Suchergebnisse

I. Preference Orderings and Utility Theory -- 1. Relational Systems -- 2. Preference Relations -- 3. Some Remarks on Utility Theory -- 4. Linear Inequalities -- II. Ordinal Utility -- 1. Some Classical Representation Theorems -- 2. Lexicographic Utility -- 3. Utility Theories with Respect to n?-Sets -- 4. Ultraproducts and Ultrapowers -- 5. Approximating an r*-Valued Utility Function by a Real Valued Function -- 6. Non-Standard Utility Functions Always Exist -- 7. Utility Functions for Partial Orderings -- III. On Numerical Relational Systems -- 1. First-Order Languages -- 2. Some Preliminary Considerations -- 3. Universal and Homogeneous Relational Systems -- 4. Saturated Relational Systems -- IV. Utility Theories for More Structured Empirical Data -- 1. Some Remarks -- 2. The Empirical Status of Axioms -- 3. Utility Theories which are Axiomatizable in an Ordinary First Order Language -- 4. Extensive Utility -- 5. Conjoint Measurement of Utilities -- 6. On Certain Mean Systems -- V. On Utility Spaces, The Theory of Games and the Realization of Comparative Probability Relations -- 1. A Generalization of the Von Neumann/Morgenstern Utility Theory -- 2. Non-Standard Utilities in Game Theory -- 3. Some Aspects of the Realization of Comparative Probability Relations -- Appendix I. Ordinal and Cardinal Numbers -- Appendix II. Some Basic Facts about Filters and Ultrafilters -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

In his book The War Trap Bruce Bueno de Mesquita claims to offer a deductive theory of international conflict based on the assumption that foreign policy makers attempt to maximize their expected utility. The theory is subjected to a systematic empirical test that seems to provide impressive confirmation. The first part of this article examines Bueno de Mesquita's theory and argues that it cannot be derived from his assumptions. The second part examines the operational version of the theory, which was the one actually tested, and argues that it can be more plausibly interpreted as a version of a different theory—one that Bueno de Mesquita claims to have discredited. The essay concludes by discussing the significance of this book with regard to the question of whether theories of individual rational choice can explain foreign policy decisions.

An expected utility theory of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the initiation and escalation of serious international conflicts, including war, is proposed. The theory leads to the seemingly obvious generalization that actors do not initiate wars—or serious disputes—if they do not expect to gain from doing so. Underlying that generalization are a number of counterintuitive deductions. For instance, I show that though a weak nonaligned state cannot rationally attack a stronger nonaligned nation, it might be able to attack a stronger adversary that, in addition to its own strength, expects to derive support from allies. I also show that serious conflict is more likely between very close allies than between enemies. Systematic tests, using data on serious international threats, military interventions, and interstate wars, as well as 17 cases of known attempts at deterrence, show very substantial support for the expected utility propositions deduced from the theory.

A continuous-outcome expected utility model is presented that generalizes the expected utility theory of Bueno de Mesquita. An examination of the more general model uncovers several unstated assumptions within and produces new conclusions from, while supporting the basic logic of, the expected utility theory. Among the new conclusions is the finding that nations shifting their level of acceptable outcomes to a conflict upward or downward after fighting starts is perfectly consistent with a rational model. The derivations demonstrate the value of theoretical articulation, a task too often neglected in quantitative international relations, and provide a sound logical basis for the construction of systemic theories based upon the expected utility theory.