will be of interest to researchers of social movements, protests and riots across sociology, history and international relations.

This article analyzes the social and political conditions associated with the incidence of racial violence in a sample of 119 American cities. Data on the incidence of racial disorders are drawn from newspaper accounts compiled by the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence during the period 1967–1969. A total of 334 disorders are analyzed.Two alternative hypotheses are examined. The first assumes that the causes of the black urban riots are rooted largely in the disorganized environment of socially marginal individuals. The second attempts to locate the outbreak of rioting primarily within a closed and unresponsive political system. Paradoxically, the results tend to provide empirical support for both theoretical perspectives. At the same time, the data suggest the need to reformulate and revise conventional interpretations of the black urban riots. This is done by synthesizing and testing a developmental model which implies a curvilinear relationship between the incidence of racial violence on the one hand, and black political development on the other.

Hyderabad, a city in southern India, has witnessed a saga of religious conflict between Hindus and Muslims, the first large-scale riot being recorded in 1939. As recently as March 2010, paramilitary forces were deployed to rein in extensive clashes over the appropriate placing of religious flags across the city. Along with this convoluted history of religious discord, the rapidly growing slum areas of Hyderabad became receptacles not just of poverty but of radical politics and unrest. This essay interrogates the violent identity politics embraced by riot-affected Muslim male children in a communally volatile slum in Hyderabad, and explores why these boys turned to armed and collective vigilantism to position themselves in a landscape of death, destruction and urban displacement. © The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav.

Postpolitik, Migration, Riots oder Polizei – dies sind einige der Schwerpunkte, die sub\urban für die Diskussion einer kritischen Stadtforschung in den Blick genommen hat. All diesen Themen ist gemein, dass sie in der einen oder anderen Weise auf das Krisenhafte unserer urbanisierten kapitalistischen Gesellschaft verweisen – sei es die Krise der politischen Repräsentation, seien es die Krisen von Nationalstaat und Grenzregimes oder die gesellschaftlicher Inklusion und 'fordistischer' Vergesellschaftung. Der Schwerpunkt unserer aktuellen Ausgabe liegt nun auf 'Stadt der Reproduktion', wo der globale Krisenkapitalismus in seinen nordatlantischen Ausprägungen besonders deutlich wird, wie die Diskussion um die 'Krise der Reproduktion' zeigt.

Contributor(s): Professor Tim Newburn, Paul Lewis, Professor John Drury | Welcome to LSE IQ, a monthly podcast from the London School of Economics and Political Science, where we ask leading social scientists – and other experts – to answer an intelligent question about economics, politics or society. In August 2011 England experienced the largest outbreak of rioting in a generation. The disorder began after the shooting of young man, Mark Duggan, by police officers in Tottenham. A protest two days later morphed into more widespread disorder. Over the next three days riots spread rapidly across London, and then other urban centres in England. In total, there were an estimated 5 deaths, 200 injuries, 3000 arrests and over 200 million pounds of property damage. Severe jail terms were imposed to deter future lawlessness. Politicians called the disorder acts of greed and opportunism, while others blamed austerity and inequality. Many years on, is it possible to state what actually happened? Since 2011 we've faced major public spending cuts, two elections, the Brexit referendum, the election of Trump and the rise of populism. Are any of these events connected? In this episode of LSE IQ James Rattee asks, what can we learn from the 2011 riots? This episode features the following contributors: Professor Tim Newburn, LSE Department of Social Policy; Paul Lewis, The Guardian; and Professor John Drury, University of Sussex School of Psychology. For further information about the podcast and all the related links visit http://lse.ac.uk/iq and please tell us what you think using the hashtag #LSEIQ.

From July to September 1978, the Marathwada region experienced intense levels of violence following the decision to rename Marathwada University into Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar University. In a crushing display of upper-caste power, thousands of dalits were killed, raped and made to flee their homes. Deep feelings of uncertainty and fear lingered on for several months after. The question of why a matter so ostensibly trivial as renaming a university incited so much violence is a perplexing one. It cannot be answered by merely reducing the violence to "an imposition of high caste authority." The rise of dalit self-assertion movements – inspired by Ambedkar – had resulted in dalits demanding their rights, liberating themselves from their age-old oppression by making use of affirmative action schemes, and moving from rural to urban sectors in search of new jobs. The complex structural undercurrents of this issue lay in the severe underdevelopment of Marathwada, the concentration of wealth and ownership in the hands of the rural political elite, strained agrarian relations, opportunistic identity politics, and the overwhelming poverty faced by large sections of the population – all of which are as ubiquitous today as they were forty years ago.

This paper examines the prevalence and relevance of looting for understanding the 2011 English riots. It begins by distinguishing these riots from previous British riots by arguing that although looting is by no means a new phenomena looting nevertheless became central to discussions, interpretations and recollections of the riots. The paper will explore public and media responses to the looting and will focus on the uses of looting as a means of identifying a feral underclass of people seen to be morally and culturally separate from mainstream society. By unpicking the relationships between looting and what currently stands for 'consumer culture', the paper will argue that looting is seen as the lowest common denominator of mob behaviour since its focus is deemed to be entirely apolitical. The paper will look towards current understandings of consumer culture to try to make sense of the looting. It will argue that whilst there is now a good deal of literature exploring the relationships between judgments of taste and the reproduction of existing class structures and barriers, there is virtually nothing examining the relationships between consumption and social exclusion. I will argue in this paper that exclusion is crucial in providing a comprehensive understanding of the looting. In particular, I suggest that Bourdieusian accounts of the effects of popular expressions of disgust at the looters can offer only a partial understanding of the looting, since they do not explain the strength of desire for consumer goods. In order to address this, the paper expands on cultural capital discourses by incorporating the concept of 'emotional capital' into the analysis. The paper concludes by arguing that we should not be surprised by the widespread looting that took place in August 2011 given that advanced consumer society is characterised by common feelings and emotions and that many of the looters were not part of the original riots but opportunists who took advantage of the lack of police presence.

Abstract  Through comparative sociological analysis, this paper discusses the patron‐client relation in urban locality groups. The civil defense groups as urban locality groups which emerged during the chaotic situation after the Kanto earthquake in September 1923, and during Jakarta riots in May 1998, are the subjects of comparison. Even though the social background and historical context of the societies in question are different, both incidents share some similarities, in the rumors which accelerated the formation of civil defense group in almost every neighborhood. Further analysis on the formation, membership, and activities of the group reveals that the patron‐client relation is not a mere power (vertical) relation, but also a life‐cooperation relation.

Objectives: This article analyzes competing explanations for variation in the relative size of contemporary police forces in larger U.S. cities. The featured explanation is conflict theory, which previously provided much evidence for a racial threat thesis but limited evidence that racial insurgency affected police mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s. Methods: The study sample consists of the 66 cities with a population of at least 250,000 in 2000. Aggregate data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Congressional Quarterly's America Votes, and the U.S. Census Bureau are combined with a content analysis using the Lexis-Nexis regional news database to generate the data set. OLS regression modeling is applied to the analysis of this cross-sectional data set. Results: This analysis shows that the size of contemporary police forces is substantially shaped not only by the legacy of the 1960-1970 wave of racial unrest in the United States, but also by reaction to racial disorders in the 1980s and 1990s and by the prevalence of racial minorities in the current population. Conclusions: Police departments' relative force size in 2000 is not only a result of incremental growth from the size attained by 1980, but also is dramatically shaped by whether the city experienced a race riot from 1980-2000 and, to a lesser extent, the size of the minority population and the violent crime rate. City wealth is a less robust indicator; and there is no evidence that either community ideology or the degree of uptake of community policing matters. Tables, 1, References. Adapted from the source document.